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Multilevel secure database management system (MLS/DBMS) products no
longer enjoy direct commercial-oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) support. Meanwhile,
existing users of these MLS/DBMS products continue to rely on them to
satisfy their multilevel security requirements. This calls for a new approach
to developing MLS/DBMS systems, one that relies on adapting the features
of existing COTS database products rather than depending on the traditional
custom design products to provide continuing MLS support.
We advocate fragmentation as a good basis for implementing multilevel
security in the new approach because it is well supported in some current
COTS database management systems. We implemented a prototype that
utilises the inherent advantages of the distribution scheme in distributed
databases for controlling access to single-level fragments; this is achieved by
augmenting the distribution module of the host distributed DBMS with MLS
code such that the clearance of the user making a request is always compared
to the classiﬁcation of the node containing the fragments referenced; requests
to unauthorised nodes are simply dropped.
The prototype we implemented was used to instrument a series of ex-
periments to determine the relative performance of the tuple, attribute, and
element level fragmentation schemes. Our experiments measured the impact
on the front-end and the network when various properties of each scheme,
such as the number of tuples, attributes, security levels, and the page size,
were varied for a Selection and Join query. We were particularly interested in
the relationship between performance degradation and changes in the quan-
tity of these properties. The performance of each scheme was measured in
terms of its response time.
The response times for the element level fragmentation scheme increased
as the numbers of tuples, attributes, security levels, and the page size were in-
creased, more signiﬁcantly so than when the number of tuples and attributes
were increased. The response times for the attribute level fragmentation
scheme was the fastest, suggesting that the performance of the attribute level
scheme is superior to the tuple and element level fragmentation schemes. In
the context of assurance, this research has also shown that the distribution of
fragments based on security level is a more natural approach to implementing
security in MLS/DBMS systems, because a multilevel database is analogous
to a distributed database based on security level.
Overall, our study ﬁnds that the attribute level fragmentation scheme
demonstrates better performance than the tuple and element level schemes.
The response times (and hence the performance) of the element level frag-
mentation scheme exhibited the worst performance degradation compared to
1the tuple and attribute level schemes.
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viiAbstract
Multilevel secure database management system (MLS/DBMS) products no longer en-
joy direct commercial-oÞ-the-shelf (COTS) support. Meanwhile, existing users of these
MLS/DBMS products continue to rely on them to satisfy their multilevel security require-
ments. This calls for a new approach to developing MLS/DBMS systems, one that relies
on adapting the features of existing COTS database products rather than depending on
the traditional custom design products to provide continuing MLS support.
We advocate fragmentation as a good basis for implementing multilevel security in
the new approach because it is well supported in some current COTS database manage-
ment systems. We implemented a prototype that utilises the inherent advantages of the
distribution scheme in distributed databases for controlling access to single-level fragments;
this is achieved by augmenting the distribution module of the host distributed DBMS with
MLS code such that the clearance of the user making a request is always compared to
the classißcation of the node containing the fragments referenced; requests to unauthorised
nodes are simply dropped.
The prototype we implemented was used to instrument a series of experiments to
determine the relative performance of the tuple, attribute, and element level fragmentation
schemes. Our experiments measured the impact on the front-end and the network when
various properties of each scheme, such as the number of tuples, attributes, security levels,
and the page size, were varied for a Selection and Join query. We were particularly inter-
ested in the relationship between performance degradation and changes in the quantity of
these properties. The performance of each scheme was measured in terms of its response
time.
The response times for the element level fragmentation scheme increased as the
numbers of tuples, attributes, security levels, and the page size were increased, more sig-
nißcantly so than when the number of tuples and attributes were increased. The response
times for the attribute level fragmentation scheme was the fastest, suggesting that the
performance of the attribute level scheme is superior to the tuple and element level frag-
mentation schemes. In the context of assurance, this research has also shown that the
distribution of fragments based on security level is a more natural approach to imple-
menting security in MLS/DBMS systems, because a multilevel database is analogous to a
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distributed database based on security level.
Overall, our study ßnds that the attribute level fragmentation scheme demonstrates
better performance than the tuple and element level schemes. The response times (and
hence the performance) of the element level fragmentation scheme exhibited the worst
performance degradation compared to the tuple and attribute level schemes.Chapter 1
Introduction
Organisations have long known the importance of restricting access to sensitive information
to prevent competitors from learning about plans, new products, or changes in strategies.
Conßdentiality, integrity, and availability are considered as some of the most important
aspects of information assets that must be protected [38]. For most organisations, the
database is the primary repository of information; it therefore follows that this asset is the
target of many security eÞorts aimed at protecting it from being compromised. A number
of models have been proposed in the past for protecting database management systems; a
few product developments and deployments have followed. However, for products based on
the multilevel approach, direct support is no longer provided by vendors, even though users
have sought it [53]. This thesis addresses this need by proposing and demonstrating the
feasibility of an alternative approach to implementing multilevel security, one that exploits
the distribution and query processing features of a distributed COTS DBMS.
The next section provides background information about database management
systems (DBMSs) and the evolution of computer security models. Section 1.2 elaborates on
the problems that motivated this research. Our research aims are described in Section 1.3.
The contributions of this research are reviewed in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 provides a guide
to the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Background
Database management systems ßrst appeared in the 1960s and have been subject to rapid
changes in concepts and technology for over thirty years. A DBMS is a computer system
which is responsible for the storage and maintenance of databases [59]. A DBMS is es-
sentially a software system but, in order to make the management of data more eácient,
it may contain specialised hardware such as special disk drives that support faster access
to the data, and multiprocessors that support parallelism [59]. In addition, DBMSs pro-
vide for the safety of information through backup, concurrency, and recovery mechanisms.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
These fundamental database concepts are now well deßned and understood [35, 59]. Three
major DBMS models have been proposed: the Hierarchical Data Model, the Network Data
Model, and the Relational Data Model [35, 59]. The relational model is a database that
is perceived by its users as a collection of tables (and tables only) [38]. It has become the
predominant model, and it is the model that will be used in this thesis. We will return
to the subject of DBMSs with a more detailed description later in Chapter 2. Another
important concept which is central to our discourse, and that evolved in parallel with the
relational data model, is computer security.
A number of deßnitions have been proposed for computer security, but most of
the deßnitions embody the conßdentiality, integrity, and availability aspects of protecting
information. However, for the purposes of this thesis, computer security is deßned as the
prevention and detection of unauthorised actions by users of a computer system [38]. Most
of the early work in computer security focused on military security. The U.S. Department of
Defense funded the initial eÞorts because of its need to control the disclosure of information
which could damage U.S. national security interests [30, 31]. A multilevel security hierarchy
with four levels of increasing sensitivity was developed. The levels from lowest to highest
are: Unclassißed (U), Conßdential (C), Secret (S), and Top Secret (TS), ignoring for now
additional categories within levels such as (Secret [Nuclear]) versus (Secret [Conventional])
[26, 72]. The four level system and its categories was designed to capture only a very
specißc ÕmilitaryÔ security policy. Later, we will consider systems that use diÞerent sets of
security levels. Data in a multilevel secure computer system is required to be labelled with
its security classißcation. Users of the data are required to have the appropriate clearance
level to access the data in the system. Secure computer systems compare the clearance of
the user to the classißcation of the data and mediate the access of the users to the data
in accordance with specißed security rules. For example, a basic security rule incorporated
in the Bell-LaPadula disclosure model (BLP) [7, 8] is that no user can read any data with
a greater classißcation than the user's clearance (e.g., a Secret user cannot have access to
Top Secret data). Since both clearances of users and classißcations of data are constructed
in the same manner, they will both be referred to using the term level.
The BLP model [7, 8] was the ßrst mathematical specißcation of a multilevel security
policy; it was central to the development of basic computer security standards and laid the
groundwork for a number of later security models, and their application in U.S. government
security standards. The model is described in terms of objects (a ßle, data, memory, I/O
devices, etc.), subjects (users or a process acting on behalf of a user) and their corresponding
security levels. The goal of preventing unauthorised disclosure can be satisßed if a user, or
a subject acting on behalf of a user, is restricted to those objects whose level is dominated
by the user. The BLP is the basis of the multilevel security policy in DBMSs with which
we are concerned here.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
Major research eÞorts were undertaken in the early 1980's to incorporate multilevel
security principles into relational database management systems [30]. The latter eÞort,
known as multilevel secure database management systems, generated much progress in
the years that followed. A multilevel secure DBMS (MLS/DBMS) extends the classical
relational data model to include security classißcation attributes and further integrity con-
straints. We will postpone a detailed treatment of these concepts until later in Chapter 2.
Database systems based on the classical relational data model are used in a wide variety of
application areas, including banking systems, reservation systems, and military intelligence
systems.
As a result of the diversity of application domains for database systems, a number of
diÞerent security models and techniques have been proposed to counter the various threats
against security. A security model is implemented on the basis of a specißc access control
policy; this could be a discretionary access control (DAC) or a mandatory access control
(MAC) policy. With a DAC policy, users at their discretion can specify to the system
who can access their ßles. In the case of secure database systems for use in applications
that call for multilevel security (such as those of the U.S. Department of Defense where
data security is of primary importance), discretionary access controls are not adequate,
and more stringent restrictions on the sharing of information are required. A MAC policy
provides the required restrictions. In contrast to a DAC policy, a MAC policy is a Õsystem
enforcedÔ policy that restricts access to objects based on the classißcation of the object
and the clearance of the user to access information at that sensitivity level; this type of
policy forms the basis of the work described in this thesis. Discretionary and mandatory
access controls are described in more detail in Chapter 2.
Most systems supporting DAC store access rules in an access control matrix. In its
simplest form the rows of the matrix represent subjects, the columns represent the objects,
and the intersection of a row and a column contains the access type or types for which a
subject is authorised with respect to the object. The access matrix model as a basis for
discretionary access controls was formulated by Lampson [57] and subsequently reßned by
Denning [25]. Other models that support DAC include the Take-Grant model [49] and the
Action-Entity model [14]. A formal description of DAC will be presented in Chapter 2.
MAC policies address a higher level of threat than discretionary policies because,
in addition to controlling access to data, they can also be used to control the àow of data.
MAC requirements are often stated using the BLP model, and are formalised using two
rules. The ßrst, the simple property, protects the database information from unauthorised
disclosure, and the second, the *-property, prevents the unauthorised downgrading of data
by restricting information àow from high security levels to low security levels. Some of the
models that support MAC include the SeaView model [28], the Jajodia-Sandhu model [48],
the Smith-Winslett model [75], and the Multilevel Relational model [20]. These models willCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
be described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Providing a database system with multilevel security, or bringing a model to life as
a prototype or a commercial product, is fraught with diáculties. A number of approaches
have been proposed; one such approach advocates designing the security mechanisms into
the database system itself and then trusting the database to enforce the security policy [2].
In practice this results in a low assurance system; that is, the separation between security
policy and enforcement is weak [2]. This kind of database system is useful, but cannot
interconnect the diverse population of users expected for the new information infrastructure.
The reason for the low assurance is the complexity and size of modern database systems.
Less straightforward but more eÞective approaches use a reference monitor to enforce the
security policy. The reference monitor is evaluated for high assurance and the database
system is designed to function under the security constraints enforced by the reference
monitor.
In a search for a more eÞective solution, the Multilevel Data Management Security
Summer Study [1] recommended three approaches to solving the multilevel database se-
curity problem. The three approaches are: integrity lock, kernelized, and replicated. The
integrity lock approach, also known as the spray paint architecture, uses a trusted front-
end, a single untrusted back-end database system, and encryption techniques to protect
data. In the kernelized approach, the multilevel database is partitioned into single-level
databases, which are then stored separately under the control of a trusted security kernel
that enforces a MAC policy. In addition, there is a separate DBMS for each security level.
In the replicated approach, a separate DBMS is used to manage data classißed at or below
each security level. Unlike the kernelized approach, each database in the replicated ap-
proach maintains data at its level and below. We will discuss all three approaches in more
detail in Chapter 3.
Building on the above models, a number of development eÞorts to build MLS proto-
types and high assurance commercial MLS/DBMS products were initiated. The SeaView
model was developed as a prototype MLS/DBMS that uses viewlike mechanisms for access
control; the Lock Data Views (LDV) prototype, the A1 Secure DBMS (ASD) prototype,
the SWORD prototype, and the Purple Penelope demonstration system followed after-
wards. A number of commercial products were also deployed as a result of the pioneering
eÞorts of database vendors such as Oracle, Ingres, Sybase, and Informix, but these systems
are no longer being supported.
In order to be certißed at a particular level of security, the prototypes and prod-
ucts must be evaluated (and tested) in an adversarial manner. The originally used criteria
for evaluating secure computer systems are contained in the U.S. Department of Defense
ÕTrusted Computer System Evaluation CriteriaÔ (TCSEC), also known as the Orange Book
[7, 8, 64], although this has since been replaced by the Common Criteria [67]. For highCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
assurance systems that must provide a strong separation between security policy and en-
forcement, the protection mechanisms must be simple and easy to evaluate. Protection
critical components must contain only protection mechanisms and must mediate every ac-
cess by each user. In general, these systems are more carefully engineered and crafted
than most computer systems. Protection critical components must be scrutinized in an
adversarial way in order to ensure that malicious code is not present in the system. The
Orange Book proposed three protection critical concepts, the Reference monitor, the Se-
curity kernel, and the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) as the central notions of a trusted
system [38, 64]. The reference monitor is an access control concept that refers to an ab-
stract machine that mediates all accesses to objects by subjects [64]. The security kernel
is the hardware, ßrmware, and software elements of a trusted computing base that im-
plements the reference monitor concept. It must mediate all accesses, be protected from
modißcation, and be verißable as correct [64]. The TCB refers to the totality of protection
mechanisms within a computer system Û including hardware, ßrmware, and software Û the
combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy [64].
1.2 Problem statement
The MLS/DBMS products that were developed and distributed in the eighties and nineties
by vendors such as Ingres, Oracle, Sybase, and Informix are no longer being supported.
The decline in vendor support has been attributed mainly to a scaling back of research
and development grants by the U.S. Department of Defense, the catalyst behind many
development eÞorts. As a consequence of the withdrawal of government funding, many of
the vendors were unwilling to continue supporting these products, already considered to be
too complex and unproßtable.
The number of existing users of COTS MLS/DBMS products, however, remains
signißcant; these users have invariably found themselves in a precarious situation with lim-
ited or no vendor support. Some of these users sought alternatives to MLS-based systems;
others continued to operate on MLS policies. There are no new products currently on the
market to ßll the void left by this absence of support. These existing users will need COTS
MLS/DBMS support for as long as they continue to operate using MLS policies. This calls
for new COTS MLS/DBMS initiatives that meet that need.
A multilevel database consisting of relations (tables), which are fragmented based
on security level, is logically the same as a distributed database. However, none of the
existing MLS/DBMSs use the inherent advantages of distributed DBMSs to access or to
provide security to single-level fragments. These distributed DBMS techniques support the
fragmentation of relations and the distribution of their fragments at the tuple, attribute,
and element levels of granularity. Although we suggest fragmentation as a good basis forCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
implementing MLS security, the relative performance of the tuple, attribute, and element-
level fragmentation schemes needs to be determined through investigation. The benchmark
information that this investigation provides is necessary to inform organisations that are
interested in implementing an MLS/DBMS based on our approach.
While MLS/DBMSs have been widely criticised for their ineáciency and complex-
ity [53], we are only aware of one benchmark study that has sought to investigate their
performance. The study by Thuraisingham and Kamon [77] was based on the distributed
architecture approach recommended by the Multilevel Data Management Security Summer
Study [1, 6]. The purpose of the benchmark study was to investigate the performance of
query processing algorithms in this particular implementation. The study did not inves-
tigate the performance of the fragmentation schemes that are of interest to our research
as it was based on a trusted DBMS that supported only one type of partitioning scheme.
Furthermore, only a limited number of variables were subject to observations to determine
their impact on the system.
1.3 Aims of this research
The work contained in this thesis is motivated by the need to demonstrate the feasibility of
using a cluster of machines and a COTS distributed DBMS software to implement multilevel
security. This need became apparent because of the absence of COTS support for existing
users of MLS/DBMS products, and the lack of an alternative system that satisßes the
security needs of these users. To that end, we will draw on the query processing techniques
and fragmentation features developed for distributed databases to more eáciently enforce
security in MLS/DBMSs which are implemented as kernelized architectures. We demon-
strate this concept by augmenting the Stargres distributed database management system1
with multilevel code to deliver security at three levels of granularity: tuple, attribute, and
element.
We have adapted Stargres, based on the kernelized approach, to provide multilevel
database security. Henceforth, we refer to this adapted distributed DBMS as the Multilevel
Stargres (MST) prototype. MST enforces a strong MAC protection policy and provides
the performance and full data management capabilities of conventional industry-standard
database management systems. It also uses physical separation as its primary protection
mechanism. The MST prototype consists of a framework for mandatory access security,
that includes local DBMSs, and a Distributed server.
In our benchmark study, we investigated the performance of our proposed kernelized
approach to multilevel security to determine how it performs under the tuple, attribute, and
element-level fragmentation schemes for the Select-All and Join queries. Our experiments
1Stargres is a product of Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Maryland.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
compared the performance impact of varying such diverse variables as tuples, attributes,
security levels, number of users, and the page size. It is important to determine how a
variation in the quantity of each variable impacts the performance of each fragmentation
scheme, so as to identify potential bottlenecks, and to suggest the combination of variable
quantities that will optimise the performance of each scheme.
1.4 Contributions of this research
The work described in this thesis builds upon prior research in a number of diÞerent ßelds,
and is up to date as of Spring 2000 Ü the date of its original submission. There have
been further developments in MLS/DBMSs research since Spring 2000 although we have
not attempted to cover them here.
This section summarises how our research contributes to this body of knowledge.
Our work:
¯ demonstrates that the query processing and distribution techniques developed in dis-
tributed databases can be used to implement security in MLS/DBMSs which are im-
plemented as kernelized architectures. This concept was elucidated (or brought to life)
by adapting a COTS distributed database management system to provide multilevel
security.
¯ proposes a conceptual MLS/DBMS model that is largely based on models oriented to-
wards representing data `truthfully', e.g., the SWORD approach rather than those that
are oriented towards representing data `honestly', e.g., the Jajodia-Sandhu model. Al-
though the model uses the Jajodia-Sandhu deßnition of a multilevel relational model,
its operational semantics is mostly based on the SWORD approach.
¯ demonstrates the feasibility of adapting a COTS DBMS to provide multilevel security;
it shows that the same techniques used in the adaptation can also be utilised by
subscribers to MLS policy who no longer enjoy direct vendor support.
¯ demonstrates that the adaptation of a COTS DBMS can be achieved solely by identi-
fying the critical modules that handle data objects and administrative/user requests,
and then augmenting them with MLS security code. This process need not be as
complex as the implementation of an MLS/DBMS from scratch.
¯ investigates the relative performance of the three fragmentation schemes supported by
our prototype by conducting a number of experiments using variables such as tuples,
attributes, security levels, number of users, and the page size, for a Select-All and Join
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¯ shows, through our observations, that the performance of the attribute-level fragmen-
tation scheme is superior to the tuple and element-level fragmentation schemes, and
that the element-level scheme suÞers from the worst performance degradation.
We will return to this list of contributions at the conclusion of this thesis and
elaborate on each contribution.
1.5 Contents of the thesis
In this chapter, we have described the background to our research, outlined the subject
matter of this thesis, provided an overview of multilevel security, and described the scope
of our work. Chapter 2 reviews the basic concepts used throughout the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we review some previous eÞorts at protecting data from unautho-
rised disclosure, and the state-of-the-art in multilevel security focusing on MLS models,
architectures, prototypes, and product development.
In Chapter 4, we present a conceptual MLS/DBMS model that is oriented towards
representing data `truthfully', e.g., the SWORD approach, but that also incorporates fea-
tures from approaches that represent data `honestly', e.g., the Jajodia-Sandhu model. We
also describe the axioms and salient features of the proposed model.
In Chapter 5, we present the architecture of the Stargres distributed database man-
agement system, including a description of its constituent facilities and modules, and how
they cooperate in processing queries.
In Chapter 6, we describe the technical details of our proposed MST prototype,
focusing on the Distributed server and the modules that were adapted to provide MLS
functionality. We also discuss the hardware conßguration and usage of the prototype.
In Chapter 7, we investigate the performance of the MST prototype's three frag-
mentation schemes for a Select-All query and a Join query. In our study, we examine the
impact of varying properties such as the number of tuples, number of attributes, number
of security levels, and the page size, on the front-end and the network.
In Chapter 8, we summarise our contributions and point to further areas of research
that can be developed to build upon the work done in this thesis.Chapter 2
Review of Basic Concepts
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a number of basic concepts that will be used throughout this thesis.
The discussion consists of ßve sections. Section 2.2 describes database systems in general,
focusing on their constituent software components. Section 2.3 presents the relational data
model and some of its Structured Query Language (SQL) operators. In section 2.4 we
present discretionary access control and mandatory access control, including ordered sets,
lattices, and the Bell-LaPadula model. The multilevel relational model, an extension of
the standard relational model, is described in section 2.5. Section 2.6 highlights some
important features of distributed database systems that are important to the discussion of
the COTS distributed DBMS architecture introduced in Chapter 5, these features include
relation fragmentation and query processing. Section 2.7 summarises the chapter.
2.2 Database systems
A database system is a computerised system to keep track of information. The information
in the database system consists of both data and information about the data (metadata)
such as the relationship of one data item to another. A database system can be viewed as
having four parts [24]: data, users, hardware, and software.
Data: These are raw information that a business, government agency, or some other
group of individuals collect to fulßl their goals or missions. Individual data
items are collected into sets of related data items called records. A collection
of interrelated records is called a database.
Users: The various individuals and groups of people who use information are deßned
as users.
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Hardware: Hardware typically consists of physical devices such as disks, printers, I/O
devices and the processor itself, with its associated memory.
Software: The interface between the physical data and the user of the data is the
Database Management System (DBMS). The DBMS is essentially a software
system, but may contain specialised hardware in order to make the manage-
ment of data more eácient [59]. Such hardware may include special disk
drives that support fast access to the data, and multiprocessors that support
parallelism [59].
The DBMS provides the various users of the database with diÞerent ways of looking
at the data depending on their uses of the data. These diÞerent ways of looking at the
data represent distinct levels of abstraction of the underlying data: the Physical level is
the lowest level of abstraction. Typically, this level is of interest to the designers of the
DBMS software who are concerned with how the data are physically stored (e.g., the disk
address of a record). The Conceptual level is the middle level of abstraction, concerned
with describing what data are in the database and the relationships between data items.
This level is of interest to Database Administrators and Security Administrators. The View
level is the highest level of abstraction. Typically, this level is the way the end-user sees the
data. Each end-user can have a tailor-made view of the data which are of interest to him
or her. This view of the data does not require the user to know or understand the internal
characteristics of the data (such as how they are represented or stored).
Database models permit diÞerentiation between the description of the database,
which is specißed in the schema, and the collected contents or values of the data items in
the database at any particular time, which is called the instance. The database schema is
specißed using a data deßnition language (DDL). The manipulation of actual data in the
database (inserting, deleting, updating, or retrieving data values) is accomplished using a
data manipulation language (DML).
The DBMS uses a complex set of software components in order to perform its func-
tion. These components include the data manager which provides an interface to physical
data stored in the database, the query processor which translates the query language into
instructions for the data manager, the data manipulation language precompiler which trans-
lates DML statements from applications programs to host language calls, and works with
the query processor, and the data deßnition language compiler which translates DDL state-
ments into tables of metadata. Metadata are stored in the data dictionary, which includes
the structure of the database or the schema and data integrity constraints (e.g., age must
be numeric and between 0 and 120), and security constraints (data item x is secret).
The relational data model is described next. This is the model that forms the basis
of the work described in this thesis.CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF BASIC CONCEPTS 11
2.3 The relational data model
We stated in Chapter 1 that a database is represented by the relational model as a col-
lection of tables (see ßgure 2.1). More importantly, the model is directly related to the
mathematical concept of a relation; it is comprised of:
1. a structural part. A database schema is a collection of relation schemas and a
database is a collection of relations.
2. an integrity part. Primary keys and foreign keys.
3. a manipulative part. Relational algebra and relational calculus.
Formally, a relation R is a subset of D1 ¢ ::: ¢ Dn where D1;::: ;Dn are the
domains of n attributes A1;::: ;An. The elements in the relation are n-tuples (v1;::: ;vn)
with vi 2 Di, i.e., the value of the ith attribute has to be an element from Di. The elements
in a tuple are often called ßelds. When a ßeld does not contain any value, we represent this
by entering a special null value in this position, meaning `there is no entry' rather than
`entry is unknown'.
DN Dept_Name Manpower Dept_Location Manager
D10 Records 43 241 East Annex Cantor
D11 Obstetrics 13 601 Main Building Baker
D12 Laboratory 8 202 Drew Building Ebert
D13 Geriatrics null B16 Basement Xavier
Figure 2.1: A department relation (or table).
2.3.1 Integrity constraints
Integrity constraints restrict the set of theoretically possible tuples to a set that is practically
meaningful. Let X and Y denote sets of one or more of the attributes Ai in a relation
schema. We say Y is functionally dependent on X, written X ! Y , if and only if it is not
possible to have two tuples with the same value for all the attributes in X but diÞerent
values for any of the attributes in Y . Functional dependencies represent the basis for most
integrity constraints in the relational model. As not all possible relations are meaningful
in an application, only those that satisfy certain integrity constraints are considered. From
the large set of proposed integrity constraints, entity integrity and referential integrity are
of major importance.
¯ the entity integrity constraint states that each tuple must be uniquely identißed
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¯ the referential integrity constraint states that an n-tuple in one relation that
refers to another relation must refer to an existing n-tuple in that relation; this is
expressed by means of foreign keys.
These two rules are application-independent, and must be valid in each relational
database. In addition, many application-dependent semantic constraints may exist.
A candidate key of a relation schema R is a minimal set of attributes on which all
other attributes of R are functionally dependent. The primary key of a relation schema R
is one of its candidate keys that has been specißcally designated as such. A foreign key of
a relation schema R is a set of attributes in a relation schema that forms a primary key
of another relation. For a more detailed treatment of the relational model including its
core integrity properties, see [35, 59]; for now, we consider how queries against relations
are expressed.
2.3.2 Structured query language
The relational model has resulted in query languages such as the relational algebra, which
is the procedural query language for the relational model, and the relational calculus, which
is the declarative counterpart of the relational algebra and is based on ßrst-order predicate
calculus [59]. Relational calculus provides the theoretical underpinning of the Structured
Query Language (SQL), the commercial relational query language used in most DBMSs
[59]. A description of the relational algebra, relational calculus, and SQL operations may
be found in many references discussing the relational model, see [18, 24, 59].
SQL was developed during the 1970's at IBM as part of the System R1 project and
was standardised during the 1980's by the International Standards Organisation (ISO).
In the following, we introduce a subset of SQL operations that will be used later in this
thesis, including the Retrieve, Insert, Update, and Delete operations. The operations will
be illustrated using the Department and Nurse relations shown in Appendix A.
RETRIEVE statement
SELECT attribute_list
FROM table_list
WHERE selection_condition
The SELECT statement selects data from a table and stores it in a result-set. Only those
tuples which satisfy the selection_condition are included in the result-set which has the
same schema as the original table. The operations allowed in a selection_condition include
=, !=, <, >, and LIKE.
1System R is a relational DBMS prototype developed by IBM at the San Jose Research Laboratory in California.CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF BASIC CONCEPTS 13
Example: A retrieval from a single table, to ßnd the Dept_Name with a DN value of D12
and its corresponding Manpower value in the Department table.
SELECT Dept_Name, Manpower
FROM Department
WHERE DN = `D12';
Example: A retrieval from two tables (JOIN), to ßnd the names of all departments, their
corresponding manpower, and the specialties of their nurses from the Department and Nurse
tables where the DN values in the Department table corresponds to the DN values in the
Nurse table, and the manager is Cantor.
SELECT Department.Dept_Name, Department.Manpower, Nurse.N_Specialty
FROM Department, Nurse
WHERE Department.DN = Nurse.DN
AND Department.Manager = `Cantor';
INSERT statement
INSERT INTO table_name (attribute1;attribute2;:::)
VALUES (value1;value2;:::)
The INSERT statement inserts new tuples in a table. The attribute names may be omitted
if both their number, and the order in which the values to be inserted appear, agree with
the original table.
Example: To INSERT a tuple in the Department table.
INSERT INTO Department (DN, Dept_Name, Manpower, Dept_Location, Manager)
VALUES (`D30', `Psychiatry', 16, `105 South Wing', `Smith');
UPDATE statement
UPDATE table_name
SET attribute_name = new_value
WHERE selection_condition
The UPDATE statement sets the attribute_name specißed to the corresponding value for
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is given, all tuples are updated.
Example: To UPDATE an attribute in the Department table.
UPDATE Department
SET Manpower = 16
WHERE DN = `D12';
DELETE statement
DELETE FROM table_name
WHERE selection_condition
The DELETE statement deletes tuples in a table. If the selection_condition is specißed,
all the tuples for which this condition holds are deleted. An unqualißed deletion will empty
the table (without destroying its structure).
Example: To DELETE a tuple from the Department table.
DELETE FROM Department
WHERE DN = `D12';
2.4 Access control
As the security of the relational database model is the main theme of this thesis, this section
contains a review of some of the basic notions of access control. Access control ensures that
all direct accesses to database objects occur only according to the models and rules ßxed
by protection policies [50]. Earlier in Chapter 1, we introduced two types of access control
policies, namely DAC and MAC. These access control policies provide diÞerent levels of
protection to the relations in a system, they are based on the concept of a set of subjects
S (e.g., users, groups of users, or transactions operating on behalf of users), to whom we
grant or deny access, a set of objects O (e.g., relations, tuples), to which access is either
granted or denied, the set of access operations A = {read, write, append, execute, grant,
delegate, revoke}, a set of predicates P, used to represent content-based access (for DAC),
and a set L of security levels with a partial ordering ´ (for MAC) (see subsection 2.4.2)
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2.4.1 Discretionary access control (DAC)
In DAC, a predicate p 2 P deßnes the permissions of subject s 2 S on object o 2 O. The
tuple < o;s;a;p > is called an access rule and a function f is deßned to determine if an
authorisation f(o;s;a;p) is valid or not:
f : O ¢ S ¢ A ¢ P ! {True, False}.
For any < o;s;a;p >, if f(o;s;a;p) is True, subject s has authorisation a to access
object o within the range deßned by predicate p. An important property of discretionary
security models is the support of the principle of delegation of rights where a right is the
(o;a;p)-portion of the access rule. A subject si who holds the access right (o;a;p) may
be allowed to delegate that right to another subject sj(i 6= j). This àexibility to delegate
(grant) access rights in DAC makes it a popular choice for implementing commercial and
industrial security policies. A more detailed treatment of DAC can be found in [15, 38].
2.4.2 Mandatory access control (MAC)
While DAC is concerned with controlling access to objects, MAC is in addition concerned
with the àow of information between diÞerent security levels in a system. MAC requires that
objects and subjects are assigned to certain security levels represented by a label. The label
for an object is called its classißcation and a label for a user is called its clearance. MAC
makes access control decisions by comparing these labels on the basis of rules described in
subsection 2.4.2.3. Security labels form a partially ordered set (and often a lattice).
2.4.2.1 Ordered sets
In the following deßnition of a partially ordered set, let L be a set. A partial order on L is
a binary relation, ´, on L such that for all a;b;c 2 L
¯ a ´ a,
¯ a ´ b and b ´ a imply that a = b,
¯ a ´ b and b ´ c imply that a ´ c.
These three conditions are referred to as reàexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity,
respectively. A set L equipped with a partial order is called a partially ordered set.
2.4.2.2 Lattices
A lattice (L,´) consists of a set L and a partial ordering ´, with the property that, for
every two elements a, b 2 L there exists a least upper bound u 2 L and a greatest lower
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¯ a ´ u, b ´ u, and for all v 2 L: (a ´ v ^ b ´ v) ) (u ´ v)
¯ l ´ a, l ´ b, and for all k 2 L: (k ´ a ^ k ´ b) ) (k ´ l)
In MLS policy, if a ´ b, we say that a is dominated by b. If there exists a security
level that is dominated by all other levels, it is called System-low. If there exists a security
level that dominates all other levels, it is called System-high. Typical examples of lattices
are illustrated in ßgure 2.2. Figure 2.2(A) shows a totally ordered set of security levels
where Top Secret dominates Secret, Conßdential, and Unclassißed; Secret dominates Con-
ßdential, and Unclassißed; and Conßdential dominates Unclassißed. Figure 2.2(B) shows a
partially ordered set of security levels proposed for ßrewalls where System high dominates
inside, outside, and System low, inside and outside dominate System low, and inside is
incomparable to outside.
Figure 2.2: Security levels in total order and security levels in partial order showing the dominates ´
relationship between elements.
2.4.2.3 Bell-LaPadula model (BLP)
The BLP model is a state machine model capturing the conßdentiality aspects of access
control, where access to objects is controlled by a strict set of rules that are enforced by
the system. Access permissions are deßned both through an access control matrix and
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high security level to a low security level is prohibited by the model when a subject observes
or alters an object. The model enforces a multilevel security (MLS) policy [7, 8].
We present a formal description of the BLP model using the set of objects, subjects,
access operations, and partially ordered security levels. The access operations of the BLP
model are: execute, read, append, and write. The current states will be described in these
terms. This leads to a state set B ¢ M ¢ F, where:
¯ B = P(S ¢ O ¢ A) is the class of all possible sets of access operations currently
permissible within the system. An element b 2 B is a collection of tuples (s;o;a),
indicating that subject s currently performs operation a on object o.
¯ M is the set of access permission matrices M = (Mso)s2S;o2O.
¯ F º LS ¢ LS ¢ LO is the set of security level assignments. An element f 2 F is a
triple (fs;fc;fo), where:
Û fs : S ! L gives the maximal security level each subject can have,
Û fc : S ! L gives the current security level of each subject,
Û fo : O ! L gives the classißcation of all objects.
The current level of a subject cannot be higher than its maximal level, hence fc ´ fs.
The reason for introducing fc will become clear as this discussion continues. The maximal
security level is sometimes called the subject's clearance. Other sources use clearance only
to denote the security level of users. Deßning the state set is the major issue in BLP. We
do not have to describe inputs, outputs, or the precise structure of state transitions, to give
the BLP security properties.
Security policies
BLP deßnes security as the property of states. Multilevel security policies allow a subject
to read an object only if the subject's security level dominates the object's classißcation.
These multilevel security policies are also called mandatory security policies. The BLP
model deßnes two properties (rules) for mediating the access of subjects to objects; these
properties are the simple security property rule (ss-property) and the *-property. Both
properties must hold in order for security to be maintained [7, 8, 58]:
ss-property. A state (b;M;f) satisßes the ss-property, if for each element
(s;o;a) 2 b where the access operation a is read, the security level of the subject
s dominates the classißcation of the object o, i.e., fo(o) ´ fs(s). This property
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The ss-property is, however, not suácient to prevent a low-level subject from reading
the contents of a high-level object. It could create a high-level Trojan horse which reads
the high-level object and copies it (writes its contents) into a low-level object. Thus, we
also have to control write access through the *-property.
*-property. A state (b;M;f) satisßes the *-property, if for each element (s;o;a) 2
b where the access operation a is append, the current level of the subject s is dom-
inated by the classißcation of the object o, i.e., fc(s) ´ fo(o). This is a No Write
Down (NWD) security policy. Furthermore, if there exists an element (s;o;a) 2 b
where the access operation a is append or write, then we must have fo(o0) ´ fo(o)
for all objects o0 with (s;o0;a0) 2 b and a0 is read or write.
This deßnition immediately implies that a high level subject cannot send information
to a low-level subject. There are two ways to escape from this restriction:
¯ Temporarily downgrade a high level subject. This is the reason for introducing the
current security level fc.
¯ Identify a set of subjects that are permitted to violate the *-property. These subjects
are called trusted subjects.
The ßrst approach assumes that a subject forgets all it knew at a higher security level
the moment it is downgraded. This looks implausible if you view subjects as human beings,
but BLP is about modelling computers. There, subjects (processes) have no memory of
their own. The only thing they `know' are the contents of the objects (ßles) they are allowed
to observe. In this situation, a temporary downgrade indeed solves the problem.
In a second interpretation, fs specißes a user's clearance. Users are allowed to login
below their clearance and fc indicates at which level a user has actually logged in.
When adopting the second approach, the *-property only has to hold for subjects
which are not trusted. By deßnition, a trusted subject may violate the security policy.
Although it has the ability to violate the security policy of the system, it is trusted not to
actually do so.
Discretionary access control in BLP is also expressed by an access control matrix
and captured by the discretionary security property (ds-property).
ds-property. A state (b;M;f) satisßes the ds-property, if for each element of
(s;o;a) 2 b we have a 2 Mso.
A state is called secure if all three security properties are satisßed.
The Basic Security Theorem
A transition from state v1 = (b1;M1;f1) to state v2 = (b2;M2;f2) is said to be secure, if both
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new state is secure, consider, for example, the ss-property. The state transition preserves
the ss-property if and only if:
1. each (s;o;a) 2 b2nb1 satisßes the ss-property with respect to f2; (b2nb1 denotes the set
diÞerence between b2 and b1) and
2. if (s;o;a) 2 b1 does not satisfy the ss-property with respect to f2, then (s;o;a) = 2 b2.
Preservation of the *-property and of the ds-property can be described in a similar
way. We are now in a position to state an important property of the BLP model.
Basic security theorem. If all state transitions in a system are secure and if
the initial state of the system is secure, then every subsequent state will also be
secure, no matter which input occurs.
A formal proof of this theorem would proceed by induction over the length of input
sequences. The proof would build on the fact that each state transition preserves security
but would not refer to the specißc BLP security properties. In practice, the basic security
theorem limits the eÞort needed to verify the security of a system. You are allowed to
check each state transition individually to show that it preserves security and you have to
identify a secure initial state. As long as a system starts in this secure initial state, it will
remain secure.
Tranquility
McLean [62] triggered a heated discussion in 1985 about the value of the BLP model by
putting forward a system that contained a state transition, which
¯ downgraded all subjects to the lowest security level,
¯ downgraded all objects to the lowest security level,
¯ entered all access rights in all positions of the access control matrix M.
The state reached by this transition is secure according to the deßnitions of BLP.
Should such a state be regarded as secure? As BLP says it is secure, does BLP then capture
security correctly? There are two opinions:
¯ The case against BLP (McLean): Intuitively, a system that can be brought into
a state where everyone is allowed to read everything is not secure. Therefore, BLP
has to be improved.
¯ The case for BLP (Bell): If the user requirements call for such a state transition,
then it should be allowed in the security model. If it is not required, then it should not
be implemented. This is not a problem of BLP but a problem of correctly capturing
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At the root of this disagreement is a state transition that changes access rights. Such
changes are certainly possible within the general framework of BLP but the originators of
the model were really contemplating systems where access rights are ßxed. The property
that security levels and access rights never change is called tranquility. Operations that do
not change access rights are called tranquil.
Aspects and limitations of BLP
Although BLP is an important security model and has played an important role in the
design of secure systems, it does not cover all aspects of security. I has been criticised
for: 1) only dealing with conßdentiality without addressing integrity, 2) not addressing the
management of access control, 3) containing covert channels.
The absence of integrity policies in BLP gave rise to an issue referred to as blind
writes. Blind writes has been shown to introduce integrity problems in systems complying
with the BLP model's NRU and NWD rules. This situation arises when a user is allowed
to insert, modify, or delete a record, but is also not allowed to observe the eÞect of these
operations. For example, if a user logged-in at System-low writes a record at System-high,
it is generally safe computing practice for the user to observe the contents of the record
being modißed to make sure that the operation succeeded; however, with BLP, a user
at System-low cannot observe the eÞects of changes at System-high. Blind write raises
concerns because the same user deemed unsuitable for viewing a record is permitted to
make arbitrary changes to that record. This may cause integrity problems that can only
be dealt with by imposing requirements that may change the BLP rules. For example,
prohibiting a no write up rule and allowing only writes to records that are at the same
security level as the user will restrict the model and shift its focus from disclosure to a
combination of integrity and disclosure. Because of this potential integrity problem, few
developers have opted to implement the BLP rules as they are written; many have opted
instead for a modißed version of the rules. Modißed versions of the BLP rules have a
tendency to be more restrictive, such as disallowing blind writes so that users can only
write records at their own security level.
2.5 The multilevel relational model
In the multilevel relational model, relations, tuples, attributes, or elements are assigned
security classißcations. This thesis uses the deßnition of a multilevel relation captured
by the Jajodia-Sandhu model [47]. The model is based on the security classißcations
introduced in the BLP model, and it formally deßnes a multilevel relation as consisting of
the following two parts:
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Ai is a data attribute deßned over domain Di, each Ci is a classißcation attribute for
Ai, and TC is the tuple-class attribute.
2. a collection of state-dependent relation instances Rc(A1;C1;:::;An;Cn;TC), where one
such instance exists for each access class c from the set of security levels. Each instance
is a set of distinct tuples of the form (a1;c1;:::;an;cn;tc) where tc is the least upper
bound of the classes of the attributes in the tuple, and tc indicates the lowest user level
that can see the tuple. The instance of a relation at a given access class represents the
version of the relation at that class [47, 50]. Basically, each element t[Ai] in a tuple t
is visible in instances at access class t[Ci] or higher; t[Ai] is replaced by a null value
in an instance at a lower access class.
A single-level relation is a relation whose elements have the same security classiß-
cation.
2.5.1 MLS database integrity constraints
In order to meet the requirements of MLS databases, the two core integrity constraints of
the relational model described earlier were adapted, and two further constraints introduced.
In the standard relational model, a key is derived by using the concept of functional de-
pendencies. In the MLS relational model such a key is called the apparent key (AK) which
we assume is a user-specißed primary key consisting of a subset of the data attributes Ai
[46]. The notion of apparent key is also discussed by Castano et al. in [15].
MLS integrity property 1: Entity integrity.
Let AK be the apparent key of a relation R. A multilevel relation R satisßes entity integrity
if, and only if, for all instances Rc of R and t 2 Rc
1. Ai 2 AK ) t[Ai] 6= null,
2. Ai;Aj 2 AK ) t[Ci] = t[Cj], i.e., AK is uniformly classißed, and
3. Ai = 2 AK ) t[Ci] µ t[CAK] (where CAK is deßned as the classißcation of the apparent
key)
This property is an extension of the entity integrity property of the standard re-
lational model designed to deal with security classißcations. It means that the apparent
key must not have a null value, must be uniformly classißed, and its classißcation must be
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MLS integrity property 2: Null integrity.
A multilevel relation R satisßes null integrity if, and only if, for each instance of Rc of R,
the following two conditions hold:
1. For all t 2 Rc;t[Ai] = null ) t[Ci] = t[CAK], i.e., null values are classißed at the level
of the key.
2. Rc is subsumption free, i.e., it does not contain two distinct tuples such that one
subsumes the other. A tuple t subsumes a tuple s, if for every attribute Ai, either
t[Ai;Ci] = s[Ai;Ci] or t[Ai] 6= null and s[Ai] = null.
The null integrity property requires that the null values in a tuple be classißed at
the level of the key, and that for subjects cleared at higher security levels, the null values
visible at lower security levels are replaced by the proper values automatically.
The next property deals with consistency between the diÞerent instances of a rela-
tion. The inter-instance property was ßrst deßned by Denning [28].
MLS integrity property 3: Inter-instance integrity.
A multilevel relation R satisßes inter-instance integrity if, and only if, for all c0 ´ c;Rc0 =
»(Rc0;c0), where the ßlter function » produces the c0-instance Rc0 from Rc as follows:
1. For every tuple t 2 Rc such that t[CAK] ´ c0, there is a tuple t0 2 Rc0, with t0[AK;CAK]
= t[AK;CAK] and for Ai = 2 AK
t0[Ai;Ci] =
(
t[Ai;Ci] if t[Ci] ´ c0
hnull;t[CAK]i otherwise
2. There are no additional tuples in Rc0 other than those derived by the above rule.
3. The end result Rc0 is made subsumption free by exhaustive elimination of subsumed
tuples.
The inter-instance property is concerned with consistency between relation instances
of a multilevel relation R. The ßlter function » maps R to diÞerent instances of Rc0 (one
for each c0 < c). By applying the ßlter function, users are restricted to only that portion
of the multilevel relation for which they are cleared.
If c0 dominates some security levels in a tuple but not others then, during query
processing, the ßlter function » replaces all the attribute values that the user is not cleared
to see with null-values. A shortcoming in the Jajodia-Sandhu model arising from the use
of this ßlter function was pointed out by Smith and Winslett [75]. Smith and Winslett
observed that the ßlter function » introduces an additional semantics for nulls. In the
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null value cannot be distinguished from a null value representing the semantics `value exists
but not known' or a null value with the meaning `this property will never have a value'.
We stated earlier that the deßnition of key in the standard relational model is based
on functional dependencies (i.e., the value of key attributes functionally determines the
values of all the other attributes). Therefore, two tuples with the same values for the
primary key attributes must not exist in a relation. Requiring this constraint to hold
in multilevel relations may cause indirect release of sensitive information to users with
inadequate clearances. The model therefore introduces the notion of apparent primary key,
which we described earlier, to distinguish between the apparent key and the actual primary
key in a relation. The actual primary key is deßned according to the polyinstantiation
integrity property.
MLS integrity property 4: Polyinstantiation integrity.
A multilevel relation R satisßes polyinstantiation integrity if, and only if, for every Rc0, for
all Ai : AK;CAK;Ci ! Ai.
The polyinstantiation integrity property asserts that the apparent key AK specißed
by a user, its classißcation, together with the classißcation of an attribute, functionally
determines the value of this attribute. The primary key of a multilevel relation is implicitly
deßned by this property as the union of the apparent key attributes, their classißcations, and
the classißcations of all the non-key attributes. Formally, the primary key of a multilevel
relation is AK [ CAK [ CR, where AK is the set of data attributes constituting the user-
specißed primary key, CAK is the classißcation attribute for data attributes in AK, and CR
is the set of classißcation attributes for data attributes not in AK. This is because it follows
from polyinstantiation integrity that the functional dependency AK [ CAK [ CR ! AR
holds, where AR denotes the set of all attributes that are not in AK. Note that for
single-level relations, CAK and CR will be equal to the same constant value in all tuples.
Therefore, in this case, polyinstantiation integrity implies that AK ! AR, which is precisely
the deßnition of the primary key in relational theory.
2.5.2 Levels of granularity
Security levels can be assigned to data at diÞerent levels of granularity. Assigning labels to
entire relations can be useful but is generally considered inconvenient. For example, if some
salaries are secret but others are not, these salaries must be placed in diÞerent relations [27].
Assigning labels to an entire column of a relation is similarly inconvenient in the general
case [27]. The ßnest granularity of labelling is at the level of individual data elements Ü
i.e, element-level labelling. This oÞers considerable àexibility. Most commercial products
oÞered labelling at the level of a tuple. Although not so àexible as element-level labelling,
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[27]. The following examples illustrate the three labelling schemes used in this thesis.
Although the Jajodia-Sandhu model does not specify how the security labels should be
stored, the labels are stored as extra columns in the tuple-level and element-level relation
instances of our examples as they are specißc to relation instances. In the attribute-level
example, the labels could be stored either in the relation instance or the schema. Storing
the labels in the instance rather than the schema requires signißcantly more storage space.
1. For tuple-level labelling, the Jajodia-Sandhu deßnition of a multilevel relation rep-
resents each tuple t in a relation R without the classißcation attribute Ci corresponding
to each attribute Ai. Instead each tuple t has a corresponding tuple classißcation at-
tribute TC. The security label for each tuple t[TC] is stored in the relation instance.
An example is illustrated in ßgure 2.3.
DN Dept_Name Manpower Dept_Location Manager TC
D10 Records 43 241 East Annex Cantor S
D11 Obstetrics 13 601 Main Building Baker TS
D12 Laboratory 8 202 Drew Building Ebert S
D13 Geriatrics 12 B16 Basement Xavier S
Figure 2.3: Tuple security labelling.
2. For attribute-level labelling, the Jajodia-Sandhu deßnition of a multilevel relation
requires that each attribute Ai in a relation R be associated with a corresponding
security level Ci, i.e., the tuple classißcation attribute TC is not required. An example
is shown in ßgure 2.4.
DN C1 Dept_Name C2 Manpower C3 Dept_Location C4 Manager C5
D10 U Records C 43 C 241 East Annex S Cantor TS
D11 U Obstetrics C 13 C 601 Main Building S Baker TS
D12 U Laboratory C 8 C 202 Drew Building S Ebert TS
D13 U Geriatrics C 12 C B16 Basement S Xavier TS
Figure 2.4: Attribute-level labelling.
3. For element-level labelling, the Jajodia-Sandhu deßnition of a multilevel relation
requires that each element or attribute value t[Ai] in a relation be associated with a
corresponding security level t[Ci]. The tuple classißcation attribute TC is not required.
The security label for each element t[Ai] is stored in the relation instance. An example
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DN C1 Dept_Name C2 Manpower C3 Dept_Location C4 Manager C5
D10 U Records TC 43 U 241 East Annex C Cantor U
D11 U Obstetrics C 13 C 601 Main Building U Baker C
D12 U Laboratory TS 8 U 202 Drew Building C Ebert S
D13 U Geriatrics C 12 C B16 Basement U Xavier TS
Figure 2.5: Element-level labelling.
2.6 Distributed database systems
A distributed database as deßned by Ozsu and Valduriez [68] is a collection of multiple, log-
ically interrelated, databases distributed over a computer network. A distributed database
management system (DDBMS) is also deßned in [68] as the software system that permits
the management of the distributed database and makes the distribution transparent to
users. These two deßnitions emphasise logically interrelated and distributed over a network
as the property that distinguishes them from other types of systems that have been de-
scribed as distributed. However, physical distribution does not imply that the computer
systems be geographically far apart; they could actually be in the same room. It implies
that the communication between them is done over a network instead of through shared
memory, with the network as the only shared resource. The DBMS must periodically
synchronize the scattered databases to ensure data consistency.
2.6.1 Relation fragmentation
Relations in distributed databases are commonly divided into smaller fragments which are
treated as separate relations in their own right. This is commonly done for performance,
availability, and reliability reasons. There are three general types of fragmentation alter-
natives. In one case, called horizontal fragmentation, a relation is partitioned into a set of
sub-relations each of which is a subset of the tuples (rows) of the original relation. The
second alternative is vertical fragmentation, where each sub-relation is deßned on a subset
of the attributes (columns) of the original relation. A less common alternative is the ele-
ment fragmentation, where sub-relation subsets are deßned on the elements of the original
multilevel relation. The following fragmentation rules taken directly from [68] are required
to ensure that the database does not undergo semantic change during fragmentation.
1. Completeness: If a relation instance R is decomposed into fragments R1;R2;:::;Rn,
each data item (tuple or attribute) that can be found in R can also be found in
one or more of the Ri's. This property, which is identical to the lossless decomposition
property of relational database normalization, is also important in fragmentation since
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2. Reconstruction: If a relation R is decomposed into fragments R1;R2;:::;Rn, it must
always be possible to reconstruct the global relation R from its fragments. This
condition is necessary to ensure that global relations can be reconstructed if necessary
from the fragments stored in the distributed database. The reconstructability of the
relation from its fragments also ensures that constraints deßned on the data in the
form of dependencies are preserved.
3. Disjointness: If a relation R is horizontally decomposed into fragments R1;R2;:::;Rn
and data item di is in Rj, it is not in any other fragment Rk (k 6= j). This criterion
ensures that the horizontal fragments are disjoint. If relation R is vertically decom-
posed, its primary key attributes are typically repeated in all its fragments. Therefore,
in the case of vertical partitioning, disjointness is deßned only on the nonprimary key
attributes of a relation.
Our proposed kernelized approach to multilevel database security draws on these
fragmentation techniques for fragmenting and distributing multilevel relations based on se-
curity level. A distributed database is logically similar to a multilevel database composed
of relations which are fragmented and distributed on the basis of security level. If the gran-
ularity of the security levels is at the tuple-level, the single-level fragments are logically the
same as a horizontally distributed database. Attribute-level granularity results in vertically
distributed databases. If the granularity is based on element-level labels, the distribution
represents neither a horizontally distributed database nor a vertically distributed database.
2.6.2 Query processing
The retrieval function of the data manipulation language (DML) is typically executed more
often than the update function and has become a specialised function referred to as query
processing. Questions are directed at a database using high level query languages such as
SQL. A disadvantage of using high level languages to write queries is that it is possible to
write queries that take a very long time to execute. Because of this, much research has
been conducted into query optimisation techniques. Good general treatments are included
in most books discussing the relational model [24, 35]. A more advanced treatment of query
processing may be found in [54].
The fragmentation of database relations introduces a new problem, that of handling
user queries that were specißed on entire relations but now have to be performed on sub-
relations. Specißcally, the issue is one of ßnding a query processing strategy based on the
fragments rather than the relations, even though the queries are specißed on the latter.
Typically, this requires a translation from what is called a global query to several fragment
queries.
The studies of query processing that have had the most inàuence on this thesisCHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF BASIC CONCEPTS 27
are those involving distributed query processing [16, 18, 19, 68]. These sources contain
detailed treatments of the process of converting global queries into their horizontal, vertical
and mixed fragment equivalents. These query fragments are processed at the appropriate
databases. While the process was developed for reasons other than security (for example,
economies of scale), the theory behind query processing in distributed databases is useful
in ensuring security in multilevel databases. This thesis builds on this recognition of the
similarities in the two processes for the treatment of single-level fragments.
2.7 Summary
A database system is a computerised system to keep track of information. A relational
database model represents a database as a set of tables. This simple idea makes it easy
to understand the model. More importantly, the relational model is directly related to the
mathematical concept of a relation. This mathematical basis has resulted in the deßnition
of languages (relational algebra and relational calculus) which can be used to express the
operations that can be performed on the tables.
While the classical relational model is concerned with data without security classiß-
cations, the concern of the multilevel relational model is data with security classißcations.
The security labels in a multilevel relational model are drawn from a set of partially ordered
elements. Relations may be single level or multilevel. In single-level relations, all of the
attributes have the same security classißcation. In multilevel relations, the attributes have
diÞerent security levels.
The BLP model deßnes the read and write rules that must hold in an MLS system
in order for security to be preserved. These rules are based on the simple security property
and the *-property. The simple property states that in order to `read' an object, the
subject's security level must dominate the object's security level. The *-property states
that in order to `write' an object, the object's security level must dominate the subject's
security level.
A distributed database is deßned as a collection of multiple, logically interrelated
databases distributed over a computer network. A distributed database management sys-
tem (DDBMS) is also deßned as the software system that permits the management of the
distributed database and makes the distribution transparent to users. Of particular interest
to our research is the fragmentation and query processing features of a DDBMS.
Chapter 3 will present a review of related research and developments in MLS/DBMS
with an emphasis on the models, prototypes and products that have had the most impact
on our research.Chapter 3
Related Research and Developments
3.1 Introduction
Research on multilevel security models began in earnest in the early 1970s with the aim
of producing high-level, software-independent, conceptual models that describe the protec-
tion mechanisms of a system [15, 58]. In order to have assurance that a given model would
perform as specißed, researchers also recognised the need to formalise these models. Many
of the models were based on the military model of security, but there were some notable
studies of security policy in the commercial sector [13, 15]. The SeaView model was the
ßrst formal MLS model. EÞorts at implementing MLS systems began in the early 1980s;
these eÞorts were either research-driven, resulting in a prototype, or commercially-driven,
resulting in a commercial product. Prototypes developed in the former category include
SeaView, Lock Data Views, A1 Secure DBMS, and SWORD. Products that resulted from
eÞorts in the latter category include Trusted Oracle 7, Sybase Secure SQL Server 11.6,
INFORMIX-OnLine/Secure DBMS 5.0, and Open INGRES/Enhanced Security 1.2. Al-
though it is widely accepted that implementing a MLS/DBMS is a highly complex task,
only one study by Thuraisingham and Kamon [77] examines the impact of this complexity
on performance.
The next section will brieày review some of the MLS models that have had some
inàuence on this thesis. Section 3.3 considers the architectures for multilevel database
systems that resulted from the Multilevel Data Management Security Summer Study (or
Woods Hole study group) [1]; these include the integrity lock, kernelized, replicated, and
trusted subject architectures. Section 3.4 presents a number of MLS/DBMS prototypes
that have been developed over the last two decades, mainly in response to the proposals
of the Woods Hole study group. A survey of commercial MLS/DBMS products that were
developed to address security concerns in diÞerent application areas is presented in sec-
tion 3.5. Section 3.6 describes one previous eÞort at building a distributed secure system
from a collection of COTS components, and another eÞort which proposed using a hardware
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device to ßlter communication between System-high and System-low LANs. A brief review
of some database benchmarking suites and a database performance study are presented in
section 3.7. The chapter is summarized in section 3.8.
3.2 Overview of MAC models
The SeaView model [28] was the ßrst formal MLS relational model. It was subsequently
developed as a prototype of an MLS/DBMS based on the view mechanism. In the SeaView
model, data elements are classißed at the element-level and stored as single-level fragments.
The single-level fragments are created from multilevel relations which are partitioned based
on security level. Each of the single-level fragments contains the primary key of its parent
relation. When a user requests information, a view is created consisting of those single-level
fragments that the user is authorised to access. The Jajodia-Sandhu model [46, 48, 50] is
based on the SeaView model and addresses some of the àaws identißed in the SeaView
model [46, 48, 50] such as the proliferation of tuples during updates, and spurious joins.
The Commutative Filter Model [26], advocates replacing the reference monitor that enforces
mandatory access control with a trusted ßlter inserted between the user and the DBMS
which would intercept returning query answers from the database and remove all data
the user is not entitled to see; it is derived from the maximal authorized view approach
proposed by Downs and Popek [32].
The Keefe et al. query modißcation approach [52] modißes a query by searching a
security constraints database for all rules involving the query in question. The restrictions
in these rules are then added to the original query in order to make it safe. Data objects in
the database are assigned security labels by the model based on its own security constraints.
The Smith-Winslett model [15, 75] addresses the semantics of an MLS database based on the
concept of belief, where a user sees and believes the contents of the database at its own level,
and sees the data objects at lower security levels. For example, a Secret user can see Secret,
Conßdential, and Unclassißed objects, but it believes only that Secret objects accurately
represent the real world situation, and it makes no assumptions about Conßdential and
Unclassißed objects. The Smith-Winslett model is also known as belief-based semantics.
Unlike the Jajodia-Sandhu model, this model does not support classißcation at the level of
each single attribute. Instead, access classes can be assigned only to key attributes and to
tuples as a whole. The most recent of the MLS data models, the Multilevel Relational model
(MLR) [20, 50] was proposed by Chen and Sandhu and is substantially based on the Jajodia-
Sandhu model. It combines ideas from SeaView, belief-based semantics, and the Lock Data
Views model in trying to eliminate ambiguity whilst retaining upward information àow.
This model supports labelling at the element-level of granularity. A detailed description of
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3.3 Architectures for multilevel database systems
Mandatory access control is often implemented by classifying both users and data at var-
ious security levels; however, it can also be implemented by classifying the sensitive data
only at system high. This approach requires all users to be cleared at system high. The
major advantage with this approach is that existing DBMSs can be used with no change;
however, it suÞers from certain drawbacks. First, it is very expensive since the cost of
clearance is high. Second, it involves additional security risk since more people are given
the highest clearance. In order to try and resolve this problem, the Woods Hole study
group, organized by the U.S. Air Force in 1982 [1, 6], considered diÞerent architectures
for building MLS/DBMSs. The study group proposed requirements for a purpose-built
multilevel DBMS as well as solutions that looked at how existing DBMS technology could
be reused to build MLS/DBMSs [33]. Among the many architectures proposed by this
study for the physical storage of multilevel data, three solutions became prominent; these
include: the Integrity lock (or spray paint) architecture, the Kernelized architecture, and
the Replicated architecture [1].
3.3.1 The integrity lock (or spray paint) architecture
This architecture uses a single DBMS to manage all levels of data [39]. Figure 3.1 is de-
picted with the four security levels introduced in our earlier example of a simple lattice in
ßgure 2.2(A). The trusted front end (TFE) (or trusted ßlter) acting as the TCB is responsi-
ble for enforcing multilevel protection; it does this by attaching security labels to database
objects in the form of a cryptographically generated stamp (or paint) which it then assigns
to every data item. While retrieving data, the TFE checks the stamp on the data item
and makes sure that the simple-security property of the BLP policy is met. Since a user's
query has access to the entire database, a clever user can infer higher level information
by formulating a query that modulates its output based on high level data. For example,
consider the relation in ßgure 3.2, and suppose a Secret user submits the following query:
If(Manpower > 50) return 1, else return 0
The value that is returned to the Secret user in response to this query will not have
a stamp that is higher than Secret, but information can still be inferred from the query.
This architecture can thus be exploited to open up high bandwidth covert channels.
3.3.2 The kernelized architecture
In this architecture, illustrated in ßgure 3.3, the multilevel database is partitioned into
single level databases, which are then stored separately [1, 42, 60]. In this architecture,CHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 31
Figure 3.1: The integrity lock (or spray paint) architecture.
DN Dept_Name Manpower Dept_Location Manager Stamp
D10 Records 40 241 East Annex Cantor S
D11 Obstetrics 83 601 Main Building Baker TS
D12 Laboratory 45 202 Drew Building Ebert S
D13 Geriatrics 32 B16 Basement Xavier S
Figure 3.2: Vulnerability of the integrity lock architecture.
there is a separate DBMS for each security classißcation. The trusted front-end ensures
that the user's queries are submitted to the DBMS with the same security level as that of
the user, while the trusted back-end makes sure that a DBMS at a specißc security level
accesses data without violating the mandatory security policies. Processing a user's query
that is requesting data from multiple security levels involves expensive Joins that may
degrade performance, since the diÞerent levels of data are stored separately. On the other
hand, since this architecture has separate DBMSs for each security level, the scheduler that
is responsible for concurrency control can also be separated for each level as it need not
be part of the TCB [1, 60]. Its concurrency control technique has to address two basic
challenges: security and data availability. When a high level process wants to read a low
level data item, it cannot set a read lock on the data item since this process would introduce
a covert channel Û the locking and unlocking of low level data can be observed by a lowCHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 32
level process. Trying to eliminate this problem causes the high user to wait for the low
level data, which creates a problem of data availability. A solution suggested in [1, 60] is
to use multiversioning, hence allowing high users to read older versions of low data. Other
researchers [1, 60] have also suggested that the number of versions be restricted to two, one
for the subjects at the same level of data item and one for subjects at higher levels.
Figure 3.3: The kernelized architecture.
3.3.3 The replicated architecture
This architecture, illustrated in ßgure 3.4, uses a separate database management system
to manage data at or below each security level [22]; a database at a security classißcation
contains all information at its class and below; lower level data are therefore replicated
in all databases containing higher level data. The replicated architecture suÞers from the
following two diáculties, arising since lower level data is replicated in higher level databases.
First, propagating updates of the lower level data to higher level DBMSs in a secure and
correct manner is not simple. Second, this architecture is impractical when there are aCHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 33
large number of security levels.
Figure 3.4: The replicated architecture.
3.3.4 The trusted subject architecture
The long-term solution proposed by the summer study group was to build a completely
trusted DBMS from scratch; this is referred to as the Trusted subject architecture and is
illustrated in ßgure 3.5. In this architecture, all DBMS data is stored with the DBMS label,
and only DBMS code can be executed by a subject with the DBMS label. Subjects with a
DBMS label are trusted and are thus exempt from mandatory access control restrictions.
Since the DBMS is trusted, a trusted front-end is not required in this architecture. In-
stead, users communicate with the DBMS through an Untrusted Front End (UFE) at their
respective classißcation level.
3.4 Multilevel secure prototypes
In response to the Woods Hole summer group proposals, a number of development eÞorts
were initiated; some of these eÞorts resulted in the deployment of MLS/DBMS prototypes
or products. This section describes the prototypes resulting from some of these eÞorts.
Trusted systems, especially DBMSs, tend to be quite large with respect to theCHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 34
Figure 3.5: The trusted subject architecture.
amount of code needed for their implementation. Although we stated the desirability of
high assurance for trusted systems in section 3.3.4, with today's technology a complete
formal proof of the specißcations of such large systems is not yet possible; a great deal
of research on formal specißcation and verißcation is ongoing. The enormous amount of
code necessary for implementing trusted DBMSs was largely responsible for the conservative
approach taken by most trusted DBMS developers in exploiting an approach known as TCB
subsetting; the use of this approach is recommended for achieving higher levels of assurance.
The approach requires trusted DBMS developers to reuse and build on previously built and
verißed trusted systems. TCB subsetting was identißed as a strategy for building trusted
DBMSs in the Trusted Database Management System Interpretation (TDI) [66]. This
section discusses the most prominent projects undertaken over the past ten years which
have had the goal of building systems that meet the requirements of the higher levels of
trust specißed in the TDI evaluation criteria.
We have identißed four major eÞorts over this period to design and implement
trusted relational database prototypes. The ßrst eÞort was a prototype of the SeaView
Trusted DBMS implemented by Stanford Research Institute (SRI) International, Gemini
Computers, and Oracle Corporation. The second eÞort was an implementation of the
Lock Data Views (LDV) approach by Honeywell. The third implementation, called the A1
Secure DBMS, originated from an internal TRW research and development project. TheCHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 35
SWORD Multilevel Secure DBMS was the fourth eÞort, developed by the UK's Defence
Research Agency.
3.4.1 SeaView prototype
The most ambitious proposal for the development of a trusted DBMS came from the SeaV-
iew project [60, 61]. The goal of this project was to design a prototype MLS/DBMS based
on the SeaView model.
The most signißcant contribution of SeaView was the realisation that multilevel
relations need only exist at a logical level and can be decomposed into single-level base
relations. The advantage of this observation was mostly practical. In particular, single
level base relations can be stored using conventional DBMSs and commercially available
TCBs can be used to enforce mandatory controls with respect to single level fragments.
The architectural approach taken by the SeaView project was to implement the
entire DBMS on top of the commercially available Gemsos TCB, which uses a dedicated
hardware platform [74]. Gemsos provided user identißcation and authentication, mainte-
nance of tables containing clearances, as well as a trusted interface for privileged security
administrators. Multilevel relations were implemented as views over single-level base rela-
tions. The single-level relations are transparent to users; they are stored using the storage
manager of an Oracle DBMS engine. From the viewpoint of Gemsos, every single-level
relation is a Gemsos object of a certain access class. Gemsos enforces a mandatory access
security policy based on the BLP security paradigm. A label comparison is performed
whenever a subject attempts to bring a storage object into its address space. A subject
is prevented from accessing storage objects not in the subject's current address space by
means of hardware controls included in Gemsos.
In addition to mandatory access controls, the SeaView security policy requires that
no user is given access to data unless that user has also been granted discretionary au-
thorisation to the data. DAC protection is performed outside Gemsos and allows users to
specify which users and groups are authorised for specißc modes of access to particular
database objects, as well as which users and groups are explicitly denied authorisation to
particular database objects.
Since a multilevel relation is stored as a set of single-level fragments, two algorithms
are necessary:
¯ A decomposition algorithm which breaks multilevel relations into single-level frag-
ments.
¯ A recovery algorithm to reconstruct the original multilevel relation from the frag-
ments. It is obvious that the recovery process must be lossless (i.e., it must recover
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In SeaView, the decomposition of multilevel relations into single-level ones is per-
formed by applying vertical and horizontal fragmentation; recovery is performed by Union
and Join operations. As an example, consider a conceptual multilevel relation R with
the schema: R(A1;C1, ::: , An;Cn;TC), where each Ai is an attribute deßned over a do-
main Di, and each Ci is a security classißcation drawn from the set: [U;C;S;TS], where
U ´ C ´ S ´ TS. We assume that A1 is the apparent primary key. The original SeaView
decomposition algorithm consists of the following three steps:
¯ Step 1: The multilevel relation R is vertically partitioned into n projections R1[A1;C1],
R2[A1;C1;A2;C2], ::: , Rn[A1;C1;An;Cn].
¯ Step 2: Each Ri is horizontally fragmented into one resulting relation Rij (1 ´ j ´ 4)
for each security level. Obviously, for the set of classißcation levels [U;C;S;TS], this
results in 4n relations.
¯ Step 3: In a further horizontal fragmentation, the relations Rij, 2 ´ i ´ n, (i.e.,
4n 4 relations) are further decomposed into at most 4 resulting relations. This ßnal
decomposition is necessary because of SeaView's support for polyinstantiation.
A performance analysis of this algorithm by Jajodia and Sandhu [46] pointed out
that the decomposition algorithm leads to unnecessary single-level fragments, and that
performing the recovery of multilevel relations requires repeating joins that may lead to
spurious tuples. The performance of SeaView is thus highly dependent on the eáciency of
these decomposition algorithms.
3.4.2 Lock Data Views prototype
Lock Data Views (LDV) [42] is another MLS/DBMS prototype that was developed during
the same period as SeaView. It was hosted on the Lock TCB and prototyped at the
Honeywell Secure Computing Technology Center (SCTC) and MITRE. It supported a
discretionary and a mandatory security policy. One aspect of this prototype that was of
special interest for the increased functionality of its TCB is type enforcement.
The general concept of type enforcement in Lock and its use in LDV is discussed
in [42]. The main idea is that the accesses of a subject to an object are restricted by the
role the subject is performing in the system. This is done by assigning a domain attribute
to each subject and a type attribute to each object, both maintained within the TCB.
Entries in the domain deßnition table correspond to a domain of a subject and to a type
list representing the set of access privileges the subject has within the domain. Lock's type
enforcement mechanism made it possible to encapsulate LDV in a protected subsystem, by
declaring the database objects to be special Lock types (Lock ßles) which are only accessible
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execute in this domain, only DBMS processes can access the Lock types holding portions of
the database. A solution to the problem of secure release of data from the DBMS domain
to the user domain was made possible through Lock's support for the implementation of
assured pipelines.
Two basic extensions to the Lock security policy were implemented in LDV [43].
Both extensions concern the proper classißcation of data. The ßrst extension deals with
the insert and update of data. During insert and update, the data is assigned to the
Lock type classißed with the lowest level at which the tuple can be stored securely. The
second extension is concerned with query results. The result of a query is transferred from
Lock types into ordinary objects and the appropriate security level of the query result is
derived. The two policies are enforced in LDV by using three assured pipelines. These
three pipelines are the query/response pipeline, the data/input pipeline, and the database
deßnition/metadata pipeline.
The query/response pipeline is the query processor of LDV. The pipeline consists of
a set of processes which execute multi-user retrieval requests, integrate data from diÞerent
Lock types, and output the information at an appropriate security level. First, a user-
supplied query is mapped from the application domain to the DBMS domain, then the
query is processed, the result is labelled and ßnally it is exported to the user. In order to
mitigate against the possibility of logical inference over time, the response pipeline included
a history function. This mechanism was designed to trace the queries already performed
for a particular user and to deny access to relations based on the query history of the user.
The data/input pipeline is responsible for actions that need to be taken whenever a
user issues an insert, modify, or delete request. First, the request has to be mapped from
the application domain to the DBMS domain where the request can then be processed.
LDV does not support blind writes; for example, a delete request will only aÞect data at a
single classißcation level. For consistency reasons, data is not actually removed but marked
as deleted. Before the actual removal takes place, certain consistency checks are performed.
More complicated is the case where the request is an insert operation. Classißcation rules
that may be present in the data dictionary (see database deßnition/metadata pipeline) may
make it necessary that the relation tuple is decomposed into diÞerent subtuples that are
stored in separate ßles, each with a diÞerent classißcation. The modify request operates in
a similar way to the insert operation.
The database deßnition/metadata pipeline interacts with the LDV data dictionary
and was used to create, delete, and maintain metadata. Metadata may either correspond
to deßnitions of the database structure (relations, views, attributes, domains) or the clas-
sißcation constraints. Classißcation constraints are rules that are responsible for assigning
proper classißcation levels to the data. The use of the metadata pipeline is restricted to
a database administrator or database security oácer (DBSO). Here, again, Lock type en-CHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 38
forcement mechanisms were used to isolate the metadata in ßles that can only be accessed
by the DBMS domain and the DBSO domain, and not by the application domain.
Furthermore, data is distributed across Lock ßles by assigning a set of ßles per
security level. The data/input pipeline determines the appropriate assignment of data to
ßles by examining the classißcation constraints stored in the data dictionary. In LDV, there
is no replication of data across diÞerent security levels. The advantage of this approach
is the simplicity of updates. However, there is an inherent and signißcant performance
penalty for retrieval requests arising from the necessity for a recovery algorithm in LDV;
this is described in [42].
3.4.3 A1 Secure DBMS prototype
The A1 Secure DBMS (ASD) [83], implemented on top of an existing DBMS called ASD,
was an MLS/DBMS prototype developed by a research project at TRW. ASD can be
operated in three diÞerent modes. Under the ßrst mode of operation, ASD can function
as a DBMS server on a local area network. Under the second mode of operation, ASD
can serve as a back-end DBMS for various single-level or multilevel host computers. Under
the third mode of operation, ASD can serve as a resident DBMS within a multilevel host
running a secure operating system.
The mandatory object of protection in ASD is the tuple of a table. The mandatory
security policy enforced satisßes the BLP security policy. Tuples also inherit their discre-
tionary access from the tables in which they are located. Discretionary access is specißed
for tables in terms of permissions for access and denials of access. Permissions and de-
nials may be specißed with respect to individual users, groups of users, or `public'. The
permissions are Select, Insert, Delete, and Update. The most specißc discretionary access
specißcation takes precedence over a less specißc discretionary access specißcation and a
denial (at a given specißcity) takes precedence over a permission. For example, a user is
more specißc than a group which is more specißc than public.
ASD also enforces the Biba integrity model [10] which states that a subject may
read a tuple if, and only if, the integrity level of the tuple dominates the integrity level of
the subject. A subject may write a tuple if, and only if, the integrity level of the subject
dominates the integrity level of the tuple.
The ASD system code is divided into two groups: trusted code and untrusted code.
Earlier, in subsection 3.3.4, we stated that a trusted subject is one which is exempt from
mandatory access control; conversely, an untrusted subject is one which is not exempt from
mandatory access control. The trusted code in ASD is part of its TCB. The untrusted code
is replicated by security level into separate, untrusted processes. The TCB ensures that
each untrusted process can send and receive data only at the security level of the process.
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process is the same as the user's session. If the user is accessing ASD while operating on
a multilevel secure operating system, then the level of the ASD process is the same as the
level of the user's process on the multilevel operating system. If the user is accessing ASD
from a single security level host or workstation, then the security level of the ASD process
is the same as the security level of the user's workstation or host. The secure operating
system provides the following services to the DBMS:
¯ separation of trusted processes from untrusted processes and untrusted processes from
each other;
¯ secure communication services between untrusted processes and the DBMS kernel via
message passing to the secure operating system;
¯ protection of the ßle holding the database data, such that only the DBMS kernel can
have direct access to it;
¯ user authentication;
¯ trusted path.
The ßle containing the database data is protected by the mandatory access policy
of the secure operating system. The database ßle is labelled at System-high, the same
level at which the DBMS kernel is running. The secure operating system also enforces
discretionary access control on the DBMS data ßle. The DBMS data ßle can only be
accessed by the special user ÕDBMSÔ. In addition, the DBMS ßle is assigned a special
integrity compartment, to prevent any process other than the trusted DBMS kernel from
modifying the data in the ßle, including the security labels of the rows.
In operation, a query is formulated in the host (or application process if ASD is
used in a stand-alone mode) and sent to the ASD server. The trusted interface ensures
that the request is serviced by the appropriately classißed untrusted DBMS code. This
code processes the request and sends requests to trusted DBMS reference monitor code to
actually retrieve the data. Various trusted utilities are present in the system to create and
maintain the ASD database.
ASD has the capability for running multiple instantiations of the untrusted DBMS
code, each at the same level as the host application process that it is supporting. This
process is only given the data it is permitted to see according to the ASD security policy.
It is only given access to data whose security level it dominates. It can only write objects
at the same level as the process in which it is currently executing. The security levels of
newly created tuples are equal to the security level of the untrusted DBMS process that
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Since ASD will operate under the control of a secure operating system, some security
functions such as identißcation and authentication, that are normally associated with a
secure system, are not part of ASD, but are provided by the secure operating system.
3.4.4 The SWORD prototype
Driven by concerns about the adverse eÞects of polyinstantiation on integrity constraints,
SWORD [85] was developed as an MLS/DBMS at the Defence Research Agency of the
United Kingdom to oÞer an alternative approach to conßdentiality control. SWORD en-
forces security at the element-level of granularity. Previous approaches to protecting the
conßdentiality of information have relied mainly on classifying views or polyinstantiation.
The abstract idea that is the basis of SWORD is referred to as the Insert Low Approach.
This approach allows the DBMS to check whether integrity constraints are upheld without
compromising the conßdentiality of information.
A major design consideration for SWORD was the threat of covert channels that
could emerge from information àows. The insert low approach controls the insertion and
deletion of records in a table in such a way that a user may only insert into or delete from
a table if no other user exists with a lower or incomparable clearance that can access the
table. For example, a user with a clearance of Unclassißed is always permitted to insert
and delete rows because any user with a higher clearance, say Top Secret, that receives
information as a result of these insert or delete operations must be cleared to handle it
anyway because upwards information àow is permitted. The insert low technique is further
generalised in SWORD by designating a diÞerent `bottom' classißcation to each table: the
table classißcation.
The concept of place holders also emerged from the SWORD DBMS eÞort. Place
holders are described in [85] as ßelds inserted into a table by a user cleared at level System-
low. These ßelds have a classißcation that dominates the user's clearance (i.e., they are
`overclassißed' relative to the user's clearance). From a conßdentiality point of view, the
data within the place holder is only overclassißed and is not considered important. Place
holders are used in the ßrst part of what is a two stage operation to insert a record. In
the ßrst stage of the operation, a user cleared at level System-low inserts a record into the
table, comprised of data elements with diÞerent security classißcations. Any ßeld that is
designated for data elements classißed above the Unclassißed level is given a place holder
value. In the second stage of the operation, the place holder is replaced with the relevant
data that was really intended for that ßeld. This update query is performed by a user
cleared above the Unclassißed level, say a Secret user; this user is not permitted to change
the classißcation of the ßeld. Unclassißed users cannot detect this update as they are
prevented from observing the contents of Secret ßelds.
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SWORD DBMS interface is accessible through Secure SQL (SSQL), essentially a standard
SQL extension that can handle classißcations. The insertion of rows is accomplished using
place holders; the ßelds of a row may contain any classißcation level that dominates the
clearance of the user but, without further constraints, this could open the possibility for
a denial of service problem. As an example of this denial of service problem, a user could
insert a place holder ßeld in a record and assign it a Top Secret classißcation. Although
the ßeld value is unimportant, users whose security clearance is greater than Unclassißed
and less than Top Secret, e.g. Secret users, can no longer get complete answers to their
queries.
A retrieval operation is permitted only if a user's clearance dominates the classißca-
tion of the table and, more specißcally, only if the clearance of the user dominates the ßeld's
classißcation. The data in a ßeld is replaced by a special value if a user cannot examine
it; this value will indicate that they are not cleared to see it. However, the classißcation
of a ßeld is not hidden as all classißcations are assigned by Unclassißed users. In order to
update a ßeld, the clearance of the user must be dominated by the classißcation of the ßeld;
this implies that users can update ßelds that they cannot observe. Rows in a table can be
deleted by a user if, and only if, the clearance of the user either equals the classißcation of
the table or is at System-low.
3.4.5 Purple Penelope
Purple Penelope [84] was developed as a prototype secure system at the Defence Research
Agency of the United Kingdom to show that the security functionality of Windows NT1 can
be extended to provide labelling, and other security mechanisms, to support users who must
handle sensitive information. The architecture provides each user with a private desktop in
which to work, along with services for sharing data. Within a desktop, the user is helped
to attach security labels to his or her data. When data is shared, labelling prevents acci-
dental disclosure, but other measures defend against other forms of compromise. Although
Windows NT does not provide any direct support for labelling functionality, the prototype
customises Windows NT to provide discretionary labelling, easy to use role-based access
controls, and eÞective accounting and audit measures for shared ßles.
The functionality provided by the system is intended for use within domains that
work in System-high or compartmented mode Ü it was not designed to be appropriate
for multilevel mode. The assured discretionary labelling functionality prevents those users
with inadequate clearance from observing some data directly, but users with adequate
clearance may use their discretion to relabel data, typically by copying it and giving the
copy a lower label than the original. Tighter controls are imposed on the exchange of
data between domains. In particular, assured controls prevent data being exported from
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a domain without this being sanctioned by one of the domain's members using a trusted
path. Accounting and audit functionality is used to monitor what data is exported in order
to detect, at a later date, inappropriate behaviour amongst users. Firewalls are deployed
to prevent, in a proactive way, any inter-domain communication that is not required.
The Windows NT operating system, and the Microsoft applications that run on
it, contain many open extensible interfaces which allow them to be customised with third
party value-added services. The `Purple Penelope' prototype has exploited these interfaces
to extend Windows NT's security functionality. The author points out that the additional
security functionality provided by Purple Penelope was implemented with a modest amount
of code, and works in systems with a heterogeneous mixture of Windows NT and Unix
servers, including Secure Unix servers such as compartmented workstations.
Windows NT already provides assured security functionality, but this only allows
access to data to be controlled according to user identity rather than by security label.
Purple Penelope exploits the native security functionality of Windows NT as the basis for
an implementation of discretionary labelling whose assurance is largely derived from that of
the base product. The visible manifestation of the additional security is the appearance of
a stripe across the top of the screen. This displays the security marking of the application
or data that currently has focus. Depending upon the application, the marking may be
associated with an entire application, an individual document or a database ßeld. The
screen stripe also displays the marking associated with the data in the clipboard. The
marking of other data which is visible on the screen, but which does not have focus, is not
displayed in the stripe, although some applications may display markings in their window
alongside their data.
Purple Penelope provides each user with a private ßlestore and access to a shared
ßlestore. Applications are free to read and write ßles in the user's private ßlestore, but they
cannot access the private ßlestore of any other user. Applications can read ßles in the shared
ßlestore if the user has suácient clearance and role-based access rights, but applications
cannot modify any shared ßles. Applications may export ßles to the shared ßlestore by
copying them, removing ßles from the shared store, or re-labelling shared ßles; however,
these are accountable actions which must be sanctioned by the user and are subject to
role-based (access) controls. The software which solicits the user's approval establishes a
trusted path and cannot be bypassed by the applications.
The marking applied to selected data may be changed using a dialogue box activated
by clicking on the screen stripe. For data which is private to the user, the action is not
audited, even if a lower marking is applied. For shared ßles, however, the action is subject
to role-based controls and is noted so the users can later be held to account for their
actions. Users can exchange messages, which may have attached ßles. Independent labels
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cannot be sent to users with inadequate clearances. Users may access services hosted on
Unix servers. Services provided by the prototype include discretionary labelling, role-based
controls, track management system, export sanction control, and accounting and audit
functionality.
3.5 Commercial MLS/DBMS products
Besides the research prototypes described in the previous section, during the same pe-
riod, several vendors also released commercial systems that supported mandatory access
controls. This section surveys a number of commercial MLS database products and their
functionalities. These products provided security within the database application itself.
The products include Ingres, Oracle, Informix, and Sybase. Three of these products are
no longer being supported by their respective vendors; the fourth, Oracle, only receives
partial support, provided in the form of a supplementary `labelled security' add-on feature
for the standard distribution of Oracle DBMSs. This feature may be added to the standard
Oracle DBMS distribution to provide additional security, but is not supplied as a separate
autonomous application.
Open INGRES/Enhanced Security 1.2 was developed, distributed, and supported
by Computer Associates until August 2000 as a fully featured multilevel relational DBMS
oÞering an ANSI compliant SQL interface. In addition to the standard discretionary ac-
cess controls, it provided security auditing and mandatory access control features. IN-
GRES/Enhanced Security acted as the primary component in the security of the system
by providing a set of database security functions that covered the areas of identißcation,
DAC, MAC, accountability, audit, and object reuse. The product provided support for a
variety of decision support and application tools including the OpenINGRES/Replicator,
Open Road products (such as Vision and Windows4GL) as well as various third generation
languages.
Trusted Oracle 7 was supplied by Oracle Corporation as a multilevel relational
DBMS, providing all the features of Oracle 7, with the added functionality of mandatory
access control and labelling. Trusted Oracle 7, release 7.2, included all the security function-
ality of Oracle 7 release 7.2, including granular privileges for enforcement of least privilege,
user-conßgurable roles for privilege management, àexible auditing, stored procedures and
triggers for enhanced access control and alert processing, row-level locking, robust repli-
cations and recovery mechanisms, secure distributed database communications and the
ability to use external authentication mechanisms. In addition, Trusted Oracle 7 provided
a full set of multilevel security functionality including àexible label management and pol-
icy enforcement, multiple security architectures, and information àow and dissemination
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architecture approach. Although Oracle continues to provide a `labelled security' extension
for its standard DBMS, its support for Trusted Oracle came to an end in 1998.
INFORMIX-OnLine/Secure DBMS 5.0 was distributed by Informix Software Ltd
as a relational DBMS for multilevel, multi-user, multi-tasking UNIX platforms and is based
on the commercial INFORMIX-OnLine database server. The DAC policy is implemented
by permitting owners of DBMS objects to grant various privileges on those objects, allowing
them to be shared with other users. It is completely separate from the DAC policy enforced
by the operating system. Resources subject to the DAC policy include the DBMS databases
and tables. Appropriate database privileges must be held by users who want to access tables
within a specißc database, in addition to privileges to the specißc target table. In addition
to the DAC mechanisms, OnLine/Secure extends the system-wide MAC policy to DBMS
objects. This extension enables the assignment of labels to databases, tables and rows. The
MAC mechanism provides control over the distribution of data protected by the system
to only those users with appropriate authorisations, and enforce a policy which is fully
consistent with the BLP security policy. OnLine/Secure relies on the operating system
administrator to deßne the labels that are to be used in the enforcement of the system-
wide policy. Operating system services are used to aid in the enforcement of the security
policy when accessing DBMS objects. Informix Software ceased supporting this product in
October 1999.
Sybase Secure SQL Server 11.6 was a security enhanced version of the Sybase SQL
Server running on an HP-UX operating system platform. It was distributed by Sybase
Inc. until 2000 and included security mechanisms for identißcation and authentication,
MAC, DAC, conßgurable auditing, groups, and roles, as well as integrity features such
as triggers, stored procedures, and declarative and procedural referential integrity. Its
identißcation and authentication mechanism is separate from that of its HP-UX operating
system platform. The Secure SQL Server provides àexible DAC through the SQL grant and
revoke mechanism. Groups, roles, and individuals may have access granted or revoked to
databases, tables, views, stored procedures, and columns. Subsequent grants and revokes
can aÞect all or part of the privileges previously granted or revoked, providing the ability to
deßne complex access control policies with a series of simple grant and revoke commands.
Additionally, it enforces a MAC security policy on the subjects and objects under its control
by associating them with sensitivity labels provided by the operating system, and utilizing
operating system label-comparison functions to mediate access. Labelled objects include
databases, tables, views, stored procedures, rows, messages, defaults, user datatypes, and
rules. Subjects correspond to user DBMS sessions, and each has a sensitivity label range
that determines the objects that it may observe and modify. The subject label range is
always constrained by the user's operating system session label.CHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 45
3.6 Multilevel network security systems
As an alternative to using MLS operating systems as the basis of security, we now examine
the use of MLS as a foundation for network security. We consider two eÞorts that inàuenced
this thesis, the seminal work by Rushby and Randell [71], and the work by Kang, Moore
and Moskowitz [51]. The systems proposed by both eÞorts implement multilevel security
and are primarily concerned with secure communication between computers in a network.
3.6.1 A distributed secure system
The focus of Rushby and Randell's work [71] was on constructing a distributed secure
system, rather than a secure operating system. The proposed system, illustrated in ßg-
ure 3.6, combines a number of diÞerent security mechanisms to provide a general-purpose
distributed computing system.
Figure 3.6: Conceptual structure of the distributed secure system.
The approach involves interconnecting small, specialised, trusted systems and a
number of larger, untrusted host machines. Each untrusted host machine provides services
to a single security level. The trusted components mediate access and communications
between the untrusted hosts; they also provide specialized services such as a multilevel
secure ßle store and a means for changing the security level to which a given host belongs.
The approach requires no modißcations to the untrusted host machines, allowing them toCHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 46
provide their full functionality and performance. Furthermore, the approach allows the
mechanisms of security enforcement to be isolated, single purpose, and simple.
The approach to the design of the secure system is based on the key notions of sep-
aration and mediation, distinct logical concerns whose mechanisms must be kept distinct
for ease of development and verißcation. The proposed system uses four diÞerent sepa-
ration mechanisms: physical, temporal, logical, and cryptographic. Physical separation
is achieved by allocating physically diÞerent resources to each security level and function.
The authors suggest that trusted reference monitors can be used to control communication
between the distributed components and to perform other security-critical operations. Due
to the cost of providing physical separation for each security level and reference monitor,
only the untrusted computing resources (hosts) and the security processors that house the
trusted components are physically separate. Temporal separation allows the untrusted host
machines to be used for activities at diÞerent security levels by separating those activities
in time. The system state is re-initialised between activities belonging to diÞerent security
levels.
The security processors in the system can each support a number of diÞerent sep-
aration and reference monitor functions, and also some untrusted support functions, by
using a separation kernel to provide logical separation between those functions. The fourth
technique, cryptographic separation, uses encryption and related (checksum) techniques to
separate diÞerent uses of shared communications and storage media.
The four separation techniques provide the basis for a heterogeneous distributed
secure system comprising both untrusted general-purpose systems and trusted specialised
components, and to be useful it must operate as a coherent whole. To this end, the
mechanism for providing security is built on a distributed system called Unix United. A
Unix United system is composed of a (possibly large) set of interlinked standard Unix
systems, or systems that can masquerade as Unix at the kernel interface level, each with
its own storage and peripheral devices, accredited set of users, and system administrator.
A secure Unix United system is composed of standard Unix systems (and possibly
some specialised servers that can masquerade as Unix) interconnected by a local area net-
work (LAN). All the components of the Unix United system are assumed to be untrusted;
the security of the overall system therefore does not depend on assumptions concerning
their behaviour Û except that the LAN provides the only means of communication. The
consequence of not trusting the individual systems is that the unit of protection must be
those systems themselves and not some sort of communal utility. Although there is no
security within the individual Unix systems, the strategy of the approach is to enforce
security on the communication of information between systems. To this end, a trusted
mediation device called a trusted network interface unit (TNIU) is placed between each
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tion between machines belonging to the same security level. Controlling which hosts can
communicate with one another is a reference monitor function, but because the LAN can
be subverted or tapped, the TNIUs must also provide a separation function to isolate and
protect the legitimate host-to-host communication channels. This separation function is
provided cryptographically, with TNIUs encrypting all communications sent over the LAN.
Encryption is traditionally used to protect communications between parties with a
shared interest in preserving the secrecy of their communications, but this is not the case
here. Host machines are untrusted and may attempt to thwart the cryptographic protection
provided by their TNIUs. For this reason, the encryption must be managed very carefully
to prevent unauthorised communication between host machines, or between a host machine
and a wiretapping accomplice.
3.6.2 NRL pump
Kang, Moore and Moskowitz [51] proposed the NRL pump as a device for enforcing multi-
level security between LANs. It is a hardware device similar to the TNIU described earlier
in section 3.6.1, and it is conßgured as a single device that interconnects a System-high
LAN and a System-low LAN. In essence, the pump places a buÞer between System-high
and System-low, pumps data from System-low to System-high, and probabilistically mod-
ulates the timing of the acknowledgement from System-high to System-low on the basis of
the average transmission times from the System-high LAN to the pump. The applications
that have to interact in the System-low and System-high enclaves communicate with the
pump through special interfacing software components, called wrappers, which implement
the pump protocol. In particular, each wrapper is made of an application-dependent part,
which supports the set of functionalities that satisfy application-specißc requirements, and
a pump dependent part, which is a library of routines that implement the pump protocol.
Each message that is received and forwarded by the wrappers includes 7 bytes of header
ßeld, containing information about the data length, some extra header, and the type of
message (data or control).
The pump can be considered as a network router. For security reasons, each pro-
cess that uses the pump must register its address with the pump administrator, which is
responsible for maintaining a conßguration ßle that contains a connection table with reg-
istration information. The pump provides both recoverable and non-recoverable services 2.
Our discussions will concentrate on non-recoverable applications such as FTP.
The procedure for establishing a connection between System-low and System-high
LANs through the pump is as follows. Initially, the System-low LAN sends a connection
request message to the main thread (MT) of the pump, which identißes the sending System-
2Recoverability safety assumes that any message sent will be delivered to the System-high system, even if connection
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low process and the address of the receiving System-high process. If both addresses are
valid (i.e., they have been previously registered in the conßguration ßle managed by the
pump administrator), MT sends back a connection valid message; otherwise it sends a
connection reject message. In the ßrst case, the connection is managed by a trusted System-
low thread (TLT) and a trusted System-high thread (THT), which are created during the
connection setup phase to interact with the System-low LAN and the System-high LAN,
respectively. Registered System-high processes are always ready to accept a connection from
the pump through the handshake mechanism described above. Once the new connection is
established, the pump sends a connection grant message to both systems with initialisation
parameters for the communication.
During the connection between System-low and System-high LANs, TLT receives
data messages from the System-low LAN, then stores them in the connection buÞer. More-
over, it sends back the acknowledgements (which are special data messages with zero data
length) in the same order that it received the related data messages, by introducing an ad-
ditional stochastic delay computed on the basis of the average rate at which THT consumes
messages. On the other hand, THT delivers to the System-high LAN any data message
contained in the connection buÞer. The pump protocol also requires the System-high LAN
to send back to THT the acknowledgement messages related to the received data messages.
If the System-high LAN violates this protocol, THT aborts the connection. In such a
case, as soon as TLT detects that THT has died, it immediately sends all the remaining
acknowledgements and a connection exit message to the System-low LAN. Another special
data message is connection close, which is sent at the end of a normal connection from the
System-low LAN to the pump.
3.7 Database benchmarking
Benchmarks are vital tools in the performance evaluation and measurement of relational
DBMSs. A database benchmark is deßned as a standard set of executable instructions
which are used to measure and compare the relative and quantitative performance of two
or more database systems through the execution of controlled experiments [44]. Standard
benchmarks such as the Wisconsin [12], TPC-A [79], TPC-B [80], TPC-C [81], and AS3AP
[82] benchmarks have been used to assess the performance of relational DBMS software.
A wide variety of users have been dependent upon these benchmarks to select systems, to
determine bottlenecks, and to verify technology improvement. The Wisconsin and AS3AP
benchmarks are widely considered as the standard relational query benchmarks [44], al-
though the AS3AP is also a complex mixed workload benchmark.
The Wisconsin Benchmark described in [12] was the result of the ßrst eÞort to
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database machines. The benchmark is a single-user and single-factor experiment using a
synthetic database and a controlled workload. It measures the query optimization per-
formance of database systems with 32 query types to exercise the components of the
proposed systems. The query suites include Selection, Join, Projection, Aggregate, and
simple Update queries. The test database consists of four generic relations. Two data
types, namely small integer number and character string are utilized. Data values are uni-
formly distributed. The primary metric is the query elapsed time. The main criticisms of
the benchmark [40, 41] include the nature of single-user workload, the simplistic database
structure, and the unrealistic query tests. A number of eÞorts have been made to extend
the benchmark to incorporate the multi-user test. However, they have not received the
same degree of acceptance as the original Wisconsin benchmark, except for an extension
called the AS3AP benchmark.
The ANSI SQL Standard Scalable and Portable (AS3AP) Benchmark described in
[82] models complex and mixed workloads, including single-user and multi-user tests, and
operational and functional tests. There are 39 single-user queries consisting of Selection,
Join, Projection, Aggregate, and Bulk Updates. The four multi-user modules include a
concurrent random read test or pure information retrieval (IR) test to execute a one-row
selection on the same relation, a concurrent random write test or pure on-line transaction
processing (OLTP) test to execute a one-row update on the same relation, a mixed IR
test, and a mixed OLTP test. The concurrent random read test measures the maximum
number of concurrent users that can be handled by the system when a retrieval operation
on the same relation is being performed. The concurrent random write test measures the
maximum number of concurrent users that can be handled by the system when the same
relation is being updated. The mixed IR test and the mixed OLTP test measure the eÞects
of the cross-section of queries on the system with concurrent random reads or concurrent
random writes. The test database consists of four generic relations, each having the same
number of ßelds and the same number of records. The database scales up by increasing
the number of records in each table. A number of data types are used, including long
integer number, double precision àoating point number, decimal number, money, datetime,
ßxed-length and variable-length character strings. Data values are created with uniform
and non-uniform distributions. A new performance metric, the equivalent database size,
is deßned to measure the largest database size the proposed system can process within a
12-hour time limit. The benchmark tries to provide a balanced workload to test the system
performance on utilities, access methods, query optimization, and concurrency control.
As one of the main objectives of our research is to instrument a performance study
of a prototype MLS/DBMS, we considered 1) using one of the standard DBMS benchmark
suites such as the Wisconsin and AS3AP Benchmarks, since there is no publicly avail-
able MLS/DBMS benchmarking suite, or 2) implementing a prototype and instrumentingCHAPTER 3. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 50
performance experiments with real rather than synthetic variables. We chose the latter
approach because, although the standard benchmarks are generally considered suácient
for benchmarking standard DBMSs, they were not designed to benchmark MLS/DBMSs.
Standard DBMS workloads are not representative of MLS/DBMS workloads which must,
in addition to such factors as database size, and number of concurrent users, consider data
and users at diÞerent security levels. A major factor that impacts the performance of
MLS/DBMS systems is the overhead imposed by the processing algorithms that handle
these multilevel data and users. Existing benchmarking suites do not simulate the impact
of this processing overhead. In the following subsection, we consider an MLS/DBMS per-
formance study that was instrumented to measure the cost of alternative query processing
strategies; this study was not undertaken using a DBMS benchmark suite.
3.7.1 A Trusted Database Management System (TDBMS) performance study
A performance study by Thuraisingham and Kamon [77] was based on a trusted database
management system (TDBMS). The authors implemented and benchmarked a TDBMS
based on the distributed architecture approach recommended by the Woods Hole study
group [6]. The objective of this study was to validate the security policy for the query
operation and to analyze the performance of query processing algorithms in the TDBMS
implementation. This was the ßrst major performance study of an MLS/DBMS. A com-
mercial SYBASE DBMS running on a Berkeley Unix 4.2 operating system was used as the
back-end DBMS for the study. The database contained two relations which may be hori-
zontally partitioned across security levels. The Select-All and Join query operations were
used to interrogate the database as the number of tuples in the relations were varied. The
authors considered a variety of query processing strategies for their cost and suitability.
The performance measurements were based on the response time of each query; this metric
is also used in this thesis. Some of the conclusions from the study were: 1) it was more
beneßcial to perform Join operations at a back-end machine rather than the front-end;
2) performance was unaÞected by polyinstantiation as long as lower level polyinstantiated
tuples were not removed from a user's view.
3.8 Summary
A U.S. Air Force sponsored summit to address issues relating to MLS/DBMS design pro-
posed that diÞerent architectures be considered for building MLS/DBMSs. These include
the integrity lock architecture, kernelized architecture, replicated architecture, and trusted
subject architecture. Each of these architectures provide a way for storing data and con-
trolling access to it. A number of MLS/DBMS prototypes were developed over the past
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the LDV prototype, the ASD prototype, and the SWORD prototype. None of these pro-
totypes became a commercial product, but some commercial database products promising
varying degrees of security were also developed, shipped, and withdrawn during the same
time period. These include Trusted Oracle 7, Ingres, Informix, and Sybase.
The prototypes and systems diÞered in the granularity of objects that they sup-
ported. For example, SeaView supported labelling at an individual attribute value level,
LDV supported tuple-level labelling, SWORD supported element-level labelling, and in
ASD the security object was a materialized view. Some of the commercial systems also
supported security labelling at the relation level or even the database level.
Benchmarks are crucial tools in the performance evaluation of database systems.
Relational database benchmarks, such as the Wisconsin and the AS3AP, have been widely
used to develop performance models, to compare alternative designs, to pinpoint system
bottlenecks, to select software, and to predict system behaviour. They serve as indis-
pensable tools in assisting academics, practitioners, programmers, benchmarkers, and even
managers, to validate database research results, to verify software prototype improvement,
and to facilitate the systems selection and procurement process.
A notable performance benchmark study of an MLS/DBMS system was conducted
by Thuraisingham and Kamon. This study, for the ßrst time, gave some measure of the
performance overhead imposed by MLS processing on standard database operations.
Chapter 4 presents a hybrid conceptual model for mandatory access control including
a description of its salient features.Chapter 4
A Conceptual Model for Access
Control
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a conceptual description of a MAC model for the protection of data
in MLS/DBMSs. Access control is governed by axioms slightly stricter than those of the
BLP model. A TCB enforces the MAC policy, mediating the access requests of subjects to
objects such that there is no unauthorised disclosure. Although the emphasis of the model
is on the protection of the conßdentiality of information, a number of integrity issues that
arose as a result of the protection mechanisms of the model are also addressed. Most of the
existing MLS/DBMS models were designed to be incorporated into a DBMS at the design
phase of development rather than post-development. The model described in this chapter is
proposed specißcally to address the needs of an organization that wishes to adapt its existing
COTS DBMS to provide MLS at a reasonable cost. Earlier in chapter 3 we described two
approaches for representing and controlling access to data, the polyinstantiation approach
and the SWORD approach. Our model incorporates features from both approaches but
draws more heavily from the SWORD approach, specißcally from its insert low approach
and its concept of place holders.
The following section describes the basic properties of the proposed model and
where it ßts between the polyinstantiation approach and the SWORD approach. It also
describes how the proposed model incorporates features from the two camps. Section 4.3
describes the BLP axioms for controlling access to objects and provides a description of
the interpretation of these axioms in data processing operations including insert, update,
delete, and select. Section 4.4 summarizes the chapter.
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4.2 Basic properties of the model
The proposed model is largely oriented towards models that represent data `truthfully',
e.g., the SWORD approach, rather than those that are oriented towards representing data
`honestly', e.g., the Jajodia-Sandhu model. Although the model uses the Jajodia-Sandhu
deßnition of a multilevel relational model, its operational semantics is based largely on the
insert low approach advocated by SWORD. The choice between these two approaches was
determined in part by integrity and performance considerations. We wanted a model that
incorporated the desirable features of the SWORD and the polyinstantiation approaches,
without inheriting their problems. For example, a problem with adopting the polyinstanti-
ation approach in its entirety is its lack of support for element-level constraint enforcement,
and its inability to guarantee that the values in a column are unique. Furthermore, using
the polyinstantiation approach would inevitably introduce performance penalties because
any increase in the number of security levels will result in a corresponding increase in the
number of instances that must be processed in response to a query.
Although the model inherits most of the query processing techniques of the SWORD
approach, including the concept of place holders, its data labelling feature is not only
at the element-level, and is not augmented with a table classißcation as is the case in
SWORD. Furthermore, in adopting the insert low approach, the model does inherit the
potential problem of a denial of service attack that could be launched by a low subject that
overclassißes a data object.
Earlier in sections 3.4.5 and 3.6.2, we described Purple Penelope and the NRL
pump, respectively. Unlike Purple Penelope, our approach does not support discretionary
and role-based access control policies Ü a main feature of Purple Penelope. In addition,
our approach, in contrast to Purple Penelope, does not permit users at all security levels
to label data objects. In the case of the NRL pump, as an application-independent device
that enforces access control `remotely', it contrasts with our approach which enforces access
control locally Ü at the DBMS layer. Furthermore, because the NRL pump was not
designed to enforce security within the individual System-high LAN and System-low LAN,
there is no mechanism to prevent access control violations within the individual LANs if
the pump is bypassed.
4.2.1 Multilevel relations
The model represents a multilevel relation as sets of relation fragments, with each set
comprised of fragments with the same security classißcation. Relation fragments in a set
share the same schema, and are generated by the application of decomposition algorithms
to a larger relation in accordance with the fragmentation rules described earlier in sec-
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security level. The model, like the Jajodia-Sandhu model, supports classißcation at the
tuple, attribute, and element levels of classißcation, but diÞers from the latter's support
for polyinstantiation.
Read and write operations on the relations are controlled and restricted to those
satisfying the `No Read-Up' and `No Write-Down' axioms of the BLP model. A null value
in a ßeld indicates that the subject is not cleared to observe that ßeld. The same semantic
obtains in the Jajodia-Sandhu model and the SWORD approach.
Earlier in section 2.4.2.3 we deßned a trusted subject as a subject that may violate
the BLP security policy. The same deßnition holds for the proposed model. However,
the proposed model uses the current security level fc to escape from the strict restric-
tions imposed by the *-property of BLP. The current security level allows a subject to be
temporarily downgraded before it can execute an insert operation.
4.3 Access to multilevel relations
This section describes the axioms for mediating the access of subjects to objects, and how
these rules translate into specißc database operations. The two axioms that regulate the
access of the subjects in the database are:
1. Write access
A database insert and delete request is only granted to subjects at System-low. For
update requests to be permitted, the subject must have a clearance corresponding to the
object's classißcation.
The write access rule corresponds to the No Write-Down principle in BLP. However,
it is stronger than the BLP constraints in that insert requests are only permitted from
subjects at System-low.
2. Read access
A database read request from a subject at level l is only permitted if the object requested
is at level l and below.
The read rule corresponds to the BLP No Read-Up principle.
In the following sections, we describe the translation of the write and read axioms above
into actual operations on objects. Write operations supported include insert, update, and
delete. The read operation supported is select.
4.3.1 Insert operation
Rows are inserted using place holders, as described earlier in section 3.4.4. A System-low
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his/her clearance. The Jajodia-Sandhu model, like the BLP model, permits insertions by
users only if the classißcation of the object dominates the clearance of the subject. The pro-
posed model, like the SWORD approach, considers this simple test to be insuácient for the
purposes of data integrity. It discourages blind-writes by oÞering a stricter interpretation
of the BLP model NWD property. It permits insertions only by subjects at System-low;
however, this alone cannot guarantee the integrity of data. Users cleared at System-high
must downgrade their clearance to System-Low in order to perform this operation. The
insert operation has the following form:
INSERT INTO table_name VALUES (value1;value2;:::)
Depending upon which fragmentation scheme is being implemented, a specißc valuei could
represent a security classißcation value.
4.3.2 Update operation
A subject may update an object only if the clearance of the subject is equal to the classiß-
cation of the object. This is a stricter interpretation of the BLP NWD property. It diÞers
from the Jajodia-Sandhu model and the SWORD approach because it only permits subjects
to update objects at their own security level and not at a higher level. The Jajodia-Sandhu
model and SWORD both permit update operations only if the classißcation of the data
object dominates the clearance of the subject. The update operation has the following form:
UPDATE table_name
SET attribute_name = new_value
WHERE selection_condition
4.3.3 Delete operation
A subject may delete an object only if the clearance of the subject is at System-low. Once
again, this operation, for the purposes of data integrity, is stricter than is required under
the BLP and Jajodia-Sandhu models. In BLP, a subject only needs to be dominated by
an object in order for a delete operation to be permitted. The delete operation is based on
that of the SWORD approach, but without the alternative requirement in SWORD for a
table classißcation to be dominated. The update operation has the following form:
DELETE FROM table_name
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4.3.4 Select operation
A subject may retrieve an object only if the clearance of the subject dominates the classi-
ßcation of the object being requested. This rule is in agreement with the BLP model NRU
property. It is also consistent with the interpretations provided by the Jajodia-Sandhu
model and SWORD approach. The update operation has the following form:
SELECT attribute_list
FROM table_list
WHERE selection_condition
The attribute list specißed never contains the security classißcations of the corresponding
attribute values.
4.4 Summary
This chapter gives an informal description of a conceptual model for enforcing mandatory
access control in an MLS/DBMS. The model is largely oriented towards representing data
`truthfully', as in the SWORD approach rather than representing data `honestly', as in
the Jajodia-Sandhu model. The model uses the Jajodia-Sandhu deßnition of a multilevel
relational model, but its operational semantics is largely based on the insert low approach
advocated by SWORD.
The model complies with the BLP NWD and NRU security properties but, in the
case of the former, it oÞers a stricter interpretation of the rules. The primary concern of
the model is the conßdentiality of information, but it also addresses, in a limited way, some
integrity issues pertaining to the insertion and deletion of data objects.
Implementing the model described in this chapter requires the identißcation of a
suitable target DBMS that can be augmented with the security policy captured by this
model. Chapter 5 presents the architecture of such a system Ü the Stargres distributed
database management system, a COTS DBMS product, including a description of its con-
stituent facilities and modules.Chapter 5
Software Architecture of a COTS
DBMS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the architecture of the Stargres distributed database management
system. This DBMS is one àavour of the open source Ingres distribution. Stargres is
comprised of a Distributed server component and the DBMS subsystems. The Distributed
server is a data manager that adds the functionality of a distributed relational DBMS to
Stargres. This chapter presents Stargres mainly from the viewpoint of the facilities and
modules that comprise each of its subsystems, our intention being to disentangle the code,
particularly the Distributed server code, and the interdependencies between its modules
before embarking on any kind of adaptation eÞort.
In the next section we brieày explain why we chose Stargres as a candidate for adap-
tation. Section 5.3 describes the software architecture of the Distributed server through its
component modules. Section 5.4 presents the software facilities of the underlying DBMS
and brief descriptions of their component modules. In section 5.5 we show how tables are
created in Stargres. Section 5.6 summarizes the chapter.
5.2 The Stargres distributed DBMS
Before we chose the Stargres DBMS as our candidate for adaptation, we also considered
other distributed DBMSs, namely Mnesia1, and Mariposa2. Mnesia was considered un-
suitable because it did not support the types of fragmentation schemes advocated in our
research; furthermore, it was developed primarily to address the needs of the telecommuni-
cations industry, and the source code was not completely open. Mariposa was considered
1Mnesia is a telecommunications industry deductive DBMS developed by EricssonTM.
2Mariposa is a wide area network distributed DBMS developed at the University of California at Berkeley.
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unsuitable because each of its objects is constantly migrating and does not have a `ßxed
home'; moreover, the latest release of Mariposa was found to be unstable in our operating
system environment.
Stargres is a large software system, which has of the order of hundreds of thou-
sands of lines of code. Its support for fragmentation and query decomposition through its
Distributed server feature set made it an ideal choice for implementing our design. Fur-
thermore, its collection of APIs makes handling of host application calls highly eácient.
Although we did not engage in a full-scale reverse engineering eÞort in order to disentangle
Stargres, we made extensive use of the documentation made available by its developers
and a reverse engineering toolkit called SWAG3 to determine the modular organisation and
their interdependencies.
The Stargres DBMS uses the star query language (StarQL), an extension of the
ANSI standard SQL [56]. StarQL was specially developed for Stargres and supports the full
range of features provided by standard SQL. StarQL also provides some additional features
and commands that extend the functionality of standard SQL; these will be introduced
in the following sections and in Chapter 6 as our description of the Stargres architecture
proceeds.
5.3 Software modules of distributed server
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the high-level and detailed software architecture of the Stargres
DBMS respectively. In this architecture, the Distributed server component receives all
requests for data from users and forwards the requests to authorised local DBMSs; it
never directly accesses the data fragments stored in databases. A local DBMS accesses its
database and returns the results to the Distributed server which, in turn, forwards it to the
user. Modules belonging to the Distributed server perform all the central coordination and
global processing tasks associated with managing the distributed data. The DBMS modules
perform all the local processing tasks. This section will describe the facilities and modules
provided by the Distributed server component; these include: the Global DDL compiler
(GDC), the Distributed query handler (DQM), the Query transformer module (QTM), the
Distributed query optimizer (DOPM), the Distributed query execution engine (DQEM),
the Remote access module (RAM), and the Coordinator database module (CDM).
5.3.1 Global DDL compiler (GDC)
Administrative queries are routed to the GDC module by the Query router module (QRM)
for compilation. Global DDL statements are compiled and forwarded directly to the DQEM
3SWAG is a Toolkit developed by the Software Architecture Group at the University of Waterloo in Canada for extracting
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Figure 5.1: Software architecture showing two nodes connected by a third node running the Distributed
server component. The Distributed server uses a dedicated coordinator DBMS and database to manage the
nodes in its domain. The system provides interfaces that support programmatic and interactive queries.
Application programs and interactive users connect to the system from remote workstations or via a virtual
private network (VPN).CHAPTER 5. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE OF A COTS DBMS 60
module for execution. Each of these statements aÞect the structure of relation fragments
maintained in the nodes or the proßle of objects such as user accounts and nodes. The
CREATE DATABASE, CREATE TABLE, and CREATE USER statements add new def-
initions of either databases, tables, or users to the coordinator database (CDB) catalog.
The ALTER TABLE command changes the structure of an existing table by updating the
global schema in the CDB catalog; it is used to add or modify columns, change the type
of existing columns, or rename columns or the table itself. The REGISTER node state-
ment registers a new node with the Distributed server and updates the CDB catalog; the
converse of this command is the REMOVE node statement.
Figure 5.2: Detailed software architecture of the Distributed server node depicted in ßgure 5.1. It shows
the interaction between the modules of the Distributed server and the host DBMS. The Distributed server
adds the GDC, DQM, QTM, DOPM, DQEM, RAM, and CDM modules to the DBMS layer below.CHAPTER 5. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE OF A COTS DBMS 61
5.3.2 Distributed query handler (DQM)
This module intercepts incoming global queries from the network server module (NSV) and
executes a simple syntax and verißcation check; it also assembles partial responses received
from local nodes. The module verißes the existence of all fragments referenced in the query
before forwarding it to the QTM module for the next phase in processing.
5.3.3 Query transformer module (QTM)
The QTM decomposes global queries against relations into sub-queries against relation
fragments. It constructs query responses using the Union, Join or a combination of Union
and Join to combine the relation fragments into a single relation. The module generates
sub-queries against relation fragments in two steps. First, it maps the distributed query into
sub-queries and substitutes each distributed relation by its reconstruction query expression;
second, it simplißes and restructures the fragment query according to the same rules used
during the query decomposition phase.
5.3.4 Distributed query optimiser module (DOPM)
The DOPM gets the sub-queries from the QTM module as input and generates a global
query execution plan as an output. The query execution plan identißes the sites where the
query needs to be executed, the partial order in which the query gets executed, and where
the ßnal result needs to be sent. The data transfer operations for executing the global
query are specißed in the execution plan.
5.3.5 Distributed query execution engine (DQEM)
The DQEM module provides functions that are used for the creation of relation fragments,
the updating or deletion of several databases within a transaction, and the transmission of
sub-queries to local sites for processing. A record of the transactions being processed by
this module is written to the coordinator database through the CDM which keeps track of
the completion status of each transaction. All newly created relations are registered with
the coordinator database through the CDM. The DQEM references the global CDB catalog
maintained in the coordinator database in order to successfully execute transactions. Local
transaction manager modules must check this catalog before beginning an operation.
5.3.6 Remote access module (RAM)
The RAM uses information stored about nodes by the CDM module during the registra-
tion of nodes, and the creation of databases, tables, and user accounts. This information
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order to direct queries and to distribute fragments to relevant nodes. It utilises a mixture
of graph and stack data structures to help distribute relation fragments, and tree data
structures for its distributed query processing. It contacts the NSV module in the Trans-
action Management Facility to open connections to the nodes that the user is authorised
to contact during a particular transaction.
5.3.7 Coordinator database module (CDM)
The CDM manages the CDB which maintains the catalogs that the Distributed server
uses to keep track of all the databases in the cluster. On receipt of a query, the DQM
module sends a request to the CDM to verify the existence of the tables referenced. If
the table verißcation is successful, the Distributed server then forwards the query to the
nodes for processing. Although the coordinator database is similar to any other database,
it is intended for use solely by the Distributed server. This module also manages the CDB
catalog containing the names of all relation fragments, their locations, and their status
(online or oâine). The CDM also maintains the global log ßle on transactions; these
ßles are used to facilitate recovery operations. The coordinator database, managed by the
CDM, stores the mapping from global relation to fragments, and the mapping of fragments
to sites. The DQM, DQEM, and RAM modules access the database and its catalog through
the CDM. The CDB catalog is not replicated.
5.4 Software facilities of the underlying DBMS
Figure 5.1 also illustrates the software architecture of the underlying DBMS. The Dis-
tributed server relies on the functionality of this layer. Figure 5.2 is an expanded view of
the high-level architecture described in ßgure 5.1; it shows the software modules in all the
facilities except the Storage and Recovery Management Facilities, and portrays a view of
the control àow within the DBMS system. A pipeline architecture, described by Garlan
and Shaw [36], is used in the Query Processor Facility between the Data Manipulation
Language Precompiler (DMP) and the Query execution engine. For the sake of simplicity,
information àows back up the architecture have been omitted, and should be deemed as
implicit. For example, calling a simple SQL command, such as SELECT ?, would require
information to be brought back up the system. This section describes the Applications
and utilities facility (AUF), the Query processor facility, and the Transaction management
facility.
5.4.1 Applications and utilities facility (AUF)
The AUF accepts queries either interactively from a user or from an application program,
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the interactive mode, a user either enters a single SQL statement at a console using SQL
syntax such as SELECT, FROM, WHERE, AND, or enters several statements enclosed by
the keywords ÕbeginÔ and ÕendÔ to get multiple results. In the application program mode,
an embedded SQL application submits a query through its API. SQL statements embedded
in application programs are preßxed by the EXEC SQL command, so that they are easily
distinguishable from the host language statements, and are terminated by a special symbol
such as a semicolon. Three modules in AUF handle the diÞerent kinds of queries that are
submitted to the DBMS. These modules can be seen in the layered DBMS architecture
diagram in ßgure 5.2, and include the Administrative utilities module (AUM), the Query
router module (QRM), and the Client/Query interface module (CQIM) (see below).
Administrative utilities module (AUM)
The AUM, in addition to performing syntax checks, provides a number of utilities for
carrying out administrative tasks such as registering nodes, creating user accounts, creating
or dropping databases and tables, schema deßnition, shutting down the server, and so
forth. Except for the CREATE table command, which is executable by all users, all the
other DDL commands require administrative privilege. In Stargres, two user accounts are
automatically created as part of the installation process and assigned to the DBA group.
The DBA group is one of the most important default groups that exists in Stargres; it gives
all administrative privileges to users who are members of this group, thus enabling them
to perform the administrative tasks.
Query router module (QRM)
The QRM directs queries to the appropriate pipeline for processing. When a request is
received, the QRM examines the query for a local or distributed switch statement. If a
local switch statement is encountered, the query is examined again to determine its type,
and then routed. DML queries are routed to the DMP module, and DDL queries are routed
to the DDC module. If a distributed switch statement is encountered, the query is routed
to the GDC module if it is a DDL query, otherwise it is routed to the DQM module.
Client/Query interface module (CQIM)
The CQIM provides the interface that facilitates interaction between users and the DBMS.
The module also imposes restrictions on the types of commands that can be executed by
non-administrative users; it enforces this constraint by responding with an error message
whenever it receives a request to execute the REGISTER node, REMOVE node, CREATE
database, DESTROY database, CREATE user, or DROP user command from a user. The
concept of `prohibited administrative operations' takes account of environments where the
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5.4.2 Query processor facility (QPF)
The vast majority of interactions with the system occur when an application program
or user wishes to query stored data. These queries, which are specißed using a DML,
are parsed and optimized by the query processor facility. This facility is represented as
a pipeline and ßlter architecture, where the result of the previous component becomes an
input or requirement to the next component. A query progresses through the DMP module,
the DDL compiler (DDC), the query parser (QPM), the query preprocessor (PPM), the
query optimiser (OPM), and the Query execution engine during processing.
5.4.3 Transaction management facility (TMF)
The purpose of this facility is to ensure that a transaction is logged and executed atomi-
cally. It does so with the aid of the concurrency control manager (CCM), the transaction
manager (TMM), and the log manager (LMM). The transaction manager is also respon-
sible for resolving any deadlock situations that occur and for issuing the COMMIT and
the ROLLBACK SQL commands. Furthermore, this facility is also responsible for servic-
ing connection requests to remote databases; it uses the NSV module to add the network
communication element to the architecture. The NSV is running on each node and is
responsible for opening and closing connections.
5.5 Database creation in Stargres
The CREATE database command is used by the RAM for creating Stargres databases; it
has the form: CREATEdb <database name> (<fragmentation option>). The database
name specißes the name of the database to be created. The name must be unique among all
Stargres databases in a particular installation. The fragmentation option, tuple, attribute,
or element, must be specißed as a parameter in the CREATEdb statement. An error
message is returned if the database creation is unsuccessful. We give a more detailed
treatment of the CREATEdb statement in Chapter 6.
5.6 Table creation in Stargres
A CREATE table command is used by the RAM for creating and distributing relation
fragments in each of the fragmentation schemes; it has the form: CREATE table <ta-
ble name> (<attributei> <data type> <distribution criteria>, :::, <attributen> <data
type> <distribution criteria>). The distribution criteria parameter is a rule that is speci-
ßed on one or more attributes of a relation schema when the schema is deßned. This rule
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the value of specißed attributes. The distribution criteria routine of the Distributed server
uses this rule in deciding where to ship fragments; the creation of a table will fail if no rule
is deßned.
Stargres does not deßne distribution criteria on any attribute that is designated as
the primary key, as it associates each attribute with the designated primary key attribute.
A `?' parameter in the specißcation of the distribution criteria is used to indicate that all
values including `nulls' of an attribute will be treated as if they were the same value for
the purposes of distribution. The distribution criteria are stored in the CDB catalog along
with relation schemas. In contrast to relation schemas which are stored globally, relation
instances are stored at the various sites maintaining fragments.
The manner in which tables are created in Stargres diÞers for each fragmentation
scheme. The following examples describe the command for creating tables; they are illus-
trated using the Department relation shown in Appendix A.
Tuple-level table creation
Tuple fragments are distributed to diÞerent nodes based on the distribution criteria specißed
on an attribute. Distribution criteria can only be specißed on one attribute during the
creation of a table. To send any tuple fragment with a Manager value of Cantor to Site-A
and a Manager value of Gerald to Site-B, the required command has the form:
¯ Command: CREATE table Department (DN NUMBER(4) WITH
(Dept_Name CHAR(25),
Manpower CHAR(10),
Dept_Location CHAR(25),
Manager CHAR(25)),
@ Site-A IF Manager = `Cantor',
@ Site-B IF Manager = `Gerald');
Attribute-level table creation
Attribute fragments are distributed to relevant nodes based on the distribution criteria
specißed on the attributes of a relation during the creation of a table. The distribution
criteria routine examines the values of each attribute to determine if they satisfy the distri-
bution criteria. The specißcation of the distribution criteria on attribute values rather than
attributes can conceivably result in fragments that are not vertical fragments, because of
errors that arise during the specißcation of distribution criteria. A non-vertical fragment
will result if the distribution criteria refer to a specißc attribute value (e.g., Manpower
CHAR(10) @ Site-B IF Manpower = `15') instead of using the `?' placeholder. Although
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a robust solution. To send the attribute fragments Dept_Name to Site-A, Manpower to
Site-B, Dept_Location to Site-C, and Manager to Site-D, the required command has the
form:
¯ Command: CREATE table Department (DN NUMBER(4) WITH
(Dept_Name CHAR(25) @ Site-A IF Dept_Name = `?',
Manpower CHAR(10) @ Site-B IF Manpower = `?',
Dept_Location CHAR(25) @ Site-C IF Dept_Location = `?',
Manager CHAR(25) @ Site-D IF Manager = `?'));
Element-level table creation
The distribution of element fragments to nodes depends on the distribution criteria spec-
ißed on the attributes of a relation; this rule must be specißed on one or more attributes
during the creation of a table. Here, the distribution criterion is similar to that used in
the attribute-level example. To send an element fragment with a Dept_Name value of
`Radiology' to Site-A, a Manpower value of `15' to Site-B, a Dept_Location value of `512
West Wing' to Site-C, and a Manager value of `Cantor' to Site-D, the necessary command
has the form:
¯ Command: CREATE table Department (DN NUMBER(4) WITH
(Dept_Name CHAR(25) @ Site-A IF Dept_Name = `Radiology',
Manpower CHAR(10) @ Site-B IF Manpower = `15',
Dept_Location CHAR(25) @ Site-C IF Dept_Location = `121 South Wing',
Manager CHAR(25) @ Site-D IF Manager = `Cantor'));
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a description of the Stargres DBMS. The Stargres DBMS
is made up of two major subsystems: the DBMS, and the Distributed server; each of
these components is further sub-divided into facilities which consist of individual modules
that perform specißc processing functions. The Distributed server component comprises a
number of modules including the GDC, DQM, QTM, DOPM, DQEM, RAM, and CDM.
The underlying DBMS server also presents the Distributed server layer above with critical
facilities such as the AUF, QPF, and TMF.
The next chapter describes how the Stargres DBMS was adapted to provide multi-
level security. It focuses on the critical modules of the DBMS and the Distributed server.Chapter 6
Adaptation of the Stargres DBMS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the technical details of the Stargres COTS DBMS components that
were adapted and systematically integrated with a computer cluster to enforce multilevel
security. We refer to this integration of software and hardware components as the Multilevel
Stargres (MST) prototype. Our description will focus mainly on the AUF and Distributed
server modules that we adapted. The AUF and Distributed server modules were augmented
with MLS code such that the rules for creating nodes, users, databases, relations, and for
distributing relation fragments relied on a security level parameter. We use the term `node'
to refer to a single-level machine in the cluster, and the term `Distributed server node' to
refer to the node running the Distributed server software (see ßgure 5.1) in Chapter 5.
Section 6.2 presents an architectural overview of the prototype. Section 6.3 de-
scribes how the Distributed server was augmented with MLS information. In section 6.3.1,
we describe how the Distributed server was adapted to capture and store MLS informa-
tion. Section 6.3.2 describes how the prototype uses MLS information in registering nodes.
Section 6.3.3 describes how MLS information is used to create user accounts. Section 6.3.4
describes how databases are created in MST. Section 6.3.5 describes how tables are cre-
ated using MLS information. Section 6.3.6 describes the command used for altering tables.
Section 6.3.7 describes the processing of Select, Join, Insert, Update, and Delete queries in
all three fragmentation schemes. Section 6.4 summarizes the chapter.
6.2 Architectural overview
The MST prototype is based on the kernelized architecture approach described in sec-
tion 3.3.2. The prototype consists of a LAN cluster of single-level machines, each contain-
ing relation fragments of the same security classißcation. A designated machine, running
Distributed server software, provides the interface for programmatic and interactive user
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queries. Programmatic applications and interactive users access the Distributed server
from remote workstations via the LAN or virtual private network (VPN). The Distributed
server is the only trusted component, it enforces MLS control by directing queries only to
authorised nodes (i.e. the set of nodes that a user is authorised to access), and by deny-
ing all connection requests to unauthorised nodes (i.e. the set of nodes that a user is not
authorised to access). It does this by comparing the user's clearance with the levels of the
target nodes (i.e. the set of nodes containing the fragments referenced in a query), and
dropping all connection requests to nodes with classißcation levels higher than the user's
clearance if the request is for a `read operation' such as a SELECT SQL statement. All
connection requests to nodes with classißcation levels lower than the user's clearance are
also denied if the request is for a `write' operation such as an INSERT SQL statement.
At the highest level of abstraction, the two software subsystems of the MST pro-
totype include the DBMS and the Distributed server. These subsystems also consist of
facilities, which in turn are made up of modules. We will focus our discussion on those
facilities and modules that form the nucleus of the prototype Ü especially the Distributed
server modules; this by no means diminishes the importance of the other facilities and
modules which also contribute in varying measures to the operation of the prototype.
6.3 Augmenting the distributed server with MLS information
Our adaptation focused on the AUM and RAM. By default, these modules do not capture
or utilise security levels for nodes or users during their respective processing operations.
However, in order to deliver a robust MLS system, these critical modules had to be adapted
to capture, store, and utilise security level information in addition to any other processing-
specißc information that may be required. The AUM was modißed so that a security
lattice can be deßned by the administrator using a DEFINE lattice command. The AUM
also requires the administrator to provide a security level when the REGISTER node or
CREATE user command is issued. The security level ßeld cannot be empty; it must contain
an element from the lattice of security labels in use. Whenever a lattice element is entered
as a parameter in the REGISTER node or CREATE user command, a validation routine
compares the element with a set of valid security labels stored in the CDB, and an error
message is returned if the label entered is invalid.
The administrator is responsible for assigning security levels to all nodes and users.
A security lattice must have been deßned in the system before the creation of a database
or the registration of a node can proceed. The lattice implements a partial ordering ´ on
any set of elements of a newly deßned data type called LABEL. Only elements from one
security lattice can be in use at any one time in a database. In Figure 2.2(B) we presented
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this lattice.
The DEFINE lattice routine specißed in Appendix B, prompts the administrator to
provide a set of classißcation labels representing the elements of the security lattice. These
elements, of type LABEL, are stored in array structures. The ordering of the elements in
the arrays is not related to the dominates relationship that exists between elements in the
lattice.
The distribution criteria routine of the RAM was augmented with additional code so
that the shipping of fragments to relevant nodes based on the distribution criteria occurs
automatically for each fragmentation scheme. We also adapted the CREATE table and
ALTER table transactions to handle the attribute and element-level fragmentation schemes
such that whenever a classißcation attribute or attribute value is shipped, the attribute or
attribute value immediately preceding it in the schema must also be shipped along with it
as part of the same fragment. Furthermore, we adapted the CQIM of the AUF facility to
enforce a `prohibited administrative operations' constraint on programmatic applications
and interactive users such that only unprohibited DDL commands can be executed by
users.
6.3.1 Capturing and Storing MLS information
The MLS information captured by the AUM includes the node name, node classißcation,
user clearance, fragmentation scheme information, and the classißcation level of fragments.
The node name and node classißcation information is captured at the point where the
REGISTER node command is issued by the administrator. The user clearance information
is captured when the administrator issues a CREATE user command; this information, like
the previous ones is written to the CDB catalog via the CDM. Security classißcation labels
are automatically inserted into a table's schema whenever the CREATE table command
is executed. This additional attribute is also stored in the CDB catalog alongside other
attributes of the table.
The MLS information stored in the CDB catalog is available to other modules in
the Distributed server for use in processing. We are especially interested in how this
information is used by the RAM module to only direct queries to authorised nodes. In
the following sections we consider how this information is utilised in creating nodes, user
accounts, tables, and in query processing.
6.3.2 Registering nodes in the cluster
Each node must be registered with the Distributed server before it can be considered a
part of the cluster. The AUM handles node registrations for the Distributed server. To
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the form: REGISTER node <node name>1 (<security classißcation>, <login password>).
The Distributed server must know the security classißcation and the login passwords of all
member nodes in order to communicate requests to them. The administrative request to
register a node is compiled by the GDC module and forwarded directly to the DQEM
module which then executes the command and writes the node information into the CDB
via the CDM. This node classißcation information is also accessible to the RAM module.
A node continues to exist in the CDB until it is dropped. The following example describes
the command for registering a node called Inside with a classißcation of `inside'.
¯ REGISTER node Inside (inside, shhh002);
A node that is registered with the Distributed server can be removed using the
REMOVE node command; the command has the form REMOVE node <node name>
(<login password>). When a node is removed from the cluster, its registration information
in the CDB will no longer exist. The modißed behaviour of the REMOVE node command
guards against the possibility of `dangling nodes' or `dangling security labels'. There must
exist a corresponding node for each security label that is in use; if a node is removed using
the REMOVE node command, then its security label will be dropped and an exception
error returned whenever the label is detected in a REGISTER node command or any other
command that requires a security level parameter.
6.3.3 Creating user accounts
The CREATE user command is of the form: CREATE user <login name> (<clearance>,
<password>). The user's security clearance was added to the parameter list to support
MLS. The CREATE user request is compiled by the GDC module; this module also checks
to see if the value entered for clearance is a valid lattice element. The request is forwarded
to the DQEM module for execution. The proßle of the new account is written to the
CDB via the CDM. The user account proßle, like the node registration information, also
continues to exist until it is dropped. The RAM uses the security clearance information,
stored in the user account proßle, in combination with the node classißcation information
to direct sub-queries to authorised nodes.
6.3.4 Creating databases
The CREATE database command provided by the COTS DBMS has the form: CREATEdb
<database name> (<fragmentation option>). This command may only be executed by a
user with administrative privileges. The CREATE database transaction is executed by the
DQEM, which creates a distributed database, associates it with a specißc fragmentation
1The process of registering a node relies on an earlier conßguration procedure at the operating system level that associates
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scheme, and builds and populates a CDB catalog. The fragmentation option switch is
used to specify a fragmentation scheme for tables of the newly created database; the only
available options are the tuple, attribute, or element schemes. A fragmentation scheme
specißed by a CREATEdb statement persists until it is changed by a new CREATEdb
statement specifying a diÞerent option. For each fragmentation scheme, the distribution
criteria routine in the RAM module that administers its distribution criteria is activated
during database creation. The command SETdf <database name> is used to set a database
to the default database; it also resets the fragmentation scheme to that of the default
database. The following example is a command for creating a database under the tuple-
level fragmentation scheme.
¯ CREATEdb Hospital (tuple);
6.3.5 Creating tables
In contrast to the CREATE database command, new relations can be created by users
logged in at System-low using the CREATE table DDL command; the request is then routed
to the GDC module where it is compiled and forwarded to the DQEM module for execution.
This command, along with the distribution criteria routine of the RAM, were adapted to no
longer require the manual specißcation of the distribution criteria. The distribution criteria
are now part of a routine that executes automatically to distribute fragments. Users cleared
at any security level must downgrade their security clearance to System-low to be able to
execute the CREATE table command. Relations are created and populated using the
insert low approach described earlier in section 3.4.4. The CREATE table command of
the COTS DBMS has the form: CREATE table <table name> (<attributei> <type>
<size>, :::, <attributen> <type> <size>). The `type' parameter deßnes the datatype
of a ßeld (e.g., CHARACTER, INTEGER, ALPHANUMERIC), and the `size' parameter
deßnes the size of a ßeld (e.g., 5, 10). In processing the CREATE table request, the DQEM
module generates an executable transaction that creates relation fragments based on the
fragmentation scheme of the default database; the RAM is invoked afterwards to distribute
the fragments based on the distribution criteria. Information on the newly created tables
and their locations is written to the CDB via the CDM.
The following sections describe how tables are created, how they are stored, and how
the Distributed server keeps track of them for each fragmentation scheme. The Department
relation in Appendix A will be used as the basis of our discussions.
Tuple-level table creation
In this scheme, the TC attribute, its type, and size are automatically inserted into the
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sißcation in the prototype is always named TC; TC is therefore reserved2 and may not be
used for naming other attributes. The following example is a command for creating a table
under the tuple-level fragmentation scheme.
¯ Command: CREATE table Department (DN NUMBER(4), Dept_Name CHAR(10),
Manpower CHAR(10), Dept_Location CHAR(10), Manager CHAR(10));
¯ Modißed command with distribution criteria inserted: CREATE table De-
partment (DN NUMBER(4) WITH
(Dept_Name CHAR(25),
Manpower CHAR(10),
Dept_Location CHAR(25),
Manager CHAR(25),
TC LABEL(20)),
@ High Node IF TC = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF TC = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF TC = `inside',
@ Low Node IF TC = `System-low');
Attribute-level table creation
In this scheme, the classißcation attributes denoted by Class_1, :::, Class_n, their types,
and sizes are automatically inserted into the schema whenever a new table is created; the
default type is LABEL. Any attribute name of the form: `Class_i', where i is any integer
value, is reserved in the system for the naming of attribute labels. The ßrst tuple to be
inserted must contain values in all of its classißcation ßelds; this tuple must be inserted
by the administrator logged in at System-low, because it deßnes the classißcation level of
all the attribute fragments. Tuples inserted afterwards by users are not required to have
values in these ßelds. The distribution criteria routine scans only the classißcation ßelds
of the ßrst row to determine the destination of fragments; it does not scan subsequent
entries. An attribute fragment is automatically shipped to a relevant node based on the
distribution criteria specißed on the classißcation attributes in the distribution criteria
routine. This routine uses the node names captured by the AUM during node registration
in its processing. The following example describes the command used to create a table for
the attribute-level fragmentation scheme.
¯ Command: CREATE table Department (DN NUMBER(4), Dept_Name CHAR(10),
Manpower CHAR(10), Dept_Location CHAR(10), Manager CHAR(10));
¯ Modißed command with distribution criteria inserted: CREATE table De-
partment (DN NUMBER(4), Class_1 LABEL(20), WITH
2Reserved words are maintained in an identißer ßle called idf:sys; this ßle includes both user and Stargres reserved words.CHAPTER 6. ADAPTATION OF THE STARGRES DBMS 73
(Dept_Name CHAR(25), Class_2 LABEL(20),
@ High Node IF Class_2 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_2 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_2 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_2 = `System-low';
Manpower CHAR(10), Class_3 LABEL(20),
@ High Node IF Class_3 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_3 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_3 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_3 = `System-low';
Dept_Location CHAR(25), Class_4 LABEL(20),
@ High Node IF Class_4 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_4 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_4 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_4 = `System-low';
Manager CHAR(25), Class_5 LABEL (20),
@ High Node IF Class_5 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_5 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_5 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_5 = `System-low'));
Element-level table creation
In this scheme, the classißcation attributes denoted by the reserved words Class_1, :::,
Class_n, their types, and sizes are automatically inserted into the schema whenever a new
table is created; the default type is LABEL. Like the attribute-level scheme, any attribute
name of the form: `Class_i', where i is any integer value, is reserved for the naming of
attribute labels. The distribution criteria are specißed on the classißcation attribute values
Class_1, :::, Class_n of each element in the tuple. When new tuples are added to the
table, each element fragment will be examined automatically by the distribution criteria
routine and shipped to the relevant node based on the distribution criteria. The process
of creating tables under this fragmentation scheme is similar to that of the attribute-level
scheme, except that the classißcation values may vary, and the distribution criteria routine
must scan the classißcation values in every row to determine the destination of fragments.
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fragmentation scheme.
¯ Command: CREATE table Department (DN NUMBER(4), Dept_Name CHAR(10),
Manpower CHAR(10), Dept_Location CHAR(10), Manager CHAR(10));
¯ Modißed command with distribution criteria inserted: CREATE table De-
partment (DN NUMBER(4), Class_1 LABEL(20), WITH
(Dept_Name CHAR(25), Class_2 LABEL(20),
@ High Node IF Class_2 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_2 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_2 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_2 = `System-low';
Manpower CHAR(10), Class_3 LABEL(20),
@ High Node IF Class_3 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_3 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_3 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_3 = `System-low';
Dept_Location CHAR(25), Class_4 LABEL(20),
@ High Node IF Class_4 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_4 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_4 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_4 = `System-low';
Manager CHAR(25), Class_5 LABEL (20),
@ High Node IF Class_5 = `System-high',
@ Outside Node IF Class_5 = `outside',
@ Inside Node IF Class_5 = `inside',
@ Low Node IF Class_5 = `System-low'));
Keeping track of fragments
The Distributed server keeps track of the status and location of fragments through the
registration information maintained in the CDB catalog. This information, captured during
the CREATE table operation, was described earlier in this section. More specißcally, it
keeps track of the tuple fragments by associating each tuple with its parent relation in
the catalog, or, for attribute and element fragments, by associating each fragment with its
primary key and parent relation in the catalog. The relation schema of the parent relation
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The distribution of fragments to relevant nodes is dependent on the relevant nodes
being accessible. A node may become inaccessible because it has been removed from the
cluster using the REMOVE node command, or for some other reason. Fragments cannot
be shipped to a node that has been `legally' removed using the REMOVE node command,
as its location and registration information is no longer available for routing purposes; the
distribution criteria routine will not reference any node that is removed this way. If a node
is inaccessible for some other reason, the Distributed server will attempt to contact the
node, resulting in an error message. In this scenario, the shipping of all fragments of the
same table is treated as one atomic transaction; it must either succeed to all the nodes or
fail, thereby preserving the completeness property of a table.
6.3.6 Altering the tables
The ALTER TABLE commands work by constructing a temporary copy of the original table
from the single-level fragments. The addition or alteration is performed on the copy; the
copy is then fragmented, the original fragments are deleted, and the new ones are renamed
as the originals. This is done in such a way that all updates are automatically redirected
to the new fragments without any failed updates. While ALTER TABLE is executing, the
original table is readable by other clients. Updates and writes to the original fragments are
stalled until the new fragments are ready.
To add a column in a tuple-level fragmentation scheme, the necessary command
has the form ALTER TABLE <table name> ADD (<attributei> <type> <size>). For
the attribute and element-level fragmentation schemes, a classißcation attribute is auto-
matically added for each column that is aáxed. We adapted the command to the form:
ALTER TABLE <table name> ADD (<attributei> <type> <size>, <Classi> <type>
<size>). Its eÞect is to create two columns; the ßrst column takes the name specißed by
the user, and the second column, inserted automatically, is named `Classi' by default. To
alter a table by modifying the properties of an existing column, the generic command has
the form ALTER TABLE <table name> MODIFY (<attributei> <type> <size>). The
global schema in the CDB catalog is updated after the command is executed by the DQEM
module.
6.3.7 Query processing
Each request for data is forwarded by the Distributed server to the appropriate nodes
containing the referenced fragments. This process begins when a query is received by
the CQIM in the AUF facility. The query is ßltered by a ßlter function in the CQIM
to prevent administrative operations, such as CREATE database, REGISTER node, or
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called Sievadmincmd, checks the commands in the query against a list of these prohibited
administrative commands; any command that is present in the list is rejected and an error
message is returned. Afterwards, if the query is considered legal, it is passed through the
Distributed server's query processing pipeline.
In the pipeline, table references are verißed by the DQM module, the query is
transformed, optimised, an execution strategy is developed, and the RAM is invoked to
distribute the sub-queries to local sites for further processing. The RAM uses the node
classißcation and user clearance information maintained in the CDB catalog when deciding
which nodes to contact. Queries to unauthorised nodes are silently dropped, and the
target nodes are never contacted. Sub-queries destined for other nodes in the cluster are
forwarded to the NSV module of the TMF facility. The NSV module opens a connection
to the NSV modules of the nodes authorised by the RAM. Recall that if the RAM chooses
not to forward the password of a remote node as part of its argument to the NSV module,
the NSV module will be unable to establish a connection. This feature places the NSV's
outbound traác under the direction of the RAM. The RAM uses the node name, node
address, and table location information maintained in the CDB catalog to determine which
nodes to contact; every fragment is associated with a specißc node in a manner that allows
the DBMS to determine the nodes to be contacted for each request that it receives. A
diagramatic representation of the main processing steps for an arbitrary DML query is
illustrated in ßgure 6.1.
At each authorised local node, the query is passed through the pipeline of the
local query processor where it is parsed, preprocessed, subjected to integrity constraint
verißcation, and ßnally optimized before reaching the query execution engine. At the
execution engine, the query is executed locally using local resources and the partial result
is forwarded to the local NSV module which transmits it to the Distributed server node.
On receipt of incoming partial results, the NSV module running at the Distributed server
node forwards it to the DQM module for further processing. The DQM module combines
the partial results using Union operations for the tuple-level fragmentation scheme, Join
operations for the attribute-level fragmentation scheme, and a combination of Union and
Join operations for the element-level fragmentation scheme. The full result set is returned
to the application program or interactive user.
As a result of time and eÞort constraints, only the Select, Join, Insert, Update,
and Delete DML commands were adapted in the MST prototype. An error message will
be returned by the prototype if it encounters a DML query other than one of these ßve.
The following examples show how Select, Insert, and Update queries are processed for each
fragmentation scheme. The Department relation in Appendix A will be used as the basis
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Figure 6.1: A àowchart illustration of how the Distributed server handles an arbitrary DML query.CHAPTER 6. ADAPTATION OF THE STARGRES DBMS 78
Tuple-level fragmentation scheme
Select queries and Join queries are handled in much the same way; the user's clearance
must dominate the classißcation of a fragment referenced in order for its host node to be
contacted. For every sub-query that reaches the RAM, the user's clearance is compared
with the classißcation of the target node. A connection request is denied to a node if the
user's clearance does not dominate it, and the target nodes are never contacted in this
case. A query is only forwarded to nodes dominated by the user's clearance. The following
example illustrates how a query is handled for a user with security clearance `outside'.
Example
¯ User Query: Select ? FROM Department
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Select DN, Dept_Name,
Manpower, Dept_Location, Manager, TC FROM Department
@ Department.Hospital:Node[Outside, Low]
For the Insert and Update SQL queries, the user's clearance must be at System-low
(for Insert) and equal to the node classißcation (for Update) in order to execute these
commands. As the processing of the Insert and Update requests also progresses in much
the same way, the following example illustrates the Insert query for a user with security
clearance `System-low'.
Example
¯ User Query: Insert INTO Department Values (D30, Psychiatry, 8, 64 South Wing,
Fraser, System-high);
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Insert INTO Department
Values (D30, Psychiatry, 8, 64 South Wing, Fraser, System-high)
@ Department.Hospital:Node[High]
¯ Result: Insert Successful. Tuple inserted @ Node[High]
Attribute-level fragmentation scheme
In this scheme, the Select queries and Join queries are also handled in much the same way.
The user's clearance must dominate the classißcation of each node containing fragments
referenced before it can be contacted. Whenever a sub-query reaches the RAM, the user's
clearance is compared with the classißcation of the target node, and a connection request
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and a query forwarded to it, if it is dominated by the user's clearance. The following ex-
ample illustrates how a query is handled for a user with security clearance `outside'.
Example
¯ User Query: Select ? FROM Department
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Select DN, Class_1,
Dept_Name, Class_2, Manpower, Class_3, Dept_Location, Class_4, Manager,
Class_5 FROM Department @ Department.Hospital:Node[Outside, Low]
For the Insert and Update SQL queries, the user's clearance must be at System-low
(for Insert) and equal to the node classißcation (for Update) in order to execute these
commands. The next example illustrates the Insert query, as it is handled in a similar
way to the Update query. Recall from section 6.3.5 that the ßrst tuple that deßnes the
classißcation of each attribute fragment must be inserted by the administrator logged in
at System-low. Example 2 illustrates the Insert query for a user with security clearance
System-low.
Example: 1
¯ Administrator Query: Insert INTO Department Values (D30, System-low, Psychi-
atry, System-low, 8, inside, 64 South Wing, outside, Fraser, System-high);
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Insert INTO Department
Values (D30, System-low, Psychiatry, System-low, 8, inside, 64 South Wing, outside,
Fraser, System-high) @ Department.Hospital:Node[High, Outside, Inside, Low]
¯ Result: Insert Successful. Tuple inserted @ Node[High, Outside, Inside, Low]
Example: 2
¯ User Query: Insert INTO Department Values (D30, Psychiatry, 8, 64 South Wing,
Fraser);
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Insert INTO Department
Values (D30, System-low, Psychiatry, System-low, 8, inside, 64 South Wing, outside,
Fraser, System-high) @ Department.Hospital:Node[High, Outside, Inside, Low]
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Element-level fragmentation scheme
This scheme is very similar to the attribute-level scheme described earlier; the Select queries
and Join queries are also handled in much the same way, and the user's clearance must
dominate the classißcation of the node containing referenced fragments before it can be
contacted. When a sub-query reaches the RAM, the user's clearance is compared with
the classißcation of the target nodes, and connection requests are granted only to nodes
dominated by the user's clearance; nodes not dominated by the user's clearance are never
contacted. The following example illustrates how a query is handled for a user with security
clearance `outside'.
Example
¯ User Query: Select ? FROM Department
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Select DN, Class_1,
Dept_Name, Class_2, Manpower, Class_3, Dept_Location, Class_4, Manager,
Class_5 FROM Department @ Department.Hospital:Node[Outside, Low]
For the Insert and Update SQL queries, the user's clearance must be at System-low
(for Insert) and equal to the node classißcation (for Update) in order to execute these com-
mands. The following example illustrates the Insert query for a user with security clearance
System-low; it is handled in a similar way to an Update query.
Example
¯ User Query: Insert INTO Department Values (D30, System-low, Psychiatry, System-
low, 8, inside, 64 South Wing, outside, Fraser, System-high);
¯ Modißed query with distribution criteria inserted: Insert INTO Department
Values (D30, System-low, Psychiatry, System-low, 8, inside, 64 South Wing, outside,
Fraser, System-high) @ Department.Hospital:Node[High, Outside, Inside, Low]
¯ Result: Insert Successful. Tuple inserted @ Node[High, Outside, Inside, Low]
6.4 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a technical description of how a COTS DBMS product
was adapted to provide multilevel security. Our adaptation eÞorts focused on the two
main subsystems of Stargres, namely the DBMS and the Distributed server. Although our
design focused on the adaptation of the Distributed server to capture, store, and use MLS
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queries, a number of modules provided by the DBMS component were also essential to the
design. Especially important were the AUM and CQIM modules of the AUF facility and
the NSV module of the TMF facility which, although external to the Distributed server,
are indispensable to a robust prototype.
Programmatic and interactive DML queries are screened for prohibited adminis-
trative operations at the AUF facility. Overall, the prototype relies on the Distributed
server component to prevent access to unauthorised fragments and to perform all the other
distributed tasks such as query optimisation, query decomposition, site selection, and the
coordination required between local DBMSs. However, the Distributed server still relies on
the local DBMSs to perform local optimisations and query execution on its behalf. The
order in which these operations are executed is entirely controlled by the Distributed server
in liaison with the local DBMSs.
Chapter 7 investigates the performance of the three fragmentation schemes sup-
ported by the prototype to determine the impact of varying the size and structure of the
database on the performance of the front-end and network.Chapter 7
Performance Study of Fragmentation
Schemes
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a performance study of the tuple, attribute, and element-level frag-
mentation schemes of the MST prototype. An experimental database, the Hospital database
comprising eight relations was created and populated to facilitate the study. The fragments
of the relations are distributed to the various nodes in the network according to their secu-
rity levels; this ensures that fragments can only be maintained at nodes with corresponding
security levels. Any number of nodes can be utilised, but the numbers must match the set
of labels in the security lattice of the database without redundancy.
In the design of our experiments to determine the relative performance of the three
fragmentation schemes, we identißed two areas of investigation, namely the front-end and
the back-end. These areas are considered to be suáciently sensitive to the eÞects of per-
formance inhibitors as to provide us with an adequate measure of their impact. The per-
formance of a distributed database management system depends on a number of diÞerent
factors; for example, if the DBMS references data over a database link, the performance
of the network infrastructure will have a direct bearing on the overall performance of the
system. In addition, activities such as snapshot refreshes and data propagation also impact
performance, and, to a large extent, their impact is related to the size of the database.
At the front-end, performance is aÞected by such things as user authentication and the
post-processing of query responses. The page size is one of the many factors that aÞect the
performance of the back-end DBMS. This work builds on a previous performance study
described in [77].
The following section describes the environment and organisation of the experiments.
Section 7.3 describes the structure of the database that was used in our experiments; this
structure is modißed to ßt the requirements of each fragmentation scheme. Section 7.4
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identißes specißc performance inhibitors that impact the performance of MLS/DBMS. Sec-
tions 7.5 and 7.6 present the experiments conducted and their results for the Select-All
and Join queries at all three levels of fragmentation. Section 7.7 presents the experiments
conducted and their results for Update operations at all three levels of fragmentation. Our
analysis of the results from all the experiments is presented in section 7.8. We conclude
with a summary of our observations in section 7.9.
7.2 Organisation of the experiments
The local area network that is the backbone of our implementation consists of sixteen
933MHz Pentium III machines. Each machine is ßtted with a 100 Megabit network adapter
card, 512MB of primary memory, 256K of cache memory, and a 36GB SCSI hard disk. This
conßguration was determined in part by the operational requirements of the DBMS. For
example, Stargres requires 512MB of primary memory in order to minimize paging and
operate optimally, and SCSI hard drives allow for multiple concurrent read/writes which is
ideally suited to I/O bound applications like DBMSs. Our network conßguration was also
constrained by the number of machines and other hardware devices that we had available.
The examples in chapter 6 were illustrated using a lattice of 4 partially ordered
security labels. The experiments described in this chapter will utilise a lattice of 16 totally
ordered security labels (1, 2, :::, 16). The experiments use the CPU response time (in
seconds) as metric. The measurements were captured at the Distributed server using a
Visual DBA monitoring tool provided by Stargres. For each query, the tool records the
time it takes for the system to respond to a query. In addition, we also utilise a Linux
network monitoring utility to monitor network traác at the front-end.
For each experiment, we plot the response times in a graph as a function of the
variable whose impact is being investigated. All three fragmentation schemes are also
shown on the same graph for ease of comparison. Furthermore, for each experiment, the
set of response times is computed by taking the average response times of users at all
security levels in 16 repeat experiments. There are in total, 1680 tuples and 48 attributes
between the relations in the Hospital database. For each fragmentation scheme, the number
of fragments are equally distributed between 16 security levels in each experiment.
7.3 Experimental database structure
The Hospital database consists of eight inter-related tables of varying sizes. We chose
a database size that was suáciently large to provide us with meaningful measurements,
but we are mindful of the fact that its size may have to be increased if our experiments
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order to ensure that the database is reasonably stressed we concentrated on two queries
for processing relation fragments: the Select-All query which selects all the tuples in a
relation, and the Join query which joins two relations. These two queries are amongst the
most expensive operations in query processing and have been used by other researchers
conducting performance studies [77]. The following schema represents the structure of the
relations in the database. A subset of the Patient, Department, and Nurse relations is
shown in Appendix A.
The patient table
Patient(P_SSN, P_Name, P_DOB, P_Status, P_Tel., INS_Name, PHY_Name, EC_Name, Patient #)
The Patient table provides information about patients who sought admission to the hospi-
tal; it has 9 attributes and 512 tuples. P_SSN is the primary key of this relation. We will
refer to this relation as R1 in our experiments and discussions.
The emergency contact (EC) table
EC(EC_SSN, EC_Name, EC_Tel., Relationship, State)
The Emergency Contact (EC) table provides information about a relative of each patient
that may be contacted in an emergency. The table has 5 attributes and 512 tuples, each
entry corresponds to an entry in the Patient relation. EC_SSN is the primary key of this
relation. We will refer to this relation as R2 in our experiments and discussions.
The insurance table
Insurance(INS_Name, INS_Location, INS_Tel., INS_Fax, INS_Contact)
The Insurance table contains information on the patient's insurance provider; it has 5
attributes and 16 tuples. INS_SSN is the primary key of this relation. We will refer to
this relation as R3 in our experiments and discussions.
The department table
Department(DN, Dept_Name, Manpower, Dept_Location, Manager)
The Department table contains information about each department at the hospital; it has
5 attributes and 16 tuples. DN is the primary key of this relation. We will refer to this
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The physician table
Physician(PHY_SSN, PHY_Name, PHY_DOB, PHY_DOR, PHY_Salary, PHY_Specialty, DN, PHY_Tel.,
PHY_Pager)
The Physician table provides information about each physician at the hospital; it has 9
attributes and 32 tuples. PHY_SSN is the primary key of this relation. We will refer to
this relation as R5 in our experiments and discussions.
The nurse table
Nurse(N_SSN, N_Name, N_DOB, N_DOR, N_Salary, N_Specialty, N_Pager, DN, Manager)
The Nurse table provides information about each nurse at the hospital; it has 9 attributes
and 64 tuples. N_SSN is the primary key of this relation. We will refer to this relation as
R6 in our experiments and discussions.
The encounter table
Encounter(Patient #, Symptoms, Diagnosis, Condition, Date, Time, PHY_Name, N_Name, Action)
The Encounter table provides information about each patient encounter with the hospital;
it has 9 attributes and 512 tuples. Patient # is the primary key of this relation. We will
refer to this relation as R7 in our experiments and discussions.
The facilities table
Facilities(Facility, Location, Function, Status, Caretaker)
The Facilities table provides information about each surgical facility at the hospital, it has
5 attributes and 16 tuples. Facility is the primary key of this relation. We will refer to this
relation as R8 in our experiments and discussions.
7.4 Identifying the inhibitors and investigating their eÞects
The main inhibitors that aÞect the performance of multilevel DBMSs include the size
of the member relations (based on the number of tuples and attributes), the number of
security levels in the lattice, the page size, and the architecture of the DBMS. We also
recognise that things such as the Selectivity factor (how many result tuples or attributes
are produced by the query), or Join factor (how many source tuples, attributes, or elements
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specißc performance inhibitors, and then design experiments to investigate their impact on
the front-end and back-end of the three fragmentation schemes using Select-All and Join
queries. The quantity of each inhibitor (or variable) will be varied a number of times to
study its eÞect on the response times.
7.5 Select-All query
The following experiments investigated the impact of varying the number of tuples, number
of attributes, number of security levels, user's clearance level, and the page size on the
performance of the front-end and back-end of the three fragmentation schemes.
7.5.1 Impact of varying the number of tuples
This experiment was designed to determine if the cost of processing varying numbers of
tuples and shipping them across the network has a signißcant impact on the performance
of the front-end and back-end of each fragmentation scheme. We chose this experiment
because the size of a database is, in part, based on the number of its tuples (records), and
the number of tuples processed during each transaction could determine how long it takes
to return a response to a user. In addition, when the tuples are disjoint and distributed,
more time is expended by queries that must combine these disjoint fragments.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.1
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R6
Original Query: Select-All FROM R6
Criteria: Vary number of tuples to 112, 212, 312, 412, and 512; ßx # of attributes at 9;
ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of tuples in relation R6.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
Observation and explanation of results
The response times exhibited linear growth as the number of tuples was increased (see
ßgure 7.1 for the Select-All query results and ßgure 7.6 for the Join query results). The
observed linear growth is an indication of the increased number of Unions (for the tuple-
level fragmentation scheme), Joins (for the attribute-level fragmentation scheme), Unions
and Joins (for the element-level fragmentation scheme), that were needed in reconstructing
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Figure 7.1: Impact of varying the number of tuples to 112, 212, 312, 412, and 512; ßx # of attributes at
9; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8. (Select-All Query).
degradation at the front-end, it does not show how this degradation is aÞected by other
inhibitors at the back-end. We will investigate this question in the following experiment.
7.5.2 Impact of page size on the back-end processing costs in section 7.5.1
This experiment investigates the impact of the operating system page size on the back-end
processing costs. We designed this experiment in order to further investigate how other
less noticeable performance inhibitors at the back-end contribute to the overall processing
cost.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.2
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R6
Original Query: Select-All FROM R6
Criteria: Vary the page size to 2, 4, 6, and 8. Fix # of tuples in each node at 105; ßx #
of attributes at 9; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level.
X axis: Operating system page size (in Megabytes).
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Figure 7.2: Vary the page size to 2, 4, 6, and 8. Fix # of tuples in each node at 105; ßx # of attributes
at 9; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level. (Select-All Query).
Observation and explanation of results
The default page size is 8MB. The response times increased signißcantly for all three
fragmentation schemes as the page size was reduced, (see ßgures 7.2 and 7.7). A reduction
in page size means that the unit of transfer between disk and memory (or the physical
record size) is reduced, thereby resulting in increased paging activity as the operating
system swaps these units in and out of the DBMS buÞers in main memory.
7.5.3 Impact of varying the number of attributes
This experiment investigates the impact of another primary inhibitor, the attribute, which
may provide us with further information about the relative impact of all the factors exam-
ined so far. The rationale behind this inquiry is that, as the size of a database is a function
of its tuples and attribute numbers, it is reasonable to try and ßnd out the relative weighting
of these variables on performance.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.3
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
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Original Query: Select-All FROM R6
Criteria: Vary number of attributes to 2, 4, 6, and 8; ßx # of tuples at 512; ßx # of
security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of attributes in relation R6.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
Figure 7.3: Vary number of attributes to 2, 4, 6, and 8; ßx # of tuples at 512; ßx # of security levels at
16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8. (Select-All Query).
Observation and explanation of results
The response times for all three fragmentation schemes exhibited linear growth as the
number of attributes was increased, (see ßgures 7.3 and 7.8). As the number of attributes
increase, so also does the number of fragments that must be combined by Union and/or
Join operations to provide a response, and hence the growth in response times. The relative
impact of attributes on performance compared to, say, the number of security levels is still
undetermined. The next experiment investigates this question.
7.5.4 Impact of varying the number of security levels
We designed this experiment to investigate the impact of varying the number of security
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is an appealing line of investigation because the distribution of relation fragments is based
on security level, and how these fragments are distributed in turn determines the cost of
the recovery algorithm that combines the fragments.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.4
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R6
Original Query: Select-All FROM R6
Criteria: Vary number of security levels to 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16; ßx # of tuples
at 512; ßx # of attributes at 9; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of security levels in relation R6.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
Figure 7.4: Vary number of security levels to 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16; ßx # of tuples at 512; ßx # of
attributes at 9; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8. (Select-All Query).
Observation and explanation of results
The response times exhibited linear growth as the number of security levels was increased
(see ßgures 7.4 and 7.9). The result shows that, as the number of security levels are
decreased, there is a consequent eÞect on how many relation fragments are created, andCHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE STUDY OF FRAGMENTATION SCHEMES 91
hence recovered. As indicated earlier in section 7.5.1, an increase in the number of fragments
to be recovered translates to an increase in the number of Union and/or Join operations
that must be performed in order to provide a response. A multilevel relation with 1 security
level is not dissimilar to a non-multilevel relation.
7.5.5 Impact of changing the number of users on CPU Load
This experiment was designed to investigate and compare the overall impact on CPU Load
when a single user submits a query as opposed to queries from 16 concurrent users and the
CPU Load on a single node. More specißcally, we wish to determine if the CPU Load on
nodes with higher classißcations is greater or smaller than the CPU Load on nodes with
lower classißcations.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.5
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R6
Original Query: Select-All FROM R6
Criteria: Vary # of concurrent users. Fix # of tuples at 512; ßx # of attributes at 9; ßx
user's clearance level; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of concurrent users.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
Observation and explanation of results
Our observation revealed that the CPU Load increased as the number of concurrent users
were increased. The load distribution appears to be evenly spread between the diÞerent
nodes in the network for a single user at level-16, but increases signißcantly when the
number of users increases to 8 (see ßgures 7.5 and 7.10). The higher level nodes appear
to have less load compared to lower level nodes. This increase may be attributed to the
fact that lower level nodes are most frequently accessed because of their security level, as
opposed to higher level nodes which are only referenced by fewer user queries.
7.6 Join query
The experiments presented in this section use a Join query to explore the performance of
the MST prototype's three fragmentation schemes. We plot the response times for varying
the number of tuples, the number of attributes, the number of security levels, the user's
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Figure 7.5: Vary # of concurrent users. Fix # of tuples at 512; ßx # of attributes at 9; ßx user's clearance
level; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx page size at 8. (Select-All Query).
R4, R5, R6, R7, and R8; as a result, the number of tuples has increased to 1680, and
the number of attributes has increased to 48. The number of security levels and the user
clearances remain unchanged.
7.6.1 Impact of varying the number of tuples
See section 7.5.1 for an explanation of this experiment and the results.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.6
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, and R8
Original Query: Join R1 :::R8
Criteria: Vary number of input tuples to 380, 680, 980, 1280, and 1680; ßx # of attributes
at 48; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of tuples in all relations.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.CHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE STUDY OF FRAGMENTATION SCHEMES 93
Figure 7.6: Impact of varying the number of tuples to 380, 680, 980, 1280, and 1680. Fix # of attributes
at 48; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8. (Join Query).
7.6.2 Impact of page size on the back-end processing costs in section 7.6.1
See section 7.5.2 for an explanation of this experiment and the results.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.7
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, and R8
Original Query: Join R1 :::R8
Criteria: Vary the page size to 2, 4, 6, and 8. Fix # of tuples in each node at 105; ßx #
of attributes at 48; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level.
X axis: Operating system page size (in Megabytes).
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
7.6.3 Impact of varying the number of attributes
See section 7.5.3 for an explanation of this experiment and the results.CHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE STUDY OF FRAGMENTATION SCHEMES 94
Figure 7.7: Vary the page size to 2, 4, 6, and 8. Fix # of tuples in each node at 105; ßx # of attributes
at 48; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level. (Join Query).
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.8
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, and R8
Original Query: Join R1 :::R8
Criteria: Vary number of attributes to 8, 16, 24 , 32, 40, and 48; ßx # of tuples at 1680;
ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of attributes in all relations.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
7.6.4 Impact of varying the number of security levels
See section 7.5.4 for an explanation of this experiment and the results.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.9
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, and R8
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Figure 7.8: Vary number of attributes to 8, 16, 24 , 32, 40, and 48; ßx # of tuples at 1680; ßx # of security
levels at 16; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8. (Join Query).
Criteria: Vary # of security levels to 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16. Fix # of tuples at
1680; ßx # of attributes at 48; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of security levels in all relations.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
7.6.5 Impact of changing the number of users on CPU Load
See section 7.5.5 for an explanation of this experiment and the results.
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.10
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, and R8
Original Query: Join R1 :::R8
Criteria: Vary # of concurrent users. Fix # of tuples at 1680; ßx # of attributes at 48;
ßx user's clearance level; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # of concurrent users.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.CHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE STUDY OF FRAGMENTATION SCHEMES 96
Figure 7.9: Vary # of security levels to 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16. Fix # of tuples at 1680; ßx # of
attributes at 48; ßx user's clearance level; ßx page size at 8. (Join Query).
Figure 7.10: Vary # of concurrent users. Fix # of tuples at 1680; ßx # of attributes at 48; ßx user's
clearance level; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx page size at 8. (Join Query).CHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE STUDY OF FRAGMENTATION SCHEMES 97
7.7 Updates
The experiments described in this section investigated the performance impact of an up-
date operation on each of the three fragmentation schemes. The operation involved the
Encounter relation. The Encounter relation has 512 tuples, 9 attributes, and 4608 ele-
ments. In the experiment, we executed UPDATE statements on all the date ßelds in the
relation to 23/11/03 as the number of tuples was varied.
7.7.1 Impact of updating the encounter relation
Operational conditions for ßgure 7.11
Fragmentation Scheme: Tuple, Attribute, and Element
Relations: R7
Original Query: UPDATE R7; SET Date TO 23/11/03
Criteria: Vary # of tuples; ßx # of concurrent users; ßx # of attributes at 9; ßx user's
clearance level; ßx # of security levels at 16; ßx page size at 8.
X axis: # tuples updated.
Y axis: CPU time in seconds.
Figure 7.11: Vary # of tuples; ßx # of concurrent users; ßx # of attributes at 9; ßx user's clearance level;
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Observation and explanation of results
Our observation reveals a clear disparity in CPU times between the fragmentation schemes
for update operations. The CPU time for executing updates in the element-level fragmen-
tation scheme was greater than for the attribute and tuple-level fragmentation schemes (see
ßgure 7.11). This result shows that the CPU time consumed during update operations is
signißcantly higher than that consumed during the query processing operations illustrated
in our earlier experiments.
7.8 Analysis of experimental results
This section presents an analysis of how changes in the variables presented in our study
aÞect the amount of operations performed by the prototype and the network traác gener-
ated. Overall, the results have shown that the workload generated by each fragmentation
scheme impacts the performance of the prototype.
7.8.1 Impact of varying the inhibitors on network performance
All three fragmentation schemes exhibited linear growth as the number of tuples were
increased for both types of queries (see ßgures 7.1 and 7.6). However, the results also
show that the attribute-level fragmentation scheme performs better than the tuple and
element-level schemes. The worst performance was demonstrated by the element-level
fragmentation scheme, which exhibited considerable performance degradation. The impact
of network traác on the performance degradation also appears to be signißcant; however,
this is true for distributed database systems in general. The response time of the element-
level fragmentation scheme is signißcantly higher than for the tuple and attribute-level
schemes.
The page size is shown to have a signißcant impact on performance (see ßgures 7.2
and 7.7). This observation was very evident during the experiments when a number of Õseg-
mentation violation faultsÔ (when a process overàows its stack) occurred as we decreased
the page size below 8. The kernel recognised the violation but could not extend the stack
size up to a conßgurable limit as is common in many operating systems. The Linux kernel
does not keep track of each user thread's stack, so it was unable to perform this function.
The implication of this observation for security is that the security domain of the MST
prototype could become compromised by a Trojan Horse if page faults and stack overàows
are a frequent occurrence.
There was evidence of performance degradation in all three schemes as the number
of attributes was increased (see ßgures 7.3 and 7.8). The attribute-level scheme continues
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case scenario was demonstrated by the element-level scheme. The comparatively modest
impact shown as the number of attributes was increased left us wondering what would
occur if the number of security levels was varied? Could the impact be more pronounced
than, say, the impact of increasing the numbers of tuples or attributes?
Increasing the number of security levels gave a noticeable growth in response times.
This is illustrated in ßgures 7.4 and 7.9 for both types of queries. By varying the number
of security levels, we also vary the amount of `reconstruction' required in computing a
response. If one security level were to be used, the amount of reconstruction (vertical or
horizontal) would be a fraction of that required for 16 security levels. The results show that
the performance of the attribute-level scheme is superior to that of the tuple and element-
level schemes; the element-level scheme continues to exhibit signißcant degradation. The
results also show a more pronounced diÞerence if a case with one security level is compared
with one in which several security levels exist. Overall, it was found that a change in
the number of security levels had a noticeable impact on the performance of all three
fragmentation schemes.
As the number of users in the system increased, so did the overall CPU Load.
The variation in CPU Load between higher level nodes and lower level nodes was clearly
signißcant (see ßgures 7.5 and 7.10). The result reveals that nodes maintaining higher level
fragments have an increased workload in most instances because they have the clearance to
process fragments from several more nodes in the network. Contrast this with a Level-1 user
who may want to reference all the distributed fragments but is unable to do so; consequently
the workload of the Level-1 user's node is diminished because the node performs only a
small fraction of the overall data processing task.
The cost of performing Join queries imposes additional overheads as was shown in
the results from all previous `Join' experiments, resulting in further performance degra-
dation. We attribute the variations in response times between the three schemes to the
overhead cost of executing the recovery algorithm and the network overhead. The element-
level fragmentation scheme creates more fragments which must be combined to provide a
response; this operation of combining fragments, especially for the element-level scheme,
increases the network traác signißcantly.
7.8.2 Impact of varying the inhibitors on front-end processing
As we increased the number of attributes in all three fragmentation schemes, the response
times increased as a function of the number of attributes (see ßgures 7.3 and 7.8). Varying
the number of attributes is implicitly the same as varying the size of the tuples; conse-
quently, as the number of attribute fragments increase, so does the size of the records
being retrieved in each fragment. There is a performance penalty inherent in processing
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connection requests that must now be sent to more disjoint vertical fragments distributed
across the network nodes. The results show that the response times of all three fragmenta-
tion schemes exhibited linear growth, increasing as the number of attributes were increased.
The security label of each tuple, attribute, or element is also treated as an attribute in its
own right, and therefore has an impact as we increase the number of attributes. The
element-level scheme, however, continues to exhibit poor performance relative to the tuple
and attribute-level schemes.
The results of varying the number of security levels also shows linear growth (see
ßgures 7.4 and 7.9). This increase attests to the noticeable performance degradation in all
three schemes, especially in the element-level scheme. Overall, the attribute-level scheme
continues to exhibit superior performance relative to the tuple and element-level schemes.
The overall CPU Load increased signißcantly as the number of concurrent users in
the system increased (see ßgures 7.5 and 7.10). However, the fraction of the overall load
borne by higher level nodes was signißcantly higher than for lower level nodes. Again,
this observation shows that the inherent advantages (i.e. access to more information) that
come with the highest clearance in a security lattice also has its associated performance
penalties. Essentially, what this indicates is that higher level nodes may often examine
more data during query processing than lower level nodes, which are restricted by security
policies from doing so.
7.8.3 Impact of executing an UPDATE operation
The need to coordinate distributed transactions throughout the network imposes a signiß-
cant cost on the performance of all three fragmentation schemes. Although the prototype
uses a variant of the two-phase commit protocol that allows local machines to fail without
forcing a `global rollback', signißcant performance gains are not evident. The relative per-
formance of the three fragmentation schemes is unchanged in this experiment Ü with the
element-level fragmentation scheme still exhibiting signißcant performance degradation.
The Stargres Visual DBA monitoring tool also revealed a signißcant demand in network
resources as the number of local DBMSs to which data must be distributed increases. This
observation was particularly evident for the element-level fragmentation scheme.
The amount of operations performed by the prototype is largely determined by the
fragmentation scheme. The more fragments and nodes that must be contacted in response
to a query, the higher the processing cost. This cost rises signißcantly for the element-level
fragmentation scheme and is partly responsible for the high performance degradation that
besets this approach. The implication for this study is that the fragmentation scheme that
processes the most amount of fragments is burdened as the various disjoint fragments are
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7.9 Summary
Through a number of experiments, this chapter compared the performance of all three
fragmentation schemes of the MST prototype. We investigated the performances by varying
the numbers of tuples, attributes, security levels, user's clearance level, and page size using
the Select-All and Join queries. All three fragmentation schemes exhibited linear growth as
the numbers of each variable were increased. However, the attribute-level scheme performed
better than the tuple and element-level schemes. The element level scheme exhibited the
worst case of performance degradation due to the numerous Union and Join operations
required to reconstruct its response relations. The attribute-level scheme exhibited the best
performance for both types of queries. The impact of varying the number of attributes and
the number of security levels was not as signißcant as the impact of varying the number of
tuples. The overhead imposed by network traác continues to have a signißcant impact on
the response times; this impact increases with the number of nodes that must be contacted
in response to a user's query. The processing cost is directly aÞected by the fragmentation
scheme; the scheme with the greatest number of fragments to process imposes a higher
load on the system. In addition, the type of query processing Ü be it a Join or a Union
Ü makes the impact on the front-end more pronounced.
The processing cost imposed by Join query operations had a signißcant impact on
system performance, resulting in an increased response time for all three schemes. The
increased response times compared unfavourably to the Select-All query operations. The
overall CPU Load also increased signißcantly as the number of concurrent users increased.
The cost of performing updates, although signißcantly higher than that for query
processing, did not contradict the growth pattern observed for all three fragmentation
schemes. The observed increase in processing activity during updates, particularly for the
element-level fragmentation scheme, amplißed the performance degradation of the element-
level scheme to a level that may be unacceptably high for most database processing envi-
ronments.
In chapter 8, we present some conclusions from the adaptation eÞort of the Stargres
DBMS and the performance investigations presented in this chapter. We also suggest a
few areas that are in need of further work to enhance the MST prototype.Chapter 8
Conclusions and Further Research
The development cost and complexity of MLS/DBMS software is cited by most vendors
as a major factor in their decision to cease supporting these software systems. Some
researchers also argue that the era of MLS/DBMS research and development has come
to an end, but only a few contend that the security concerns that instigated the early
research eÞorts have ceased to exist. In the presence of these concerns, it is important that
we continue to consider less complex and more cost eÞective alternatives to implementing
multilevel security in DBMSs. This thesis proposed one alternative approach that augments
an existing COTS DDBMS product with multilevel security, and that has been prototyped
in a limited adaptation eÞort.
In adapting the COTS DDBMS to provide multilevel security at the tuple, attribute,
and element-level fragmentation schemes, we encountered several research issues that had
a direct or indirect impact on the performance of each fragmentation scheme. In our
approach, we targeted and adapted specißc modules in the COTS DDBMS, specißcally
those modules in the query processing pipeline that are responsible for transforming and/or
routing an SQL query. The following section summarises our contributions, draws some
conclusions from our work, and discusses the eÞort involved and issues raised in adapting a
COTS DBMS to MLS/DBMS. Section 8.2 presents a brief MLS analysis of our prototype.
Section 8.3 points to areas requiring further research.
8.1 Contributions and conclusions
The major contributions of our work are related to the adaptation of the Stargres system,
and to the performance experiments that were instrumented using the system. The per-
formance experiments revealed information about the impact of diÞerent variables on the
performance of MLS/DBMSs implemented under three fragmentation schemes. It adds to
the work of Thuraisingham and Kamon [77], described in chapter 3, in the sense that the
impact of more variables was placed under observation, and at diÞerent levels of granularity.
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8.1.1 Summary of contributions
Collectively, the contributions of this thesis demonstrate the feasibility of adapting a COTS
DDBMS product to provide multilevel security. We also illuminated performance argu-
ments that must be considered by organisations that would wish to embark on a similar
adaptation eÞort. A summary of the main contributions of this thesis is as follows:
¯ Our proposed approach contends that the query processing techniques developed for
transforming global queries into query fragments in distributed databases can also be
used to eáciently implement multilevel security. To this end, we augmented a COTS
DDBMS code with multilevel logic such that the distribution of relation fragments and
sub-queries to relevant nodes is determined on the basis of security level only. This
ensures that sub-queries en-route to unauthorised nodes are intercepted and dropped
by the Distributed server.
¯ We developed a prototype that utilises the query decomposition and recovery feature
of distributed databases to recover relation fragments distributed across several nodes
in a network. We also show that the same techniques used for adapting the Stargres
COTS product, in which critical modules were augmented with MLS code, can also
be utilised by subscribers to MLS policy who no longer enjoy direct vendor support.
¯ We investigated the performance of the three fragmentation schemes supported by
the MST prototype to determine the impact of varying properties such as the number
of tuples, number of attributes, number of security levels, number of nodes, user
clearance, and page size on the front-end and the network for a Select-All and Join
query. A full analysis of experimental data was given in chapter 7; however, a summary
of the main ßndings from the performance study is as follows:
Û All three fragmentation schemes exhibited linear growth as the number of tuples
and attributes were increased for the Select-All and Join queries; however, the
rate of performance degradation was more evident in the element-level fragmen-
tation scheme. The performance of the attribute-level fragmentation scheme was
comparatively superior to the tuple and element-level schemes (see sections 7.5.1
and 7.5.3).
Û Performance is aÞected by the page size in all three fragmentation schemes; it
deteriorates as the page size decreases due to increased paging activity (see sec-
tion 7.5.2).
Û A variation in the number of security levels aÞects the performance of all three
fragmentation schemes. As the number of security levels increases, so does the
amount of reconstruction needed to generate a response set, which in turn in-
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respect to the number of security levels. Its eÞect is more evident in the element-
level fragmentation scheme (see section 7.5.4).
Û The number of concurrent users in the system also directly impacts performance.
As the number of users increases, so does the performance degradation. The degra-
dation is more pronounced at the element-level of granularity if all the concurrent
users are logged-in at System-high, because there are more fragments being pro-
cessed. This contrasts with a scenario where all the concurrent users are logged-in
at System-low and can only access a fraction of the overall number of fragments
available (see section 7.5.5).
8.1.2 Conclusions
Our approach provides organisations with a strategy for adapting their existing COTS
DBMSs to provide multilevel security. An MLS/DBMS can be deployed without the pro-
hibitive cost of investing in custom designed MLS/DBMSs. The main ßnding described
in the previous section will also provide these organisations with suácient information to
determine if a particular type of system ßts their requirements. There are several possible
system types that can be created as a result of the information provided by the study.
For example, an organisation could choose to implement the element-level fragmentation
scheme but with limits placed upon the number of security levels. We draw the following
conclusions about the eÞort and the performance experiments that were conducted.
¯ The performance variations between the three fragmentation schemes translates into
large cost diÞerences. Based on the results of the performance experiments, the
attribute-level fragmentation scheme provides a better implementation option, that
is, if the main indicator of a system's suitability is its response time.
¯ There is a signißcant network overhead, increasing as the number of fragments be-
ing processed increases. This is particularly true for the element-level fragmentation
scheme. An organisation's network architecture and conßguration should be a factor
in deciding which scheme to implement.
¯ Adapting an existing COTS DBMS, although a non-trivial task, can be accomplished
with modest resources and within a reasonable time. However the complexity of
the task and the possibility of success or failure is for the most part determined
by the internal structure of the target software. Overall, the AUF facility and the
Distributed server modules that were adapted, consisted of more than 57 functions
with approximately 4,860 lines of code in total. It should be recognised that not all
COTS DBMS products will be suitable candidates for the kind of adaptation eÞort
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¯ The COTS DBMS products individually do not provide high assurance solutions, and
the successful integration and operation of the constituent components was highly chal-
lenging. We encountered the following issues during the adaptation and conßguration
eÞort:
Û The identißcation of a suitable and stable open source DDBMS was not as ef-
fortless as we had anticipated. Many of the open source DBMS products that
are currently available do not possess a distributed feature set; distribution was
a necessary requirement in our design. Although Mnesia and Mariposa (see sec-
tion 5.2) were highly documented systems, Mnesia did not support fragmentation
Ü a key requirement in our target system; for Mariposa, the issue of objects mi-
grating to other nodes presented a security dilemma; controlling the movement of
objects was necessary to ensure security. After identifying Stargres as a suitable
target for adaptation, the next challenge was to successfully disentangle the code
to identify the modules that could be modißed. Due to the size of the DDBMS,
it was impractical to undertake this task manually, and hence a SWAG reverse
engineering toolkit (see section 5.2) was utilised to identify the modules and their
interdependencies.
Û The conßguration of the network was accomplished using the LinuxConf utility;
this was for the most part, rather straightforward. However, by default, the
resolution of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and host names was managed by a
Domain Name Server (DNS) outside of our experimental cluster. Dropping this
role and assigning it to the Distributed server node required a re-conßguration
of the entire subnet such that 1) the Distributed server is not also acting as the
Domain Name Server for any node outside the cluster, and 2) nodes in the cluster
cannot contact a DNS outside the cluster to resolve host names. Our strategy
was to separate the cluster traác from the pre-existing network traác by routing
them through separate switches, thus providing our cluster with its own dedicated
switch. This part of the task was easily accomplished. A problem emerged because
of a requirement in the Linux DNS conßguration that the hostnames and IP
addresses be listed in the host ßles of a primary and secondary DNS. Although
the traác was separated, a node in the cluster that is unable to contact the
Distributed server node within a specißc time frame will seek resolution at a
secondary DNS outside of the cluster, and, if that fails, it will default to other
nodes further up the network tree. This situation was an obvious security àaw
that required the editing of a ßle located at the /etc/host directory of each node
in the cluster.
Û A signißcant part of the Stargres DBMS source code is uncommented, and, in
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cant compilation problems during the adaptation eÞort, resulting in delays. The
most signißcant of the problems relates to the cascading nature of logic errors to
other modules after a function has been altered. For example, when the Register
node command was modißed to require a security label entry, it generated several
referential errors and memory consistency errors in the RAM and CDM modules
of the Distributed server. This remains one of the major challenges involved in
the adaptation of a COTS DBMS software, or any other large software system for
that matter.
8.2 Security analysis of MST
The design of our proposed model (see chapter 4) was inàuenced largely by our thesis Û
the adaptation of a COTS distributed DBMS for MLS. This resulted in a tradeoÞ between
security (covert channels) and the practicality of implementation. The complexity and size
of modern DBMSs also means that it is impractical for an entire DBMS system to be subject
to an exhaustive security analysis. Consequently, we only engaged in a limited MLS analysis
of the prototype's trusted component, i.e., the Distributed server Û recognising that covert
channels can never be totally eliminated in many practical high assurance systems. All the
other components of the prototype are untrusted (i.e., they are not exempt from mandatory
access control). The Distributed server mediates all accesses made by subjects to objects
using a set of mechanisms and modules that control access to objects, assign security levels,
maintain subject and object attributes, and perform logging functions. Compliance with
MLS policy, ensuring that information àows within the MST system does not lead to a
violation of the BLP's two security properties, is considered in the context of four scenarios.
These scenarios include the Insert, Retrieve, Update, and Delete operations. For each of
these scenarios, we identify possible threats, their sources, and their impact.
8.2.1 Processing Scenarios
The following scenarios are typical of the kinds of operations that are requested of the
MST prototype by users. An analysis of the information àows during these operations
is necessary to determine the degree to which the prototype complies with MLS policy,
particularly the BLP properties.
¯ Insert operations. Users may only insert tuples if they are logged-in at System-low.
System-high users cannot insert tuples unless their security level is downgraded to
System-low.
¯ Retrieve operations. Users can only retrieve data classißed at or below their security
levels. A user logged-in at System-low cannot view data classißed at System-high.CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 107
¯ Update operations. Users may only update tuples at their security levels only.
Upwards information àow is permitted.
¯ Delete operations. Users may only delete tuples if they are logged-in at System-
low. System-high users must downgrade their security levels to System-low in order
to delete a tuple.
8.2.2 Threats and their sources
Threats to the security of the MST prototype can be in diÞerent forms. We will only
consider threats arising from a denial of service attack, the insertion of a Trojan Horse in a
data communication device, and the presence of covert channels in the Distributed server.
These threats can result in sensitive data being made unavailable to authorised users, the
disclosure of sensitive information, or the illegal modißcation of data. The threats can also
occur intentionally or accidentally, but whatever the cause they are all damaging if they
are realised.
1. Denial of service attack. The database could be monopolised in such a way that
legitimate users cannot access complete records. For example, during insertion opera-
tions, a user logged-in at Level-1 could launch this type of attack by inserting a place
holder ßeld in a record and assigning it a Level-16 classißcation, thereby preventing
all users (except Level-16 users) from getting complete answers to their queries (see
3.4.4).
2. Communication attack. The Distributed server has the special privilege of han-
dling communication between all the nodes in the cluster. This privilege makes it an
ideal target for attack. The communication link could be tampered with by inserting
a Trojan Horse at the switch designed to intercept and perhaps modify data commu-
nications between the nodes in the cluster. This threat is very much implementation-
dependent and any further analysis would be highly speculative. However, it is clear
that, wherever possible, the LAN devices and communication links should be designed
to minimise the threats.
3. Trojan Horse attack. Despite the mandatory access control mechanism of the Dis-
tributed server, it is still possible for a Trojan Horse running at the Distributed server
to covertly leak information. The MST prototype, like all multilevel systems, requires
information àow from System-low to System-high. Furthermore, reliability and atom-
icity1 of transactions are also integral components of high-assurance computing. In a
COTS DBMS, a user/process would wish to receive an acknowledgement of a success-
ful update. Without acknowledgements, necessary data may be written over, or may
1All or nothing without the appearance of interruptions.CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 108
be lost during a crash. In a non-secure DBMS like the Stargres, there is no problem
with acknowledgements; however, in a secure DBMS like MST, acknowledgements can
allow a covert channel to exist between System-low and System-high. In the following,
we show how a Trojan Horse can exploit the Distributed server and cause the release
of sensitive information.
(a) A Trojan Horse running at the Distributed server could continuously monitor
inbound/outbound traác at the NSV module of the Distributed server, noting
the type and classißcation label of each request, and transmitting this information
to a second Trojan Horse at a System-low node which could then store the data
for later use. Recall that the NSV module is aware of the address of all the nodes
in the cluster and will only contact them if authorised to do so by the Distributed
server.
(b) The contents of the CDB, specißcally the classißcation of data objects and the
clearance of users, which unlike user passwords are unencrypted, could be at-
tacked by two cooperating Trojan Horses. A legal query could be launched by
the Trojan Horse running at the Distributed server against a specißc CDB table
to retrieve its entries; this could then be written to a System-low node using the
same technique described in (a) above. This vulnerability, as we stated earlier, is
a consequence of the tradeoÞs that had to be made in building the MST prototype
from several COTS components. Furthermore, our design assumed that, because
the Distributed server is trusted, additional security measures were perhaps un-
necessary to protect it from compromise. The basis of this assumption is that the
Distributed server will not fall victim to a Trojan Horse attack; however, this is
highly speculative. Further security measures could be employed to protect the
contents of the CDB from such an attack, but the performance penalty of applying
these measures must also be considered.
(c) A user at System-low can infer high-level information (Allen and Reuter's salary)
by formulating a query such as: If (Allen's salary > Reuter's salary) return
1, else return 0. This query will modulate its output based on the value of
System-high data.
8.2.3 Impact of security threats
Next, we consider the impact of the threats identißed in the previous section. If threat
#1 is successful, all (except Level-16 users) will be denied access to information to which
they are authorised, leading to a signißcant degradation in quality of service. Undoing the
impact of this damage will depend to a large extent on the number of data items that
are aÞected and that therefore must be re-classißed. Should threat #2 become successful,CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 109
adherence to the BLP's security policies will be gravely compromised as the Trojan Horse
could modify the security labels of fragments, the clearance of a user making a request, or
even the destination of a query or query response.
8.3 Further research and future issues
The MST prototype could be further enhanced to improve its eáciency and performance.
This section suggests two ways in which this might be accomplished, and points to two issues
which, although peculiar to distributed databases in general, have a particular implication
on our architecture and require further research. These issues include 1) the necessity
for novel query optimisation techniques to improve the performance of the prototype, and
2) the maintenance of security label information. Further work on enhancements to the
prototype could therefore proceed in these directions.
¯ A useful enhancement to the MST prototype would be the development of query opti-
misation techniques that consider the additional complexity inherent in MLS/DBMS
systems. This is of particular importance as the performance of the fragmentation
schemes, especially the element-level scheme, is in need of substantial improvement.
Innovative approaches to query optimisation are essential if the prototype is to achieve
acceptable performance and eáciency. The optimisation must take into account the
extra communication costs of moving data from site to site, as this is considerably
more complex in a non-replicated distributed DBMS network. Replicated and cen-
tralised DBMSs can exploit the advantages of locality of reference to improve the
speed of processing a request. The strength oÞered by relational expressions is at a
suáciently high level to make query optimisation feasible. This contrasts with non-
relational systems where user requests are low level and optimisation is done manually
by the user. Semantic query optimisation techniques, that specify constraints on the
database schema, used in combination with other optimisation techniques, could be
exploited.
¯ In the current architecture, security classißcations are stored alongside the data items,
thus requiring additional eÞort to suppress them in the response relation. This solu-
tion is sub-optimal and further work is required to 1) determine how labels could be
stored separately from data, and 2) decide how security labels can be associated with
their corresponding data without disclosure. The separate storage of classißcation in-
formation could introduce an additional performance overhead. In addition, the table
maintaining the security label information could become the target of attacks.Glossary
The purpose of this glossary is to explicitly deßne some of the terms that occur most fre-
quently in this thesis. It is not a comprehensive list of information security terminology.
The deßnitions were taken mainly from Information security: an integrated collection of es-
says [2], Computer security basics [72], Computer security [38], An introduction to database
systems [24], and Stargres release 3.2 [55, 56].
*-property A Bell-LaPadula security model rule allowing a subject write access to
an object only if the security level of the subject is dominated by the
security level of the object. Also known as the no write down (NWD)
rule.
A1 The Highest level of trust described in the Orange Book.
API Application program interface. System access point or library function
that has a well-deßned syntax and is accessible from application pro-
grams or user code to provide well-deßned functionality.
Arity The number of attributes in a relation(s).
Assurance A measure of conßdence that a system's security features have been
implemented and work properly. Assurance is one of the primary issues
addressed by the Orange Book.
Attribute Each column in the table contains the values for a specißc attribute of
the relation. A column name is known as an attribute.
Audit To record independently and later examine system activity (e.g., logins
and logouts, ßle accesses, security violations).
AUM Administrative utilities module. A module of the AUF that, in addi-
tion to performing syntax checks, provides a number of utilities for car-
rying out administrative tasks such as registering nodes, creating user
accounts, creating or dropping databases and tables, schema deßnition,
shutting down the server, and so forth.
110Authentication The process of proving that a subject (e.g., a user or a system) is what
it claims to be. It is a measure used to verify the eligibility of a subject
and the ability of that subject to access certain information.
Base Relation A named relation in permanent storage that is not a derived relation
(i.e., base relations are autonomous). In practice, base relations are
those relations that have been judged to be suáciently important (for
the database at hand) that the designer has decided it is worth giving
them a name and making them a direct part of the database Û as opposed
to other relations that are more ephemeral in nature, such as the result
of a query [24].
BLP Bell-LaPadula model. The computer security policy model on which the
Orange Book requirements are based. It is a formal description of the
allowable paths of information àow in a secure system. The goal of the
model is to identify allowable communication where it is important to
maintain secrecy.
Cardinality The number of tuples in a relation.
CCM Concurrency control manager. A module of the TMF; it is responsible for
making sure that transactions are executed separately and independently.
It does so by acquiring locks on appropriate pieces of data from the
locking table that is stored in memory.
CDB Coordinator database. The database that maintains the catalogs that
the Distributed server uses to keep track of objects within the cluster.
CDM Coordinator database module. A Distributed server module that is re-
sponsible for managing the CDB which maintains the catalogs that the
Distributed server uses to keep track of all the databases in the cluster.
Classißcation The hierarchical portion of a sensitivity label (the non-hierarchical por-
tion is called the Õcategory setÔ or the ÕcompartmentsÔ). A classißcation
is a single level in a stratißed set of levels. For example, in a military
environment, each of the levels UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SE-
CRET, and TOP SECRET is more trusted than the level beneath it.
Clearance A representation of the sensitivity level (the classißcation and the cate-
gories) associated with a user in a system supporting mandatory access
controls. A user with a particular clearance can typically access only
information with a sensitivity label equal to or lower than the user's
clearance.
111Conßdentiality The assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorised entities
or processes.
Covert Channel A communications channel not normally meant for information àow
but that could nevertheless be used by a process to signal information
in a way that violates a system's security policy.
COTS Commercial oÞ-the-shelf product. A combination of hardware, ßrmware,
and software that can be purchased commercially.
CQIM Client/Query interface module. A module of the AUF; it provides the
interface that facilitates the interaction between users and the DBMS. It
also imposes restrictions on the types of commands that can be executed
by non-administrative users.
DAC Discretionary Access Control. A means of restricting access to objects
based on the identity of users and/or groups to which they belong. DAC
is the most common type of access control mechanism found in trusted
systems.
Database An organised collection of logically related records or ßles.
DBA Database Administrator. The technical person responsible for imple-
menting and administering a database management system.
DBMS Database Management System. The collection of hardware and software
that organises, manages, and provides access to a database.
DDBS Distributed Database. A collection of multiple, logically interrelated
databases distributed over a computer network.
DDBMS Distributed Database Management System. The software system that
permits the management of the DDBS and makes the distribution trans-
parent to the users.
DDL Data Deßnition Language. A language used by database administrators
to create, store, and manage data in a database environment.
DML Data Manipulation Language. A language that allows users to inter-
rogate and access a computerised database system using English-like
statements.
DMP Data Manipulation Language Precompiler. A Distributed server module
that is responsible for compiling global DML statements.
112Domain A set of data values from which specißc attributes of specißc relations
draw their actual values, e.g., the domain of the age attribute might be
integers from 0 to 120.
DOPM Distributed query optimiser module. A Distributed server module that
is responsible for generating global query execution plans.
DQEM Distributed query execution engine. A Distributed server module that
provides the functions used for creating and updating relation fragments,
deleting databases, and transmitting sub-queries to local sites for pro-
cessing.
DQM Distributed query handler. A Distributed server module that is respon-
sible for performing syntax and verißcation checks on queries.
Element An indivisible item of data.
Ethernet A local area computer network designed on the principle that one com-
puter wishing to communicate with another, broadcasts onto the net-
work. Acknowledgement establishes the link.
Firewall The generic name for any security system protecting the boundary of an
internal computer network. A bastion host is a computer system with
strong security as it is exposed to the outside world.
GDC Global DDL compiler. A Distributed server module that is responsible
for compiling global DDL statements.
Instance A set of tuples in the database for a specißc relation at a specißc time.
Integrity A security principle that keeps information from being modißed or oth-
erwise corrupted either maliciously or accidentally. Integrity protects
against forgery or tampering. Synonymous with accuracy.
Kernelized Kernelized Architecture. A multilevel database is partitioned into single-
level databases, which are then stored separately. In this architecture,
there is a separate DBMS for each security class.
LMM Log manager module. A module of the TMF that is responsible for
logging every operation executed in the database. It does so by storing
the log on disk through the buÞer manager. The operations in the log
are stored as DBMS commands. Thus, in the case of a system crash,
executing every command in the log will bring back the database to its
last stable state.
113Login The process of identifying oneself to, and having one's identity authen-
ticated by, a computer system.
MAC Mandatory Access Control. Unlike discretionary access control (DAC),
which allows users to specify, at their own discretion, who can and cannot
share their ßles, mandatory access control puts all such access decisions
under the control of the system.
Metadata A special database, also referred to as a data dictionary, containing de-
scriptions of the elements, (e.g., relations, domains, entities, or relation-
ships) of a database.
MST Multilevel Stargres prototype. Our proposed multilevel secure database
management system.
Multilevel Used to describe data or devices. Multilevel security allows users at
diÞerent sensitivity levels to access a system concurrently. The system
permits each user to access only the data that he or she is authorized to
access. A multilevel device is one on which a number of diÞerent levels
of data can be processed.
mSQL Mini SQL. Open Source Database distribution.
MySQL Open Source Database distribution.
NSV Network server module. A module of the TMF facility that adds the
network communication element to Stargres. Queries destined for re-
mote nodes are routed to this module by the QRM module. It is also
responsible for opening and closing network connections.
Object From the Orange Book deßnition: ÕA passive entity that contains or
receives information. Access to an object potentially implies access to
information it contains. Examples of objects are records, ßelds, ßles, and
programs.Ô
OPM Query optimiser module. A module of the QPF; it is responsible for
optimizing queries. It does this by analyzing the processed query to see
if it can take advantage of any optimizations that will allow it to process
the query more quickly. It uses indexes whenever possible and uses the
most restrictive index in order to ßrst eliminate as many rows as possible
as soon as possible.
PC Personal Computer. A moderately priced microcomputer system in-
tended for personal use rather than commercial purposes.
114Polyinstantiate A technique used by the DBMS to prevent inference. It allows the
DBMS to contain multiple instances of the same data item, each one
having its own classißcation level. In other words, diÞerent tuples with
the same key can exist at diÞerent classißcation levels if for example a
high-classißed row already exists and a low-classißed user requests the
insertion of a new row having the same key [15].
Primary-Key A unique set of attribute(s) which identify an individual tuple in a rela-
tion.
QPF Query processor facility. A facility that is responsible for parsing and op-
timizing DML statements. It consists of the DMP module, the DDL com-
piler (DDC), the query parser (QPM), the query preprocessor (PPM),
the query optimiser (OPM), and the Query execution engine (QEM).
QPM Query parser module. A module of the QPF; it is responsible for parsing
queries.
Query To ask for information. To make a request or interrogate a database for
information.
QR Query Response. The answer(s) returned to a user by the database in
response to the user's query.
QRM Query router module. A module of the AUF that is responsible for direct-
ing DDL and DML queries to the appropriate pipelines for processing.
QTM Query transformer module. A Distributed server module that is respon-
sible for decomposing global queries against relations into sub-queries
against relation fragments.
RAM Remote access module. A Distributed server module; it uses information
stored about nodes by the CDM module during the registration of nodes,
and the creation of databases, tables, and user accounts to distribute
fragments to relevant nodes.
Reference Monitor From the Orange Book deßnition: ÕAn access control concept that
refers to an abstract machine that mediates all accesses to objects by
subjectsÔ.
Relation A set of values collected as information about something of interest to the
user. Each relation is represented by a table with a name (the relation
or table name).
115Response Time The time it takes the computer system to react to a given input, e.g., a
query. It is the interval between an event and the system's response to
the event.
RPC Remote Procedure Call. A client/server infrastructure that increases the
interoperability, portability, and àexibility of an application by allowing
an application to be distributed over multiple heterogeneous platforms.
It insulates the application developer from the details of the various
operating system and network interfaces.
Schema The deßnition of a table (i.e., its name and attribute names) is called
the schema.
Secrecy A security principle that keeps information from being disclosed to any-
one not authorized to access it. Synonymous with conßdentiality.
Security Freedom from risk or danger. Safety and the assurance of safety.
Security Domain A collection of nodes adhering to a particular security policy. A secu-
rity domain could have both trusted and untrusted nodes.
Security Kernel From the Orange Book deßnition: ÕThe hardware, ßrmware, and soft-
ware elements of a Trusted Computing Base that implement the refer-
ence monitor concept. It must mediate all accesses, be protected from
modißcation, and be verißable as correct.
Security Level A representation of the sensitivity of information, derived from a sensi-
tivity label (consisting of classißcation and categories).
Security Model A precise statement of the security rules of a system.
Security Policy From the Orange Book deßnition: ÕThe set of laws, rules, and practices
that regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes
sensitive informationÔ.
Simple security property A Bell-LaPadula security model rule allowing a subject read
access to an object only if the security level of the subject dominates the
security level of the object. Also known as the no read up (NRU) rule.
Snapshot A named derived relation. Like base relations, they are also relation
variables. However, a snapshot is real, not virtual Û i.e., it is represented
not only by its deßnition in terms of other named relations, but also (at
least conceptually) by its own separate data [24].
116SSN Social Security Number. A unique identißer used by the U.S. government
to identify its citizens. It consists of nine digits, commonly written as
three ßelds separated by hyphens: AAA-GG-SSSS. The ßrst three-digit
ßeld is called the Õarea numberÔ. The central, two-digit ßeld is called the
Õgroup numberÔ. The ßnal, four-digit ßeld is called the Õserial numberÔ.
SQL Structured Query Language. A database query language that was adopted
as an industry standard in 1986.
StarQL Stargres Query Language. The query language of the Stargres DBMS.
It is an extension of the standard SQL.
Subject From the Orange Book deßnition: ÕAn active entity, generally in the form
of a person, process, or device that causes information to àow among
objects or changes the system stateÔ.
System high The highest security level supported by a system at a particular time or
in a particular environment.
System low The lowest security level supported by a system at a particular time or
in a particular environment.
TFE Trusted Front-end. A front-end application that has been evaluated for
its adherence to the security policy and whose incorrect or malicious
execution is capable of violating system security policy.
Trap Door A concealed entry-point to software in a computer system that allows
normal system protection to be circumvented.
Trojan Horse An independent program (software) that appears to perform a useful
function while doing something else (usually destructive).
Trust Reliance on the ability of a system to meet its specißcations.
TCB Trusted Computing Base. The totality of protection mechanisms within
a computer system - including hardware, ßrmware and software - the
combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy.
TCSEC The Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Cri-
teria (or Orange Book). The document that describes the evaluation
criteria used to assess the level of trust that can be placed on a particu-
lar computer system.
TDI The Department of Defense Trusted Database Management System In-
terpretation (or Lavender Book). The document that interprets Orange
Book requirements for database management system products.
117TMF Transaction management facility. A facility that is responsible for en-
suring that a transaction is logged and executed atomically. It does so
with the aid of the concurrency control manager (CCM), the transaction
manager (TMM), and the log manager (LMM).
TMM Transaction manager module. A module of the TMF; it is responsible
for making sure that a transaction is logged and executed atomically. It
does so through the aid of the log manager and the concurrency control
manager.
TNIU Trusted Network Interface Unit. A trusted mediation device placed be-
tween each system and its network connection for the purpose of permit-
ting communication between machines belonging to the same security
level.
Trusted System A system designed and developed in accordance with Orange Book
criteria and evaluated according to those criteria.
Tuple Each row in the table contains the values for a member of the relation
set. A row is known as a tuple.
Uniprocessor A computer system with only one processor on its system board.
User A person or a process who accesses a computer system.
UFE Untrusted Front-end. A front-end application that has not been evalu-
ated or examined for adherence to the security policy. It may include
incorrect or malicious code that attempts to circumvent the security
mechanisms.
View A named derived relation that results from a relational query. Like
Snapshots and Base relations, they are also relation variables. Views
are also virtual Û they are represented within the system solely by their
deßnitions in terms of other named relations [24].
VPN Virtual Private Network. A secure connection between gateways in two
subnets that are not directly connected. All traác between the subnets
occurs through the gateways where cryptographic protection is added to
extend the security perimeter.
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Database Structure
The following relation schema represents the structure of two relations from the Hospital
database. Figure A.1 shows a subset of the Department relation, Figure A.2 shows a subset
of the Nurse relation, and a subset of the Patient relation is shown in Figure A.3.
¯ Department(DN, Dept_Name, Manpower, Dept_Location, Manager)
¯ Nurse(N_SSN, N_Name, N_DOB, N_DOR, N_Salary, N_Specialty, N_Pager, DN, Manager)
¯ Patient(P_SSN, P_Name, P_DOB, P_Status, P_Tel., INS_Name, PHY_Name, EC_Name, Patient #)
DN Dept_Name Manpower Dept_Location Manager
D10 Records 43 241 East Annex Cantor
D11 Obstetrics 13 601 Main Building Baker
D12 Laboratory 8 202 Drew Building Ebert
D13 Geriatrics 12 B16 Basement Xavier
D14 Paediatrics 23 512 West Wing Gerald
D16 Ambulance 12 Emmergency Wing Leach
D17 Cathering 9 Kitchen Sachs
D18 Radiology 4 409 Drew Building Kain
D19 Tertiary Care 11 121 South Wing Usher
D21 Orthopaedics 9 714 South Wing Zalkin
D22 Neurology 17 305 Outpatient Wing Beaver
D23 ICU 24 513 West Wing Hagger
D25 Pharmacology 10 216 East Annex Carter
D26 Pathology 7 234 West Wing Marshall
D28 Supplies 6 B23 Basement Richards
D29 Management 4 120 Main Building Patterson
Figure A.1: The Department relation.
119N_SSN N_Name N_DOB N_DOR N_Salary N_Specialty N_Pager DN Manager
200000 Abbott 110466 170788 23,000 Surgical 224 165 D11 Cantor
200050 Allen 240371 260793 19,000 Gerontology 321 675 D13 Xavier
200100 Ball 090562 250785 20,000 Midwifery 641 876 D11 Cantor
200150 Barclay 210474 230797 17,000 Psychiatry 986 521 D22 Beaver
200200 Chapman 090171 120795 16,900 Paediatrics 571 443 D14 Gerald
200250 Cheadle 230575 250798 16,600 Surgical 876 453 D22 Beaver
200300 Darby 250961 160785 21,000 Perinatal 721 887 D11 Baker
200350 Dorman 040668 220791 20,000 Child 443 654 D23 Hagger
200400 Evans 231269 280795 19,000 Gerontology 551 232 D13 Xavier
200450 Earl 290955 160778 26,000 Adult 896 467 D21 Zalkin
200500 Flutter 160461 150783 22,800 Perinatal 756 498 D14 Gerald
200550 Forster 201170 120793 21,000 Surgical 692 441 D13 Xavier
200600 Glover 041074 270798 23,500 Adult 521 886 D14 Gerald
200650 Gray 160875 180799 21,800 Perinatal 821 490 D11 Baker
200700 Hatcher 271065 210788 24,600 Psychiatry 941 724 D22 Beaver
200750 Heaton 230859 240783 30,580 Gerontology 578 452 D13 Xavier
200800 Hurst 061076 200799 21,341 Midwifery 790 442 D11 Baker
200850 Jenkins 020568 120793 23,670 Paediatrics 674 251 D14 Gerald
200900 Jervis 140973 190796 24,656 Geriatrics 322 890 D19 Usher
200950 Jessop 281072 110795 23,510 Surgical 983 221 D23 Hagger
201000 Kemp 131276 280798 24,970 Adult 452 775 D14 Gerald
201050 Knight 210677 220700 20,360 Perinatal 674 218 D11 Baker
201100 Lucas 260758 260784 32,000 Surgical 540 328 D13 Xavier
201150 Ludgate 080568 220790 24,800 Child 674 543 D23 Hagger
201200 Malcolm 061071 140793 21,723 Gerontology 353 769 D13 Xavier
201250 Mason 130173 260796 22,920 Adult 253 762 D21 Zalkin
201300 Neaves 160857 300779 33,200 Midwifery 663 741 D11 Baker
201350 Newman 041271 170794 22,700 Psychiatry 287 441 D22 Beaver
201400 Oscar 060475 220798 21,200 Perinatal 531 442 D11 Baker
201450 Oudes 230975 260798 22,100 Paediatrics 965 432 D14 Gerald
201500 Peace 221073 120795 22,000 Surgical 471 663 D23 Hagger
201550 Petrie 070564 230787 31,000 Geriatrics 421 875 D19 Usher
201600 Reuter 200771 180793 24,350 Adult 854 331 D14 Gerald
201650 Russell 120973 250795 23,800 Child 247 890 D23 Hagger
201700 Scales 191270 140793 23,900 Midwifery 421 776 D11 Baker
201750 Speller 130877 120798 22,000 Surgical 993 567 D23 Hagger
201800 Staples 220269 170793 21,788 Psychiatry 651 774 D22 Beaver
201850 Swanton 010775 120797 18,922 Child 531 442 D23 Hagger
201900 Tam 200181 220701 16,300 Child 661 476 D23 Hagger
201950 Tardif 220768 140790 27,600 Geriatrics 552 659 D19 Usher
202000 Taylor 100377 210799 21,677 Gerontology 542 774 D13 Xavier
202050 Turpin 241070 260792 24,344 Adult 471 922 D14 Gerald
202100 Vallis 140674 270796 21,300 Psychiatry 367 884 D22 Beaver
202150 Veitch 110674 120796 22,100 Perinatal 422 7791 D11 Baker
202200 Vernon 181072 160794 23,838 Paediatrics 472 1562 D14 Gerald
202250 Viner 080665 120787 30,700 Perinatal 674 228 D11 Baker
202300 Walker 110972 230795 23,650 Surgical 571 224 D23 Hagger
202350 Weaver 240363 170785 27,500 Gerontology 641 833 D13 Xavier
202400 Watson 110577 280799 22,150 Geriatrics 431 688 D19 Usher
202450 Waugh 310873 200795 22,200 Child 598 331 D23 Hagger
Figure A.2: The Nurse relation.
120P_SSN P_Name P_DOB P_Status P_Tel. INS_Name PHY_Name EC_Name Patient #
100000 Aaron 120955 Outpatient 453 6645 BlueCross Piper Bolwell 124
100050 Baker 240351 Inpatient 324 8030 Geico Stanley Hussey 133
100100 Cantor 210265 Outpatient 463 6211 CareFirst Albert Lewis 212
100150 Davies 090552 Inpatient 393 2222 Humana Farah West 214
100200 Earl 160961 Outpatient 727 3323 Kaiser Duncan Dickson 109
100250 Fagin 271153 Inpatient 832 4357 Cigna Archer Butler 173
100300 Garrod 210464 Inpatient 442 4320 Aetna Wood Lloyd 663
100350 Hall 240360 Outpatient 442 9200 CapitalCare Wolfgang Ford 256
100400 Ian 010755 Inpatient 332 2630 PrimeHealth Brown Fraser 389
100450 James 131066 Inpatient 736 1775 Trigon Higgins Andrews 765
100500 Kain 230848 Outpatient 842 7621 Concordia Vinall Angus 932
100550 Laws 050150 Inpatient 338 2969 Potomac Piper Duncan 512
100600 Martin 120857 Outpatient 232 2232 AlliedHealth Booker Beasley 902
100650 Nash 280363 Inpatient 244 0800 Metropolitan Weaver Davies 767
100700 Oakley 041268 Outpatient 362 6120 Prudential Booth Morris 550
100750 Parker 180464 Inpatient 363 5803 Providence Collins Rider 700
100800 Qassem 291267 Inpatient 291 9341 Humana Conolly Bright 212
100850 Ratner 230253 Outpatient 723 6670 Concordia Fletcher Crane 908
100900 Sachs 020959 Inpatient 635 6563 Potomac Rahman Crompton 113
100950 Taylor 221148 Inpatient 398 5101 Metropolitan Freeman Wilson 141
101000 Usher 180456 Outpatient 724 9702 Trigon Gunn Gates 155
101050 Valdez 170365 Inpatient 582 6360 PrimeHealth Sumter Gardner 673
101100 Walker 111063 Outpatient 889 9745 Kaiser Pierce Hancock 326
101150 Xavier 290860 Inpatient 562 1188 Cigna Johnson Gould 182
101200 Yates 170951 Inpatient 234 1723 BlueCross Huskins Field 258
101250 Zalkin 081260 Outpatient 872 9200 Geico Foster Neville 193
101300 Able 300152 Inpatient 363 8060 Kaiser Keenan Blackwell 284
101350 Beaver 140363 Outpatient 466 4270 Potomac Warren Hughes 337
101400 Ceasar 170956 Inpatient 984 1800 Humana Abbott Harvey 792
101450 Dean 230448 Inpatient 652 9188 Metropolitan Warwick Potter 375
101500 Ebert 140658 Outpatient 547 2355 Concordia Walker Green 161
101550 Feeney 121061 Inpatient 466 8312 Prudential Clark Allen 982
101600 Gerald 160357 Outpatient 383 7451 AlliedHealth Preston Nash 158
101650 Henry 180960 Inpatient 331 7100 BlueCross Lawrence Ince 210
101700 Ingram 030262 Inpatient 328 9449 Humana Wesley Wood 112
101750 Jessup 090964 Outpatient 628 2209 Cigna Weiss Alderton 637
101800 Kerry 130667 Inpatient 237 1788 Geico CliÞord Scott 818
101850 Leach 050565 Inpatient 635 5299 Potomac Sutton Cox 166
101900 Meadow 040360 Inpatient 828 4908 Trigon Gupta Gibbons 222
101950 Nelson 131252 Outpatient 955 9600 Concordia Peters Hall 313
102000 Oberst 201161 Inpatient 835 2041 CapitalCare Shepperd Fowler 111
102050 Peters 010858 Outpatient 508 6059 PrimeHealth Schneider Wright 180
102100 Quaye 260554 Inpatient 622 1904 Geico Bruce Roper 397
102150 Reaves 080750 Outpatient 554 8489 Metropolitan Yates Turner 788
102200 Scales 171251 Inpatient 289 9838 BlueCross Mercer Hamilton 285
102250 Temple 031259 Inpatient 829 4458 Kaiser Fulford Drake 135
102300 Ullman 021048 Outpatient 635 7025 Humana Rosenthal Carter 266
102350 Verdi 250961 Inpatient 965 0675 Providence Brendan Sullivan 377
102400 Wells 161163 Inpatient 463 0950 Trigon Rothman Facey 381
102450 Xhing 281258 Outpatient 546 3311 Aetna Grián Murphy 214
Figure A.3: A subset of the Patient relation.
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Lattice Routine Algorithm
Require: List of elements of type LABEL
Ensure: List of elements constitute a lattice
LABEL Element[64], SystemHigh, SystemLow, SecurityLabel, Res;
INT IsIndex = 0, MaxElem = 0, ArrayIndex = 0, track = 0, count = 0;
BOOL boolDominate[64][64]= FALSE, ArrayDominate[64] = FALSE, ArrayDominant[64] = FALSE;
while SecurityLabel 6= `.' do
Input SecurityLabel
Element[ArrayIndex] = SecurityLabel; MaxElem++; ArrayIndex++;
end while
for (ArrayIndex = 0; Arrayindex < MaxElem; Arrayindex++) do
boolDominate[ArrayIndex][ArrayIndex] = TRUE;
end for
for (ArrayIndex = 0; ArrayIndex < MaxElem; ArrayIndex++) do
for (IsIndex = 0; IsIndex < MaxElem; IsIndex++ ) do
Output Does Element[ArrayIndex] Dominates Element[IsIndex]
Input Res;
if (Res = ÕYesÔ) then
boolDominate[ArrayIndex][IsIndex] = TRUE;
end if
end for
end for
for (ArrayIndex = 0; Arrayindex < MaxElem; ArrayIndex++ ) do
for (IsIndex = Arrayindex + 1; IsIndex < MaxElem; IsIndex++ ) do
for (m = 0; m < MaxElem; m++) do
if (boolDominate[ArrayIndex][m] = TRUE and boolDominate[IsIndex][m] = TRUE)
then
122ArrayDominate[m] = TRUE;
end if
if (boolDominate[m][ArrayIndex] = TRUE and boolDominate[m][IsIndex] = TRUE)
then
ArrayDominant[m] = TRUE;
end if
end for
if (TRUE = 2 ArrayDominate[0..MaxElem] or TRUE = 2 ArrayDominant[0..MaxElem])
then
Failure: This set of labels is not a security lattice; STOP
end if
for (i = 0; i < MaxElem; i++) do
for (j = i + 1; j < MaxElem; j++) do
if (ArrayDominate[i] = TRUE and ArrayDominate[j] = TRUE) then
if (boolDominate[i][j] = TRUE) then
ArrayDominate[j] = FALSE;
else if (boolDominate[j][i] = TRUE) then
ArrayDominate[i] = FALSE;
end if
end if
if (ArrayDominant[i] = TRUE and ArrayDominant[j] = TRUE) then
if (boolDominate[i][j] = TRUE) then
ArrayDominant[i] = FALSE;
else if (boolDominant[j][i] = TRUE) then
ArrayDominant[j] = FALSE;
end if
end if
end for
end for
for (num = 0; num < MaxElem; num++) do
if (ArrayDominate[num] = TRUE) then
count++;
end if
if (ArrayDominant[num] = TRUE) then
track++;
end if
end for
if (count 6= 1 or track 6= 1) then
123Failure: This set of labels is not a security lattice; STOP
end if
ArrayDominate[0..MaxElem] = FALSE; ArrayDominant[0..MaxElem] = FALSE;
track = 0; count = 0;
end for
end for
Success: This set of labels forms a lattice
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